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ABSTRACT
It is commonplace to expect that individuals and organized groups in the political 
domain will be confronted with two main obligations: 1. To take a principled stance 
towards each other by virtue of co-existing in such a domain, and 2. To take a 
principled stance towards the state in that domain, and vice versa. One of the most 
prominent principled stances that individuals and groups make to each other and to the 
state, and vice versa, is that of political civility. All the operative political entities within 
the political domain are expected to show a sufficient amount of respect towards each 
other.
The literature on political theory has overwhelming held the position that political 
civility matters to individuals and the state for instrumental reasons, namely that civil 
relations promote well-ordered societies in which such values as freedom, equality, 
peace, justice, self-determination, communal decision-making, economic prosperity and 
the like are realized. Civil relations do this by facilitating harmonious deliberation 
within the polity that enables the achievement of such goals as effective consultation, 
problem-sharing and solving, rights-protection, community welfare, and the effective 
exercise of the rule of law. This process of civility is most prevalent within the political 
theories of liberalism, republicanism and the recent work done on the notion of 
deliberative democracy. Liberalism values civic unity on the basis that it protects 
individuality; republicans and deliberative democracy theorists on the basis that it 
harmonizes areas of conflict in a pluralistic world so as to produce outcomes consistent 
with the common or public good. The former tends to favour institutional mechanisms 
based on rights and the rule of law as a way of protecting the interests of individuals, 
whereas the latter views favour mechanisms involving dialogical engagement to achieve 
such a goal and the goal of maintain common goods.
This thesis asks whether the procedural operation of civil relations is sufficient in 
meeting our normative expectations about the role of the state and its relation to the
citizenry. In particular, I will assess the nature of liberalism’s commitment to the rights 
of individuals and the contractual relation that exist between individuals and the state. I 
will also assess the type of civil and procedural relations that lie at the core of 
republicanism. Republicanism, and the spirit of deliberative democracy theory, places 
great faith in the idea that dialogical or deliberative engagement between individuals 
and the state will produce outcomes that serve the interests of all. I express scepticism 
in relation to this process and its intended outcomes. Specifically, I hold that we need to 
monitor whether the operation of deliberative procedures sufficiently caters for 
outcomes that protect the essential interests of all citizens. Firstly, I present the view 
that we can have serious doubts about the extent to which our faith in civil relations as a 
determinant of just outcomes is justified. Secondly, in response to this concern, I 
present an argument for why the protection and enhancement of essential interests 
should be accepted as a principled stance, along with political civility, that, at the very 
least, the state ought to take towards its citizens. I offer an account of ideal preference 
utilitarianism as a way of comprehending what our essential interests are. This view 
stipulates, on the one hand, that no outcomes ought to prevail in a society that are 
detrimental to an individual’s basic biological welfare, a form of welfare essential for 
the performance of preference expression, and, on the other hand, that there are states of 
being that are of intrinsic disvalue for sentient beings. These are what I take to be the 
essential interests that we all share.
Furthermore, I argue that utilitarian essential interests can be formulated in such a way 
that they can effectively become a feasible goal for the state to pursue. I offer this 
argument in the light of views, held by some, that utilitarianism cannot adequately 
provide a fair distribution of human needs. One way of protecting such needs using a 
utilitarian reference point is in the area of public service on the part of policy-makers. 
Under this notion, state policy making officials are justified, I argue, in promoting and 
implementing a concern for essential interests in their institutional practices. I include in 
this group of officials a certain category of public servants and judges, and I argue that 
conscience utilitarianism can guide public service policy formation and act as a 
constraint on the exercise of judicial decision-making. Our understanding of the 
normative principles that ought to underpin political society will be extended to include,
on the part of the state at least, professional principles that are in line with conscientious 
deliberation.
In conclusion, I draw out the extent to which this thesis extends our understanding of 
the state-citizen relationship as it has been traditionally presented by such political 
theorists as liberals and republicans. Citizens as members of a polity, and not merely as 
parties to a social contract or as functionaries in a symbiotic relation with sectional 
interests in a republic, are entitled, I hold, to be served by a state that is sufficiently 
geared to protect their essential interests. The idea of the state as an institution that can 
play a discerning role in this fashion is not established in the political theories I have 
mentioned here. This thesis does not deny the importance of such theories as they exist 
as contributions in political analysis, but it does present a new way of thinking about the 
role of the state and its obligations to citizens.
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1. APPLICATIONS OF CIVILITY
This thesis looks at the nature of an obligation that exists between citizens and the state. 
Traditionally, I argue, the nature of this obligation has been minimal. A substantial part 
of this minimal obligation between citizens and the state is that each ought to exemplify 
political civility to the other. In this chapter I set out a characterization of civility in 
general, pointing out its overall function as norm of human behaviour. Civility will be 
seen here as a behavioural norm limited in application to those capable of taking 
rational and voluntary action, and will be expected to have universal appeal to this 
category. I look at how this universality requirement implicates civility as a concept 
inextricably linked with the concept of justice, and how this fact constitutes a 
precondition for the existence of a moral community. These general features of civility 
assist in producing, in practical terms at the very least, a sufficient amount of social 
cohesion within diverse social networks.
I then move on to narrow the focus by looking at political civility in particular. The 
effectiveness of common civility as an aid to social cohesion overlaps into the political 
domain. Political associations and interactions are served well by civil behaviour 
between agents. The reason why such civility in the political realm ought to be adopted 
by all those who participate in it is that, by so doing, all will be able to protect their own 
self-interest commensurate with others doing the same. I show that the best way of 
protecting one’s own self-interest in a political context, whether one is an individual, 
association or the state, is by conforming to certain norms of rationality that facilitate a 
communicative process of civil and deliberative engagement.
1.1 A Characterization
Civility is a conception of human behaviour concerning the appropriate relations 
between people. It exemplifies the behavioural practices required for amenable 
relations. Civil behaviour is necessarily a positive form of human interaction in that it
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inherently seeks harmony between persons. It is similar in this respect to such 
conceptions of behaviour as courtesy, politeness, patience, tolerance, tactfulness and 
punctuality. All of these are underpinned by a basic respect for others and the need for 
well-ordered interactions between people. Courtesy is a pervasive aspect of civil 
behaviour, and it reflects the moral respect for persons. Examples of civility as courtesy 
are many. I am civil to others when I apologize for bumping into them at the 
supermarket; when I refrain from taking food from the fridge that is not mine; when I 
ask for my neighbour’s permission to retrieve my football from their backyard; when I 
approvingly acknowledge the arrival of someone I have invited to my place; when I 
inform a friend that my plans have changed and I cannot meet her at the arranged time; 
when I remain silent and let someone speak whose turn it is to speak; etc. But there is 
an understanding of civility where it doesn’t sound correct to call it courtesy. Take a 
case where I politely censor someone for butting into a group discussion out of turn, or 1 
do the same to someone whom I spot littering. I would want to call these cases of 
civility but I do not consider them instances of courtesy. What makes them civil is that 
they are forms of censorship that do not offend, or are not intended to offend, the people 
who are breaking the norms. In this sense we might say that civility implies 
graciousness.
Civility relates to behavioural practices in both private and public domains. In the 
private domain of civility, I may be polite to my brothers and sisters, aunts and uncles, 
and to others who share in close personal relations with me. A behavioural norm such as 
this binds the identity of a social unit and makes an institution such as the family more 
grounded. The norm is also used to bind other social institutions such as friendships, 
recreational and workplace associations, and the like. The reasons why people join 
together in their private lives with others is done on a basis where there can be a 
multitude of causal factors—both intentional and unintentional. But what solidifies such 
bonds, no matter what their origins, will be the norms of civility.
Yet civility also applies in a public domain; it can involve respectful social behaviour 
between persons when those persons are distanced from each other in a particular way. 
For example, I am civil to others when I respect the social rules associated with
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queuing. Or when I follow social conventions such as cleaning up after myself after 
eating a meal in a public place, or refraining from making loud objections when I miss a 
bus due to circumstances of my own creation. Such norms of social behaviour are 
tacitly accepted by members of the same social community. Civility here only applies to 
relations between persons as they exist at a civic level —at a level of engagement with 
each other for the sake of social solidarity; specifically where such solidarity is not 
secured by any personal involvement between persons.
The motivations to behaving civilly can be varied. It is enough to say that I am being 
polite, say out of a sense of obligation to family members or out of sincere affection for 
them. It is enough to show politeness to strangers in public due to habit, on the one 
hand, or a deep respect for cultural norms on the other. The norms of civility tolerate 
motivational-diversity in this sense; even though the motivations for civil action may 
vary greatly it is only the social cohesion of the outcome that is of concern regarding the 
maintenance of a civil environment. There is a sense however in which we can say that 
forms of habitual behaviour of this kind are quasi-intentional. I may wait patiently for 
someone who is blocking my way because this is the way I have been taught to behave 
in such a context. However, even though I may act out of no direct respect for those in 
difficulty, it seems plausible to say that I have retained the habit of treating these people 
the way I do, in these circumstances, due to a tacit notion of respect. If I really did not 
respect others this would override my habitual behaviour and see a change in my 
response to this scenario. In this sense my actions here are performed with a degree of 
respect that is implied by the fact that I retain this type of habitual behaviour. No matter 
what the motivation, however, it is expected that civility in a community will reflect 
positively on those bound to it and to those who are treated with such respect. On this 
point all will be expected to agree. Civil action is intended to lessen any fears held 
about the need to share public space with others, and to act as a foundation for 
interacting with others in a way that enhances a sense of security for all.
We can understand a general definition of civility better if we consider a definition of 
its opposite —incivility. Uncivil behaviour tends to be detrimental to ordered social 
functioning. Uncivil behaviour violates community norms. It is behaviour that produces
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a negative response between persons in the public domain. Disrespect to others here 
amounts to treating them as beings who are unworthy of due acknowledgement and 
consideration.
A barbaric society, for example, is one that is not governed by the norms of respect 
between strangers and friends alike. The way we consider and treat each other in such a 
society is left to the contingencies of brute force rather than the norms of standardised 
behaviour. Barbarism is constituted at the core by an absence of standardised, rule- 
governed engagement; a state of being that makes cruelty and humiliation more likely. 
A society that is barbaric is normally one that uses the existence of unfettered power to 
treat others inhumanely. Less extreme examples of incivility are found with cases of 
rudeness. Rude behaviour can be performed in either a rule or non-rule governed way. I 
can know the norms of civility and deliberately violate them, or I can violate the norms 
of civility unintentionally by being apathetic towards the normative force of such rules. 
In either sense, rudeness inherently implies offence and disrespect towards others. It is 
inherently a violation of everyone’s expectation that others will relate to me from a 
stance of predictable respect. Rudeness violates this expectation and hence violates a 
sense of security for the individual in the way she/he relates to others. This is what the 
act of rudeness does in itself; it is another dimension to the act of rudeness as to the 
specific harm it does to another by insulting them.
1.2 Civility as a Social Norm.
It is important to add to the characterization an understanding of the way in which 
civility operates as norm within a social context at the public level. Social rules, for 
instance, are constraints that make one set of options more appropriate to conform to 
than others. The rule is the guideline that makes the option appropriate. For example, 
the social rule that one ought to wait patiently whilst queuing, and not push in out of 
turn, operates so as to avoid and sanction the disorder created by que-jumping 
behaviour.
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Civility is a social rule that exists in a way that is distinct from such other kinds of rules, 
say, for example, procedural rules such as the rules of evidence. The latter are codified 
within the institution of law with clear institutional guidelines about their nature and 
application; each participant in the legal process knows when they have been satisfied 
and knows the sanctions that will result if they are not met. However, civility is a rule or 
norm in a more informal sense. The rules of civility are not codified or implemented at 
an institutional level, rather they exist informally in the social domain. By this I mean 
they are more culturally acquired expectations about behaviour that are learned by the 
participants in a specific society.
Even though civility is an informal social norm learned in a cultural context rather than 
an institutional one, it is still bound by certain requirements. One is that the norm of 
civility and the practices of civil behaviour need to be spread equally throughout 
society. Civility, in other words, is expected to have universal appeal and application. 
Civility is a non-compartmentalized social practice of respect. For example, civility is a 
gender-neutral notion. We do not hold that civil behaviour such as caring and respect 
should be a task unique to females or males. Nor does civility operate within the 
principle of a division of labour. Civility is not to be tendered out into the professions, 
say, of nursing, social work, religious ministries, etc. We do not expect that only some 
are obligated to be civil and others not. All are expected to conform to the cultural 
expectation of civility.
Civility as a social norm, however, can be open-ended in the following sense. What we 
take to be civil action can change over time. Opening doors for women was once 
considered to be a civil form of action —an action expected of men in relation to women 
even when both were unknown to each other. The civility of the action could be 
explained in terms of males reinforcing the welfare of the social order by emphasising 
the importance of women to its survival and reproduction. Although such an 
explanation could be more critically assessed, it is one that could be upheld in a civil 
society tied by paternalistic bonds. But civility as a social norm in this sense is no 
longer applicable. Changes in our perceptions of women and their role in society have 
altered the suitability of this norm of civility in modem, western society.
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But it should be noted that civility and universalisation connect in a unique way. We do 
not expect every individual of society to exhibit the norm of civility; instead the norm is 
only expected of those who possess minimal rational autonomy. We are not expected to 
be civil towards those who do not fit into this category. We are not expected to be civil 
towards trees and rocks, for example. But this does not mean that civility only makes 
sense in the relations between fully rational agents. An adult is expected to be civil to an 
infant but we don’t expect an infant to be civil until she/he is taught the necessary 
norms. Civility need not overtly happen within reciprocal relations between rational 
agents. However, the institutions of civility itself will make sense to rational agents on 
the basis of producing reciprocal benefits for all. Each of us is culturally programmed to 
sanction such behaviour should it occur. In giving praise for the performance of civil 
action a minimal sense of rational autonomy is assumed. We approve of the diligent 
ordering of emotions when we identify and praise the practice of civility, and use of an 
appropriate method of censorship when we see its norms being violated by those who 
are rationally capable of following its guide. We praise, in other words, the correct 
rationing up of the world when civility is exercised, and show disapprobation when the 
infringement of the norms of civility are transgressed.
Civility in other words has its rewards. The rewards of civility are those of being 
thought well of by your peers and receiving from them, in return, civil behaviour or 
respect. This makes life more pleasant. I know that I will not be censured by others if I 
hold them up due to an accident. Here I will receive empathetic and gracious treatment 
if others are disposed to act with civility. This gives a security not only that I will be 
treated appropriately by others in this sense, but also that others are so disposed to think 
in this way across the board. Civil action enhances publicly responsible thinking and 
behaviour. It helps to create and maintain a public consciousness.
The richness of civility is found in that it is expected to be a voluntary action. We do 
not talk of people being coerced to be civil. Civility is meant to spring from a generous 
disposition and enacted spontaneously. Civility and justice come together when we see 
that the more admirable cases of civility will be those where the voluntary actions of
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respect for others is motivated by a desire to reinforce the social bonds that weave the 
fabric of a community together. This is the ideal at least. However, those who do not 
adhere to the civility norms may have to be disciplined by others so as to redirect their 
behaviour away from the uncivil and towards the civil.
Civil action will also have the effect of demarcating the boundaries of social identity. 
By being civil or respectful towards others we are assuming that the instantiation of 
civil action reaffirms the identity of both parties in a community of shared values and 
expectations. There is the assumption that both parties to the civil action are aware of 
this and that the instance of civility experienced strengthens the likelihood that the norm 
will continue within that society. It is expected that the act of civility will occur again 
either between the agents concerned, or between either of the agents and other members 
of the society similarly placed. Civility then will assume a strong sense of solidarity and 
continuity within a society. However, having said this, the expectation of civil action to 
others will cut across societal and national boundaries. We are also expected to treat 
those of different national origins outside our national boundaries with due civility.
1.3 Civility as a Moral Norm.
Civility is a concept and dimension of character or action trait that is inextricably linked 
with certain moral constraints. It captures a sense of the way in which all people ought 
or deserve to be treated. Civility, in other words, exists as a moral norm. Moral norms 
of behaviour are not necessarily constructed on the basis of what it is socially prudent to 
do, although a moral norm could be constructed in this way. Rather, a moral norm can 
be constructed on the basis of what we ought to do where this is determined by what is, 
in a normative sense, the right action to perform in relation to persons. For example, the 
sanctions against incivility must be proportionate to the offending transgression. It is a 
requirement of justice that disapprobation will be proportionate to the civility norms 
themselves. It would be counterproductive for there to be heavy and disproportionate 
penalties for being uncivil. A short, sharp and public rebuke to someone who is 
violating a civil norm should be enough to shame that person and remind them, and
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those who witness it, of the importance of obedience to the social norm. For example, 
speaking out of turn at a public meeting will be a civility violation deserving of such a 
penalty. It would be inappropriate to rebuke such a violation of civility with acts of 
physical violence.
Also, we expect that civil action is only properly exercised when it is directed at 
morally salient outcomes. Being civil, for example, to the innocent victims of one’s 
crimes is not a proper instantiation of civility. Likewise, civility would not be 
appropriately instantiated if we showed civility towards people we were deceiving. 
Deception is inherently uncivil. Deceiving someone violates the status of others as 
autonomous entities. Deception of the innocent may produce good outcomes for people 
but its existence violates the value of civility. The wrongness of corruption for example 
is found in its inherent incivility. It involves a misappropriation of resources; it involves 
unfair distributions in the sense that they result from a non-inclusive and non- 
informative decision procedure. Corruption bases the distribution of resources on means 
that are unaccountable. Accountability is an essential feature of civility. A corrupt 
society may do better than an uncorrupt society in producing a greater equality of 
resources for all, but it will be uncivil because it denies to people the right to be treated 
as autonomous citizens. However, it should be noted that the wrongness of corruption is 
not captured totally in the sense of its being uncivil. The lack of respect that corruption 
portrays needs to be seen also in conjunction with other serious factors as the violation 
of trust and the sense of indignance that acts of corruption generate.
Civility seeks justice also in the sense that it is directed towards moderation and 
tolerance. People deserve a fair hearing and should be free from a social environment in 
which they are pressed or hounded for responses or answers, or mocked and humiliated 
for holding the views that they do. This is not to say that a civil society will not be a 
critical society. Each, as we will see later in this chapter, is expected to subject their 
views to scrutiny, but the views they hold themselves deserve a prima facie level of 
respect. Toleration in a civil society is not based on scepticism nor fear of disorder, but 
rather out of a respect for the views of others.
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Civility, as we have seen, can be a social trait that has prudential value for the self- 
interest of rational agents. The motivation to civility can be generated by the payback 
that one expects by being respectful to others. The deal is that if I pay due respect to the 
interest of others they will, in turn, pay the same respect to me. But civility as a moral 
norm can take on a different guise. Take, for example, the conceptual bond between 
civility and justice found in the notion of civil disobedience. Legitimate or civil 
disobedience honours justice in the sense that it inherently respects persons and social 
continuity. Legitimately violating the obligation to obey the law is carried out only 
under certain conditions—conditions that uphold the framework of civil life. Firstly, the 
disobedience has to be justifiable on grounds that all in the community can take to be 
reasonable. Examples of such grounds are the following. Those performing civil 
disobedience may seek to jolt a majority in a society from their apathy or ignorance of 
certain facts that we would expect them to have if they were to make informed political 
decisions. For example, activists who raid chicken farms and take pictures of mistreated 
stock justify their violation of the law on the basis of informing others of the realities of 
factory farming. The assumption is that the unnecessary suffering of animals would be 
seen as immoral to any reasonable person. In this sense, the civility of disobedience is 
found in that it promotes and respects rational autonomy. It seeks to ‘inform a 
misguided majority’. But civil disobedience can also be performed not on the basis of 
informing misguided majorities, but on the basis of informing misguided minorities, say 
elected representatives, of what in fact majority opinion is on a matter. If activists have 
good reasons for believing that a government does not recognize the wishes of the 
majority on a certain matter, then it is justified in disobeying the law.
However, the general point is that disobedience is justified in the cases above on the 
basis that there exists in these cases reasons that would be supported, rationally 
speaking, by the welfare of the majority. Violation of the law, in these instances, will 
not damage the civil norm of ‘respect for the law’ because of the amount of support 
behind it. The act of disobedience is necessarily public. The perpetrators commit the act 
with the intention of getting caught and claiming responsibility. There is no intention to 
cheat the law, as it were. This means that the level of disobedience cannot be violent. 
Disobedience that harms others violates community standards of respect for the person.
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It also violates the effectiveness of the act of disobedience as a reference point in future 
dialogical engagement between citizens. Disobedience performed in the name of 
‘civility’ is not effective if reference to it evinces views of distaste and disapprobation 
by the public due to its use of excessive violence. In order to be an act of civility, 
disobedience needs to be moderated to such an extent so as to make the act itself worthy 
of public comment and deliberation.
These points have implications when it comes to the issue of sentencing civil 
disobedients? Cohen writes that punishment is based on three principles: deterrence, 
reform and retribution1. The state punishes convicted citizens on the basis of using their 
punishment as a disincentive to others to commit the same crime, to assist the criminal 
in becoming aware of the harm done to her/his victims and to maintain social security 
for all; and to re-educate the offenders so as to reintegrate them into society. There is 
also a sense in which sentencing ought to count as a symbolic reaction by the state to 
the wrongness of the transgression itself. Yet, in the case of disobedience where the 
transgression of the law is based on civil motivations, there is no clear evidence that 
deterrence, reform and retribution is required. The impact of punishment on civil 
disobedients in terms of their freedom and status should be minimal. As Cohen writes, 
“ ...if the ultimate object of the law is to encourage citizens to build a peaceful and 
harmonious society in which one’s fellows are respected and principles of justice 
manifested, there is no need to punish...civil disobedients severely. ” 2 For the reasons 
just stated, we can conclude that there are good reasons for holding that the state is 
obliged to respond to instances of civil disobedience in a civil way themselves. The 
state contributes to the harmony of social order and public values if it recognises its 
moral obligation not to inflict harsh punishments on civil disobedients. The fact that a 
law is broken with civil intent should be a mitigating factor when it comes to the 
sentencing of such “crimes”. It should be seen as an opportunity by the state to honour 
the morally disobedient. We can at least say that civility requires us to ensure that 
judges retain discretionary sentencing powers over acts of civil disobedience, and such 
acts should never be subject to mandatory sentencing laws.
‘ See Cohen (1971) p. 77.
2 Ibid. p. 82.
1 1
There is however, I argue, a sense of civility and disobedience that goes beyond 
calculations of reciprocity between persons. This understanding seeks to make the 
public aware of a substantive moral good —say, the protection of animals against 
torture. For instance, the disobedience is civil in the sense that the violation of the law 
needs to be commensurate with morally acceptable standards of behaviour. Shooting 
whaling ships with missiles and taking the lives of those on board is not an acceptable 
form of disobedience. Protests against torture and pain cannot violate its own standards. 
What the reference to civil disobedience shows is that civility is not only normatively 
bound in that it needs to respect the rights of all to make choices in a democracy based 
on full knowledge, but is also a morally bound concept. Civility, in other words, is not 
only tightly linked with strong social norms that generate solidarity, but also with strong 
moral norms concerning just behaviour and treatment.
There is another sense in which I want to refer to civility as a moral norm. It is the sense 
in which civility is understood as a moral virtue. Civility is a specifically moral term for 
Cheshire Calhoun3. Civility is in essence a term that demands that people are treated in 
a way that we ought to treat them; in a way that they deserve to be treated. What is it 
about persons, for Calhoun, that implies this moral dimension to civility? Calhoun holds 
that individuals are beings that deserve to have their self-esteem respected. This 
position derives from her observation that moral scepticism is true. If scepticism is true, 
then there is no universally applicable ‘socially critical morality’ or knowledge about 
moral facts that warrants us to suppress the rights of individuals to express their 
viewpoints on the nature of the good life, and their opinions on others. Self-esteem is 
respected to the extent that we do not subject people to regulation by a ‘socially critical 
morality” narrowly construed.
What needs to be in place instead, according to Calhoun, is a civil moral order. Civility, 
in this sense, is primarily a display of respect to others in order to facilitate the
3 Calhoun (2000). Calhoun’s reference to civility as a moral norm is similar to Richard Boyd’s notion of mutual 
respect as a moral norm that appears under his theory of homeostatic consequentialism. Here, mutual respect is a 
human good that has value in that it tends to “mitigate possible conflicts between various individual goods.” Boyd 
(1988) p. 203.
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operation of a moral community (i.e. a community that is sufficiently interactive so as 
to enable peaceful and constructive engagement over moral issues and disputes). For 
example, homosexuals in the presence of homophobes owe it to the latter not to deny or 
question their right to hold on to and articulate their fears and opinions on 
homosexuality. Conversely, homophobes must respect the esteem of homosexuals to 
enjoy the same right of expression. The participants in this scenario are owed respect on 
the basis that there is no moral knowledge about the ‘rightness or wrongness’ of sexual 
orientation. Morality is not a search for facts, for Calhoun, but is rather a necessarily 
communicative performance between persons. Morality is something that exists in a 
context of dialogue between competent agents rather than something that is enforced 
from ‘known’ principles. Civility protects the lines of communications in this moral 
network; it ensures that we think well of others at least to the extent of being prepared 
to listen and engage with them in such a manner that does not spurn them from 
conversational processes.
It’s also important to note that if civility is founded on moral scepticism, then it means 
that the former is held to be a non-substantive concept. Calhoun holds that there is a 
difference between displaying civility and being respectful, tolerant and considerate. 
For example, Calhoun informs us, someone can display civility in relation to the 
viewpoints of gay people even if they disagree with their lifestyle, yet refuse to eat food 
prepared by gay people in their daily living. Civility then only requires a minimal sort 
of proper treatment to others, and is not an extended moral term in the sense of focusing 
on the ways in which we actually ought to, where ‘ought’ is understood in a substantive 
sense, treat people. Gay people may be offended and demeaned by the knowledge that 
there are people who do not want to eat food prepared by them, but the prevalence of 
such experiences, for Calhoun, are consistent with living in a civil society. For Calhoun, 
exemplifying civility as a virtue means treating others with a respect that is owed to 
them qua their moral personality, and not in the sense of directly assessing the rightness 
or wrongness of the moral norms that happen to prevail in society. She points out that 
“Existing social norms may sanction as...legitimate, treatment that is in fact 
demeaning. ” 4
4 Calhoune (2000) p. 263.
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Another moral feature of civility has to do with the empathy it encourages towards 
others in one’s group. Communicative civility has been ascribed a moral relevance by 
Cheshire Calhoun. For her, civility is a virtue, or a lauded trait of excellent character, 
due to the fact that the respect for others it produces enhances the harmonious 
interaction and exchange of viewpoints that is an essential condition of a morally 
reflective and ordered society. But, it should be noted, this only implies a thin notion of 
empathy with others. Civility requires that we empathize with others on the grounds that 
they are rational agents who seek to interact with their world in a dignified manner, but 
we are not expected, in the performance of civility, to identify totally with the plight 
and welfare of others. Civility, in other words, facilitates the minimal goal of 
safeguarding our common social life together5. Moral life she holds is deeply social,and 
civility has instrumental value in the sense that it enhances the good functioning of our 
social life by make communicative practices effective and respect-affirming.
Civility is not only a rule-governed, social performance but can also be an expression of 
good character. After all, I may conform to the civil norm of obeying the law through 
fear of its sanctions and not through any recognition of the worthiness of being ‘law- 
abiding’. But if I obey the law because I value the respect it shows to people then I am 
exemplifying a moral excellence. If I am polite to others out of habit or because of the 
social disapprobation that would result from rudeness then I am in my actions 
conforming to the rule of civility, but if I am polite to others because I see them as 
intrinsically worthy of respect then I am exemplifying civility as a virtue.
To exemplify civility as a virtue may require other conditions. To be civil in a morally 
worthy sense, and not just to act out civility, will require that I act in this way across a 
wide range of areas in my life, and I must possess a robust disposition that will sustain 
this way of being civil over time. We would be reluctant to say that someone was civil 
in a moral sense if they only showed respect for certain others. For example, if I only 
allow religious people to be heard in silence but not agnostics then there is a sense in 
which I am acting civilly, but I am not exemplifying civility as a virtue. Also, if I show
5 See ibid, p.272.
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respect towards members of my neighbourhood but not towards people outside it I am 
not being morally civil. For civility to be a moral virtue I must exemplify the 
appropriate motivations towards respecting others across a wide range of areas in my 
life and be committed to this endeavour. Being morally civil involves the appropriate 
outlook towards others that exists resiliently and consistently over time.
1.4 Civility as a Political Norm: Civil Proceduralism
I have covered to this point the main characteristics of civility as it exists in the non­
political, social and moral domains. I have shown how civil behaviour appeals to people 
with a concern for cohesive social existence as well as living a life that respects our 
basic moral duties to others. The attraction of civility extends also, however, to the 
norms of behaviour within a distinctly political context. Just as a society or moral 
community is a coming together of disparate lifestyles and practices, a political society 
is constituted by the coming together of disparate political beliefs, opinions, views and 
interests.
The reasons why individuals are motivated to show civility to each other in the political 
domain can originate from different sources. On the one hand, one might be motivated 
to treat others with political civility for reasons of protecting one’s self-determined 
interests in a pluralistic environment. I will cover this type of motivation in more detail 
in the next chapter where I look at the link between liberalism and civility. On the other 
hand, the motivation to civility may originate from a recognition that one can only 
effectively formulate preferences and interests if this is done so with engagement with 
others in a political forum. This notion of civility holds that political interaction 
constitutes a form of social capital6. Here civility operates on the basis of an assumption 
that social networks play an effective and crucial role in human development. A worthy 
human value is created, it is assumed, when people are connected or socially bound to 
each other. People are interdependent on each other for the social skills and qualities 
that make a sustained and distinct human life possible.
6 Although, not all the operations of social capital are inherently or explicitly political.
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Civility in this sense is a conduit for social edification in the political domain. For 
instance, the trustworthiness among strangers that civility produces strengthens the 
bonds between people and, as a consequence information flows and support networks 
can develop to respond to needs and create opportunities for cooperation in a diverse 
political environment. But, it should be noted, that the trust produced here is of a thin 
kind only. Civic trust, for example, means more than trusting others to be civil, but the 
latter is an essential part of any cohesive order aimed at my a unifying political idiom.
Detachment can be an enemy, for example, of political cohesion. Social isolation and 
alienation brings with it traits that are inimical to human development and social 
cohesion. What is more, it is assumed that these edifying networks in a society can be 
qualitatively moulded by deliberate planning. Such planning highlights those social 
relations essential for wellbeing. For example, joiners become more tolerant, more 
aware, more empathetic to the misfortune of others, and less cynical. Connection with 
others means less stress, better education opportunities, and makes people better able to 
cope with illness. Teachers are more enthused about their career when parents are 
involved and child development is enhanced when there is a stable and harmonious 
educational environment.
Specifically, political civility understood in the sense of social capital assumes that 
institutional engagement will be a positive experience for those who participate within 
it. They will acquire through institutional engagement with others more information of 
where they fit in the world, what the common interests of a society are, that they count 
as worthy partners in such a society due to their views being respected and thus will 
hold a sense of ownership of the outcome, and they will acquire via their engagement a 
trust and confidence in fair process.
Civility as social capital is also a mechanism that facilitates deliberative engagement. 
Social capital assumes that civil engagement can produce a social harmony not only in 
the processes of deliberation between each other, but also in outcomes for all. It is 
expected that there will be an acknowledgment of essential differences and sharing
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experiences, and that disparate parties can deliberate towards outcomes that all can 
agree to. In other words, political civility as social capital assumes perfect competition: 
“Social capital assumes that all members of the partnership have equal interests and 
equal access to all resources needed for this collaboration, and it assumes that all will 
benefit equally from the collaboration. ” 7 There is no justification for being hostile or 
abrasive towards each other. Group dynamics, it is expected, will produce the optimal 
moral code. All are obliged to uphold the ideals of a “good faith” polity.
It is by being civil to one another when deliberation is required—listening attentively 
and respectfully to the ideas of all stakeholders irrespective of inequalities in wealth, 
opportunity, gender, class, luck, etc. —that politically harmonious outcomes can be 
reached, rather than biased, political outcomes from above. Pharmaceutical companies, 
it is assumed for example, can be attentive to their own market interests as well as to the 
unique interests of consumers. An individual consumer’s voice will be heard and 
respected by such companies, and the consumer can expect a result that will harmonize 
her interests with that of pharmaceutical companies. Deliberative engagement will occur 
between groups that bond together for common purpose. But it will also apply to groups 
that do not bond. Here civility will act as a bridging mechanism that enables 
reconciliation and conflict resolution.
In what sense do dialogical processes produce legitimate outcomes for all? Why should 
we put faith in dialogue per se? Dialogue exchanges information and results in 
relationships of reciprocity. Strangers in a civil society have something that the other 
wants, and cultivating good dialogical ties enables each to tell the other about their 
needs and wants. Here the reciprocity is not that of an exchange of respect as I 
mentioned above, but of a reciprocity of information. But the dialogical strategy also 
needs to guarantee not only that certain information is communicated to others, but that 
interests are shared as a result of deliberation. How does the dialogical process ensure 
this? There is a minimal sense in which interests can said to be shared. No matter what 
the outcome each will benefit from the gesture of acknowledgement in the open 
dialogue. Alienation for instance will have been averted. Also averted is the need for
7 Erben, R (1999).
17
excessive government regulation. It is hoped that salient interests are more likely to be 
tracked in a dialogical process by the constraints of discourse ethics, assuming that such 
constraints are influencing the discourse. This is how optimal moral outcomes can result 
from intersubjective engagement according to the social capital approach. Civility as a 
tool of social capital operates on an intersubjective or pragmatic moral basis, and such a 
pragmatic discourse ethic is embedded within a formal-proceduralist moral theory8.
1.5 Political Civility and Rationalism
All deliberators in a proceduralist order of the kind just covered need to acknowledge 
certain rationality principles. Each should have a certain attitudinal stance with relation 
to the importance of reason. They must, for instance, acknowledge the necessity of 
reason-giving; acknowledging that reasoned deliberation involves previewing the ideas 
of others and reviewing one’s own ideas in response. All are expected also to 
acknowledge the need for resolution criteria: that at the end of the day a decision has to 
be reached between parties and that all parties agree to live by the decision unless there 
is an appeal. There needs to be this level of consensual agreement even if the result is 
not totally what one wanted. This prioritisation of reasons is essential for deliberative 
engagement. Habermas says that such rationality norms are valid if “All affected can 
accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to 
have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these consequences are preferred to 
those of known alternative possibilities).”9 It is on this basis that disparate groups can be 
expected to reach a rationally binding consensus.
So civility here seems to imply a more extended concern for ‘the other’ and their 
interests as previously thought. It is civil to accept only outcomes where everyone’s 
interests are satisfied, and where it is up to the parties involved to inform the others of 
what these interests are and what would constitute their adequate satisfaction in the 
context of the decision procedure. Once one party is informed that a salient interest of
8 See Rehg (1994) p. 27.
9 Habermas (1990b) p. 65. See also Habermas (1991).
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another needs protecting, then that party is expected to see the convincing power of the 
better argument and adjust their expectations about the outcome so as to accommodate 
that interest. It is, in other words, rationality that enables one party to acknowledge the 
salient interest of the other and their own moral obligations. This calls for a certain 
amount of prudential ability on behalf of deliberators. They all need to be ‘self- 
understanding’ and receptive to the salient needs of the other. This is the assumption on 
which this heuristic is working.
This intersubjective heuristic only works, however, if it is the’ competent speakers’ who 
do the deliberating for each group10. Only competent speakers will understand the 
nature of the intersubjective process. For Habermas it is the process of universalising 
that provides an “intersubjective notion of moral insight”. It does this by highlighting 
the practice of “universal perspective taking”* 11. Firstly, no party enters a discourse or 
resolution procedure with another unless they assume that this strategy will protect their 
salient interests. If this were not the case then the resolution procedure would not be 
their best option, and they would have good reason to look elsewhere12. So, implicit in 
mutual deliberation is this concern for the maintenance of salient interests. One may not 
identify with those interests themselves or see them as salient in one’s own context, but 
one can at least see the analytic connection between the salient interests of others and 
the need to ensure that such interests are respected in the deliberative process. 
Deliberation has to be inclusive so that all those who are affected by a decision or 
outcome will have a right to present their views and articulate their interests, and one 
must be coerced or manipulated into acceptance. However, there is a delicate balancing 
of interests at work here. All the parties in a deliberative process will be likely to favour 
their own self-interest first and foremost, and the ideal for shared outcomes needs to be 
seen in this light13.
We have seen how civility in its political context means more than exemplifying 
politeness or courtesy to others. The role of rationality in this sphere of deliberation also
10 Ibid. p. 63.
11 Rehg (1994) p. 57.
12 Ibid. p. 58.
13 Ibid. p. 76.
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binds individuals to a civic identity. It requires, as Selznick points out, that individuals 
exemplify ‘behaviour befitting a citizen’ . 14 Citizens are expected to adapt their 
behaviour from the realities of their private domains to those of the public. They should, 
to a significant degree, look beyond their differences with others and seek to find 
common ground on which they can settle disputes with others and formulate, in a just 
manner, policies in the public interest. It is in the transition from the private to the 
public domain that individuals become citizens. Being a citizen, and not merely a 
private individual, brings with it an expectation that one will acquire civic traits and 
dispositions that will assist in achieving the outcomes that constitute the public interest. 
Identifying with a politically civil polity means also identifying with certain character 
traits of citizenship .To adopt beliefs on the basis of relevant reasons (that is, it is 
rational to seek accurate reasons for the sake of seeking advantage rather than 
disadvantage in decision making); to seek out and accept only evidence for belief- 
formation that is appropriate to the task being undertaken; and to suspend judgment 
until a sufficient amount of such evidence is accumulated.
When citizens engage with each other within the institutions of the state they are 
expected to do so with a respect tolerance, open-mindedness, and due diligence to 
rational procedures. But citizens are not necessarily expected to bring these traits to the 
processes they engage in, rather the process themselves ought to inculcate the 
rationality norms into their decision-making procedures. Such procedures are expected 
to filter out subjective forces such as the power of passions, prejudices and traditional 
beliefs in favour of making decisions that are arrived at after the performance of rational 
deliberation within processes that are fair and reasonable to all. Selznick writes, “A 
conspicuous feature of civility is the development of “critical” or “reflective” morality, 
based on reason and principle rather than passion and historicity. ” 15
The rationality norms that constrain deliberative engagement are, it should be noted, 
minimally rational. They are the sorts of constraints that it is reasonable for all citizens 
to have reason to conform to. The reasonableness of conformity here is something that
14 See Selznick (1992). p. 390.
15 Ibid, p.392.
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is known empirically with reference to a liberal and pluralistic domain of political 
action. It is, in other words, a pragmatic notion of rationality norms; the sorts of 
rationality norms that are adopted due to their effectiveness in acquiring order and 
agreement in the society in which they are adopted16. They are the sorts of norms that, 
de facto, do appeal to citizens and groups in a pluralistic society and this fact, in itself, 
is a good reason for adopting them and using them to bring about and assist in the 
legitimisation of outcomes. It is not an interpretation of rationality that assumes that 
there are substantively ‘better reasons’ or outcomes that all rational agents ought to 
pursue. Rather, it is an interpretation of rationality that acquires its normative strength 
from the sorts of outcomes it can produce in a varied and complex social order where 
viewpoints conflict.
We can contrast this minimal sense of rationality with a more in-depth understanding of 
the role rationality may play in a political order. Such an in-depth version of rationality 
holds that there are substantively rational ends that we can expect all rational agents to 
agree on if they were to be all equally well informed17. Such a view of rationality is 
more in line with a Kantian sense of rational ends and contrasts clearly with the 
pragmatic sense of rationality just mentioned. The relationship between these two 
senses of rationality is an underlying concern of this thesis. Some hold that the only 
extent to which a polity ought to embrace rationality is in the pragmatic sense, or at 
least that the overwhelming emphasis should be on this rather than a substantive notion 
of rationality. What I will show in later chapters is that we ought to think of the role of 
rationality in politics in a more substantive sense, and that utilitarian thinking itself is 
deeply committed to this view more than some have given it credit for. I do not deny 
that the pragmatic sense of rationality has value in promoting civic order and enabling 
civil deliberation, but I hold that this is not a sufficient account of the components that 
ought to make up a normative polity. We, at the very least, I argue, should be concerned 
with a political ideal that only holds to the pragmatic sense of rationality as a sufficient 
one for such a polity.
16 See, for example, John Rawls (1993) for the prevalanece of pragmatic norms of reasoning, p. 76; 162-3; 229
17 See D ’ Agostino and Gaus (ed) (1998) p. xiv.
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1.6 Apolitical Civility: Civil Society.
There is another way in which we can understand or apply civility. It is a strong feature 
within the modern literature on political civility that there is such a thing as a ‘civil 
society’ that exists beyond the formal political structures in a society18.1 want to explore 
here briefly the basis on which civil society is distinguished from, yet remains related 
to, political society. One way of making the distinction is to define the latter in terms of 
a deliberately constructed, impartial sovereign structure that seeks to serve outcomes 
across a disparate collection of individuals and groups, whereas the former, (non­
political) civil society, has been understood as a natural and unplanned array of social 
relations and bonds that have evolved via historical forces19. Civil society is different 
from political society in the sense that it is an “area of human relations which was at 
least potentially coherent and harmonious but not willed or purposefully created.”20
However, there is a problem with basing the distinction between the civil and the 
political on this point. The boundaries between the planned and unplanned may be 
blurred. There may be certain institutions that we normally associate with civil, and not 
political, society that are nevertheless, to a significant degree, chosen and constructed 
by those who constitute them. Not only are they deliberately formulated in this way by 
those who are members of such institutions, but they are deliberately enhanced by the 
actions of the state. An example of a non-political yet intended civil entity exists in the 
form of, for example, the family. The family is a social institution that has evolved in 
response to socio-economic and religious forces. It is an institution that has been, in 
part, intentionally created via a legal constitution seeking political order. While the 
family, and the value of parent/off-spring solidarity and support throughout life, does 
not derive from a formal agreement between nation and individuals, it is a well- 
supported unit in the social and political community. Societies have attributed status 
and approbation to this form of social planning as a way of promoting social cohesion
18 See Lively, J and Reeve, A in Fine, R (ed) (1997) for the idea that ancient notions of civility did not make such a 
clear distinction between society and the state.
19 Ibid, p.63, 66.
20 Ibid. p. 67.
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within that community. Institutions such as families are chosen by those who construct 
them, and they may choose them as a way of strengthening the community around 
them, or by instantiating the plans of a divine force to constitute society in a particular 
way. On this basis we can challenge the idea that a civil society is an unplanned, natural 
phenomenon as set out above?
However, another justification for the distinction between civil and political society 
may run along the following lines. Civil society is distinct from political society in the 
sense that the former involves associations of ‘life mission’, whereas the latter involves 
only prudential associations. Life missions I take to be apolitical associations where 
individuals join with others, or find themselves culturally bonded, in such a way that 
their connections constitute their human identity. Their lives make sense and have 
personal meaning largely with relation to the apolitical bonding undertaken with others. 
Life missions can take the form of belonging to an ethnic group, religious 
denomination, recreational association, rotary clubs, toastmasters, neighbourhoods, 
family, environmental groups, etc. There will be varying reasons for how people come 
to have the life missions they do. Some will be more overtly chosen than others. 
Habermas refers, for example, the constitution of the Tifeworld’ as made up of 
embedded cultural identity and unshaken convictions that have evolved from cultural 
knowledge21. Individuals may not overtly express choices to take on such live missions 
in the same way as when, for example, some individuals may consciously and overtly 
choose to join a recreational group or rotary club. However, within these associations 
there is a strong requirement that there be some form of commitment and devotion to a 
notion of the good life. That people associate with others with an appreciation that 
belonging to that group is constitutive, either in part or in whole, of how they wish to 
lead their lives in the way they see fit22.
Civil societies, then, are identifiable on the basis of the solidarity they exemplify in 
relation to their life missions. Each apolitical, civil society will formulate its own rules 
of membership, to distinguish itself from others, and will stipulate and reinforce the
21 See Habermas, (1970)
22 Associating with others on this basis is similar to Oakeshott’s notion of enterprise association.
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Standards of behaviour that are consistent with maintaining that solidarity. Cahoone 
writes, “civil society is the name for the worldly autonomy of the social, the notion that 
social life is existentially self-sustaining and generates its own norms of validity, 
distinct from the directorship of any special, supra-social agency. ” 23 There is some 
concern that the rules of solidarity themselves need to be of a certain normative nature 
in order for a society to be civil. Gellner, for instance, argues that apoliticalism and 
social autonomy are not sufficient conditions for a society to be civil. What is also 
required, Gellner holds, is that the associations made must be voluntary ones. He holds 
that civil bonds are only maintained when those united by those bonds have the freedom 
to escape them through voluntary action24. This is a contentious point. Other 
institutions, such as religious entities or social groupings may overtly coerce others to 
choose one way of life over another, and make disassociation difficult for its members. 
However, looking at possible tensions within Gellner’s view here is not my concern. I 
only wish to expose the notion of apolitical solidarity and its relations to the idea of 
civil society.
Group solidarity in apolitical, civil society produces a by-product that has important 
implications for the value placed on civil society itself. This is the role that apolitical 
civil solidarity plays in counter-balancing the power of the state. Civil societies are 
expected to act as restraints on state control. Civil societies are expected to respect the 
laws produced by the state, but apolitical associations are expected to engage with the 
state, as it undertakes its law making practices, in order to ensure that it does not 
encroach on the rights of individuals and groups to maintain their apolitical identity. 
Civil associations are expected to do this individually in the way that they interact with 
the state, and with other associations. But collectively, apolitical civil entities will, when 
acting in terms of protecting their own life missions, contribute to an anti-authoritarian 
spirit25.
These are some brief points about what makes a civil society distinct from a political 
one. But what makes a political society distinct from a civil one? A political society is
23 See Cahoone (2002) p. 225.
24 See Gellner, E (1995) p. 15.
25 See Shils p. 256-7 and Gellner,E (1995) p. 32
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based on associations that do not hold an expectation of a commitment to a life mission. 
Instead, political society is based on an association between individuals and a common 
state that is motivated on the basis of prudential interests. The notion of political society 
assumes that there is no other end for each member of that society to pursue other than 
the end of just association26. Participants in a political society will be coerced by law to 
respect this as the ultimate end of political association. Such an association is prudential 
for all individuals and groups in a civil society to consent to on the basis of substantive 
disagreements about what the good life is to live, and the fact that such individuals and 
groups are geographically tied together and must share common resources. It is 
prudential for all, then, to agree on common procedures and the locus of a common 
authority to settle such disputes in a way that preserves the exercise of each individual’s 
or group’s own pursuit of the good life as they see fit. Whereas there was no common 
authority between individuals and groups in a civil society, there is such a thing in a 
political society. It is expected that there will be a higher-order solidarity over the issue 
of just procedures for conflict dispute and interest protection that is distinct from the 
type of solidarity expected by civil associations in their apolitical dealings.
I have indicated how civility is a term of common respect that applies in different ways 
and in various contexts. I want to close by saying something about how the concept of 
civility will be applied in this thesis. The common respect of civility is a behavioural 
trait and expectation that assists in creating group identity, cohesion and continuity. In 
this sense civil relations can unite both political and non-political groupings alike. But, 
by and large, they contribute to the bonds that enable effective and harmonious 
deliberation within a well-defined legal and political network. In the following chapters 
I will focus on civility as it has been adopted by the theories of liberalism and 
republicanism. Specifically, I will refer to the concept in the sense that it has been 
adopted by these theories to enable the cohesion of political action in pluralistic 
societies. Both theories stipulate that one of the central duties of the state is to maintain 
civil relations between itself and the citizenry. Such relations are a feature on which 
state legitimacy is based. The enhancement of civility is a main reason why citizens 
have a good reason to recognize and obey the power held by the state. In a more
26 See Oakeshott.( 1975a) and (1975b).
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detailed sense, civil relations assist in opening up deliberative procedures between that 
the state and the citizenry. By providing the avenues of civil engagement in this way, 
the theories hold, the outcomes produced by state action in this area are legitimised. 
While accepting this as a worthy feature of state legitimacy, this thesis will argue that 
more is need if we are to capture a sufficient account of the normative standards that the 
state should be subject to. We need, I will argue, to go beyond the mere provision of 
civil engagement between the different sectors in a pluralistic society. I will hold that in 
addition to the conditions of civil union that have been set out by these theories, we 
need to establish a duty on the part of the state to consider, enhance and protect the 
essential interests of its citizenry. This will be a further condition that the outcomes of 
legitimate state action ought to meet. The state needs to concern itself not only with 
maintaining a civil order; it needs to also concern itself with maintaining outcomes and 
states of affairs that treat people in accordance with more in-depth standards of human 
propriety or decency.
SUMMARY
In this chapter I have set out a characterization of civility and shown the various 
applications that the notion can take. I hold that civility itself is a cluster concept: it 
applies differently in distinct contexts yet in each case there is still a resemblance in 
each application that ties it with a common understanding of civility in general. In other 
words, civility is used in various contexts but retains a common meaning without 
sharing an essence in each context. The resemblances that unite the different 
applications of civility are, I showed, based on the understanding of civility as a 
behavioural norm of propriety. It is a norm, in all contexts, that seeks social cohesion 
between disparate groups; placing each in a positive relation to the other; and 
reaffirming the identity of those with shared beliefs.
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I noted that while civility can strengthen private relations, its main force lies at the 
public level between rational agents. I also noted that civility at this level operates 
effectively even if civil action is motivated by differing concerns on the part of its 
practitioners. I also highlighted the moral dimensions of civility. Here I looked at how 
civility satisfies the minimal conditions of justice and contributes to the formation of a 
moral dialogue in a pluralistic community.
I have also highlighted how the features of civility just summarized make it an effective 
norm in the political domain. Social cohesion and the facilitation of political dialogue 
between disparate entities are vital goals in a polity. What is more, I examined how 
political civility can produce outcomes that are crucial for the stability of the civic 
institutions within such a polity. Not all civil entities are overtly political however, and I 
covered how there is a sense of civil society that is articulated for the reason of 
providing a check on the concentration and exercise of state power. However, generally 
speaking, to create and maintain political stability across the board it is essential that 
civil relations are guided by, and performed with respect towards, norms of rationality. 
It is crucial that these norms prevail in the operations of a polity in order to solidify the 
bonds of civil union.
By characterizing these different aspects of civility I want to expose the variations in 
meaning that the concept has in political and non-political domains. The chapters that 
follow will deal, however, only with the concept of civility as it is understood in the 
sense of its political applications. I will use the term to emphasise the nature of the civil 
union between disparate political entities.
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2. LIBERALISM AND POLITICAL CIVILITY
In the next two chapters I will expose the extent to which citizens have a minimal 
obligation to exemplify political civility to each other and the state. Specifically, I will 
see how this is done by two of the main political idioms in the contemporary literature: 
liberalism and republicanism. In this chapter I look at the obligations held by citizens 
and the state in the case of the former, and I expose the differing justifications that exist 
within liberalism for why individuals in a political context have reason to have a 
minimal amount of concern, or exemplify a certain amount of political civility, to 
others. In general, I hold that political civility is valued in varying ways by different 
liberals. Three of the main reasons for why liberals have valued civility are: 1. as a 
political relation that is morally bound. 2. as a political relation based on a contract or 
rational agreement, and 3. as a political relation based on prudence.
However, I add that liberalism has an extended notion of concern for others in the 
political realm by also endorsing the protection of rights. Beyond the obligation to 
protect civil rights, an obligation that is incorporated within the reason for why it is 
prudential to exemplify political civility to others, is an obligation to protect certain 
fundamental human rights; namely the rights to life, non-harm and welfare. A main 
concern for all liberals is that such human rights must be protected due to their 
effectiveness in maintaining the overall right that all individuals have to autonomy, or to 
freedom of choice. I close this chapter by reinforcing this link that most liberals have to 
valuing human rights on the grounds of respecting autonomy, and reflect on how this 
underlies a liberal understanding of the role played by political civility.
2.1 Moral Reasons for Political Civility: The Primacy of Individual Freedom.
I take liberalism as a theory about what sort of political society we ought to have. It 
holds that individuals have a fundamental right to freedom that can only be overridden 
if it results in causing harm to others. Outside of this harm constraint, liberals believe, 
individuals ought to be free from interference or coercion in the way they formulate
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their beliefs, organize and implement their movements and associations, earn income 
and possess property, express themselves via speech, etc
This commitment by liberal theory is captured within Kant’s theory of persons as ends. 
For Kant, what makes individuals ends in themselves is their capacity to exercise free 
will which is of unconditional value. A constitutive feature of a free will is having a 
rational will —having the capacity to perform the task of choosing according to the 
relevant or appropriate criteria. Civility involves, for Kant, individuals in a polity 
viewing and treating each other as ends, as well as the state maintaining formal 
procedures than respect persons as such. Political civility operates here on the 
understanding that each individual must live under her/his own moral law while at the 
same time assuming that “the freedom of the will of each can coexist together with the 
freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law.” 1 In other words, it is the 
freedom of each to live according to his or her autonomous will that is at the core of 
Kant’s moral and political thought.2 One of the assumptions here is that individualism is 
a plausible ontological notion. Individuals are held to be the primary units of reality and 
the ultimate loci of value. “The capacity to propose an end to oneself is the 
characteristic of humanity (as distinguished from animality) . . . . ” 3
For Kant, free will involves choosing according to one’s moral duty or in accordance 
with the moral law. Our moral duties under the moral law, for Kant, involve a 
commitment to control or filter out the influence of inclination. Inclinations or desires 
are a threat to respecting persons as ends because they lay emphasis on private 
reason —the seeking of private gratification-instead of public reason. The latter is 
constrained by the test of universalisation. Here we are told that morality is only
1 See Kant’s Metaphysical Element of Justice 35/231. See also Fleischacker (1992) p. 200 for the link between civil 
society and the protection of individual free will under the moral law.
2 Is Kantian individualism a plausible ontological position if it is based on the assumption of free will? Isn’t there 
sufficiently plausible evidence around us that individuals are constituted, and their choices determined, by social 
forces prior to and greater than the individual? Think, for example, how strange it is to say that I have freely chosen 
to speak English. I have never consciously made or willed such a choice after due deliberation about the world 
around me. I have found myself so constituted by historical forces beyond my identity as an individual.
Liberals may respond to this by saying that even though this may be the case, we still have a strong sense, 
phenomenally speaking, of ourselves as free and rational choosers. This phenomenal experience of being a free 
choosers is meaningful and at the forefront of human conscious in liberal societies, and thus must be respected on this 
basis. Civility under this understanding of free will may require a respect for this phenomenal belief in our own 
agency.
3 Kant (1797).
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achieved if the maxims we choose can be willed as a general rule by all rational agents. 
Here is an example of how this universalisation restraints protects individuals as ends in 
themselves. Firstly, we need to remind ourselves of Kant’s existential argument that 
individuals are, as a matter of fact, ends in themselves due their possessing the capacity 
to exercise free will. It is therefore irrational for individuals to universalise a maxim that 
would deny the exercise of free will. For instance, treating others exclusively as a 
means to my ends would mean that the following maxim could be universalised ‘We 
can treat others exclusively as a means to one’s ends’. But if it is universalised, then all 
individuals would be permitted to act in accordance with this maxim. But if all were to 
do so then our treatment of others would constantly deny treating others as ends, and 
this would violate Kant’s existential view that each is intrinsically an end in themselves. 
We cannot will a denial of the self as ends because this cannot be universalised. We 
can’t, for example, rationally will ourselves or consent into perpetual slavery. This 
would involve holding that all could be slaves which would be to will a 
contradiction—that free agents could will themselves into servitude. No rational agent 
can universalise this as they would then be denying themselves.
The existential fact of individuals as ends in themselves, and the constraints of the 
universalisation test on rational agents, evinces from members of a moral community 
attitudes to others that are morally fundamental. Such attitudes are determined by the 
need to respect individuals as intrinsically valuable ends. The need for such attitudes to 
each other in the moral domain overlaps, for Kant, into the political domain. Civility, 
for Kant, involves the discipline of the inclinations/impulses under the framework of 
rationality. Civilisation does “much to overcome the tyrannical propensities of sense, 
and so prepare man for a sovereignty in which reason alone shall have its sway. ” 4 If 
private reason prevailed then such things as the insatiability of wants (eg. seeking food 
for vanity) would be equally legitimate to any other motivation in the moral world. This 
would place us under the influence of inclination which is contrary to the moral law.
What results from this emphasis on individuals as ends in themselves, and as beings 
whose rational self must prevail over the inclined self, are important implications for the
4 Kant (1987) p. 97.
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status of individuals in the political domain. Namely, it implies a general metaphysic of 
the right as a framework for political decision making. This notion of the right must 
constrain any exercise of public or common reason. One condition of the exercise of the 
right is the attribution of consent. Seeking consent not only affirms respect for the 
individual —treating the individual as a rational end in her/himself—but it also 
legitimises the outcomes obtained by the free associations of individuals5.
Evidence of Kant’s views on these points are found in the following areas. Kant wrote 
that a civil society is one that is politically structured so as to protect the exercise of the 
will by individuals, and that a vital part of exercising one’s choices in the world is to be 
free to enjoy the benefits of private property. Kant wrote, “The state of nature is not 
opposed and contrasted to the state of society, but to the civil society, for within a state 
of nature there can indeed be a society, but there can be no civil society (that guarantees 
property through public law).”6 To structure society in a civil way, rather than in merely 
a social way, the members of that society need to be bound by what Kant calls “a 
universal rule of the external juridical relationship.” 7 Here there is an acknowledgment 
by all members of the polity that they are “reciprocally bound to everyone else to 
[exercise] a similar and equal restraint with respect to what is theirs.”8 One seeks to 
have one’s own privately willed life and property free from the incursions of others, 
and, once this is universalised as a rule, one ought to see that one has an obligation to 
treat others in the same way. Ownership of property, for example, only makes sense in 
relation to the way in which possession by me is secured by the recognition by others 
that I own that property and enjoy the right to use it as I will. Kant wrote, “ ...a thing 
can be externally yours or mine only in a civil society.”9
Kant’s linking of civility here to universal juridical authority creates, however, only a 
society where political authority is established to facilitate the universal laws of co­
existence. It should be noted that this does not imply a relationship between citizen and
5 “For a citizen must always be regarded as a co-legislative member of the state (i.e. not just as a means, but also as 
an end in himself), and he must therefore give his free consent” Kant (1797b) in Reiss (1970). pp. 166-7.
6 Kant (1797b). p. 48.
7 Ibid. p. 64.
8 Ibid.
9 ibid. p. 65. See also p. 76 for the same point.
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state that is dialogue-based. Instead it implies a relationship in which citizens consent to 
authorities that are obligated to protect the private spheres of individuals. Legislative 
authority, in other words, can only legitimately operate on the basis that it produces and 
maintains outcomes that are common to all. Kant wrote, “ ...only the united and 
consented Will of all—that is, a general and united Will of the people by which each 
decides the same for all and all decide the same for each—can legislate.” The state itself 
cannot operate beyond this maxim. The state only engages with citizens, and vice versa, 
on the basis of maintaining the conditions that are conducive to individual autonomy. 
“The ruler of the state...is that...person who has the executive authority. He is the agent 
of the state who appoints magistrates and prescribes those rules for the people by means 
of which each of them can, in conformity with the law, acquire things or preserve his 
property” . 10 In this sense, the relationship between individuals and the state is a passive 
one* 11. However, citizens do have a way of participating in a process of deliberation with 
the state via the jury system, and they can elect representatives12. Yet, this is not 
deliberation directly between the individual and the state where the two can come 
together to formulate policies.
Another way of expressing this point that the state exists only to protect the autonomy 
of citizens, and not to specify or enforce substantive outcomes, is reflected in Kant’s 
notion of reason. For Kant, reason has no dictatorial power, “reason has no dictatorial 
authority; its verdict is always the agreement of free citizens, of whom each one must be 
permitted to express, without let or hindrance, his objections.”13. The rational science of 
principled thinking must prevail if we are to allow the ‘experiential’ to influence 
outcomes14. Ends are subjective for Kant but rational principles need to be met so as to 
legitimise these ends. There are, in particular, no objective or rational ends for the state 
to ensure. Politics is not a matter of instantiating transcendental truths on sorts of lives 
people ought to lead; politics is instead guided by a plurality of non-coordinated 
thinkers.”15. Reason can only be used in self-defence—it has no force of its own that
10 Ibid. p. 82.
11 Ibid. p. 83.
12 Ibid, pp.82-3.
13 Guyer, P and Wood, A (ed) (1998).
14 See O’Neill (1989) p. 68 for the idea in Kant that thought and action can only be constrained by reason—thought 
and action cannot be fully determined by principles of reason.
15 O’Neill (1989) p. 64.
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leads us to adopt one way of life over another. For instance, spotting the failures in 
others reasoning is not an instance of reason forcing us to a conclusion. A person may 
hold views A and B where A and B are contradictory. A rational criticism of this is to 
point out the contradictory relation between A and B. Reason will critique the use of 
contradictory reasoning not because it thinks of this as an end that all must conform to, 
but because this a truth of reasoning to which all rational agents are subject.
Kant shows that he only affirms a rational telos and denies a natural telos when we 
wrote, “It is....quite certain that we can never get a sufficient knowledge of organized 
beings and their inner possibility, much less and explanation of them, by looking merely 
to mechanical principles of nature. Indeed, so certain it is, that we may confidently 
assert that it is absurd for me even to entertain any thought of so doing....Such insight 
we must absolutely deny to mankind. ” 16 For Kant it is “an open question....how much 
the mechanism of nature contributes as means to each final design in nature. ” 17 The idea 
that there are no natural ends for people18 is also seen in Kant’s view that if freedom 
were nothing but a natural state politics would be “the art of utilizing nature (the facts of 
human psychology) for the government of men.” This political reliance on nature would 
then be “the whole of practical wisdom” and the ‘concept of right” would be “only an 
empty idea,” not even a “limiting condition” restricting what politics can do19. Persons 
if seen merely as natural beings will become tools of adaptation, and will not, in 
themselves, have a need for their rational capacity to be protected. For Kant, human life 
has to be regulated according to duty, and not according to nature.
The point to take from this is that natural well-being cannot be articulated as an 
objective body of knowledge. For example, Kaufman argues, take the maxim “assist the 
less fortunate.” In what sense can Kantian reasoning come to justify such a conclusion. 
It does not do it by seeing the intrinsic or natural wrong in the suffering of the less 
fortunate, but rather asks “Can rational agents negate this maxim?”. The answer to this 
is no. Rational and autonomous agents cannot universalise the maxim that negates the
16 Kant (1987) p. 54.
17 Ibid. p. 73.
18 See Riley (1983) p. 72.
19 Reiss (1970) p. 117
33
view that less fortunate should be assisted20. Rational and autonomous individuals 
cannot will that they could be denied assistance if they were less fortunate. It’s also 
interesting to note the sense in which giving aid to the poor is justified by Kant. There is 
some disagreement as to the precise nature of Kant’s commitment here21, but there is 
strong evidence presented for the view that Kant believed we should aid the poor 
because if we did not do so social stability would be threatened, and the ambience 
needed to exercise rational choice would not be maintained22.
So, welfare matters for Kant not because it avoids misery or other natural states 
detrimental to the natural well-being of persons, but because it ensures that the 
conditions of rational deliberation are maintained. We all, as rational agents, have good 
reason to acknowledge the need for ‘reaching agreement’ rather than living in a world 
of disorientation. A world of disorientation is not what rational deliberators require in 
order to function as rational beings. This is not a natural fact about persons in the sense 
of identifying a natural telos of human existence, but rather it is a robustly contingent 
fact that we are rational deliberators. Hence, we are led to value organization and 
agreement over disorientation. Organised outcomes for persons are not forms of a 
‘transcendental reality’; they are only practical realities —realties we take from robust 
facts about ourselves.
Even though Kant’s metaphysic of the right has been criticized for being too 
‘rigoristic’23 at the cost of guiding us to substantive outcomes, it is worth noting that 
Kant does hold out hope or faith that a polity of rational agents constrained by the 
metaphysic of the right will reach outcomes of ‘perpetual peace’. If each obligatory 
moral maxim of the right is necessarily connected to an obligatory end, namely an end 
that respects the autonomy of all, then there is faith that individuals can only but 
consent to outcomes that are not detrimental to them themselves nor to the autonomy of 
others24. Peace is an end inextricably linked with the moral law that founds ‘the right’.
20 See Kant (2000) p. 423.
21 See Kaufman (1999) pp. 30-33.. See here also for the view that there exists for Kant a duty of beneficience to 
individuals as ends.
22 See Aune, B (1979) p. 157 and Murphy (1970).
23 See Williams,B (1985) and Yovel (1980) 141 ff.
24 See Kant (1797a) p.385 and Kant (2000) p. 433.
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‘Perpetual peace and the kind of constitution that seems most conducive to it constitute 
the ‘highest political good,’ the entire final end of the Doctrine of Right within the 
limits of reason alone” “What is incumbent upon us as a duty is...to act in conformity 
with the Idea of (perpetual peace)’25 Peace, it is hoped, will be a contingently reached 
goal of human deliberation26.
Civility, then, under the notion of Kantian liberalism, involves encouraging political 
behaviour between persons that does not undermined their status as distinctly rational 
beings. What is more, Kant’s notion of the nature of civil union is agnostic about 
outcomes. So long as individuals retain their status as ends in themselves —as exercisers 
of rational will —then civility is satisfied. For Kant, universalism and civility are 
intricately linked. Each ought to live according to their own beliefs commensurate with 
a respect for the rational welfare of others. The free will, in other words, of each must 
co-exist in accordance with universal law. Incivility is when we treat others exclusively 
as means to our goals. Political incivility, it is plausible to assume from Kant, occurs 
when we let inclination triumph over the rational right. Deceiving others for the sake of 
personal wealth involves the irrational view that ‘wealth is more important than 
individuals’. No one can ‘rationally’ universalise this because it involves ‘in principle’ 
the elimination of the self.
2.2 Kantian Civility and its Influence on Nozick and Rawls.
Kant’s notion of human propriety in the moral domain, and its overlapping influence on 
the political domain in the form of political civility, has had two main influences on 
contemporary liberal thinking, namely on the political writings of Nozick and Rawls27. 
The two are different so it is interesting to see how they diverge even though they 
derive themselves from the same deontic source.
25 Kant (1797a) pp. 354-5.
26 See Kant (1784) where he talks about evolutionary pressures.
27 For the Kantian connection with Nozick and Rawls see Nozick (1974) pp. 32, 228 and Rawls (1971) pp. 11; 179- 
183.
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Nozick is a liberal who holds that individuals are the primary source of value, are ends 
in themselves, due to their status as self-owners28. The fact of self-ownership implies an 
entitlement to a certain way in which individuals deserve to be treated in the political 
domain by other individuals and by the state. For Nozick, we own ourselves in the sense 
of possessing an awareness of self-guidance. We are aware of ourselves, that is, as 
individuals that freely choose and shape our own identity. Nozick’s liberalism in this 
sense incorporates the phenomenological expression of freedom as a justification for 
respecting persons. I will in this section assume, as I did with Kant, that there is a link 
between the moral view of individualism held by the author and the implications this 
has for the degree to which we are expected to respect others in the political domain.
Coupled with this is a strong sense of our own right to bodily integrity. The ‘eye lottery’ 
brings out strong intuitions about the ownership of the self. Imagine, Nozick asks us, 
that a lottery is held where all those with two good eyes are placed into a draw whereby 
those selected would be forced to give up one of their good eyes so as to redistribute 
among those who are blind. Overall benefit would come from such a redistribution; we 
would have more people with sight than without. However, there is a very strong sense 
in which we say that such a redistribution is not justified. Those with two good eyes 
own their own bodies, and to force them to part with one good eye, even if it is done to 
assist those in my most need of sight, violates their fundamental right to self-ownership 
of their body.
If we are self-owners, Nozick goes on, we are entitled to the fruits of our own unique 
talents. To divide up the fruits of one’s own talents in the name of redistributive justice 
would be a violation of an individual’s selfhood. For example, libertarians criticize the 
state provision for welfare via taxation as a violation of individualism—it is treating 
individuals as instruments to the realization of goals that were not freely chosen by 
those individuals. Libertarians, such as Nozick, hold that the state must respect the 
rights of citizens to choose for themselves a life they deem to be worthy, and to 
associate freely with others if they should choose to do so.
28 See Nozick (1974) p. 48.
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Although Nozick does not directly address the issue of political civility, we can infer 
will good reason that individuals are civil to one another when they respect each other 
as self-owners. Likewise, the state is civil to the citizenry when it respects this right. 
The only function of the libertarian state is to ensure the self-preservation of individuals 
and to protect their property rights; to protect all against “violence, theft, fraud, and to 
the enforcement of contracts. ” 29 Taxation, for example, violates selfhood if it is used to 
fund public services beyond the minimal ones’ of protecting persons and their rights.
This means that there is a very limited idea of dialogical engagement between 
individuals and the state under Nozick’s account of the relationship between citizens 
and the state. The extent to which the state and individuals enter dialogue is to request 
assistance where rights are violated. We might expect a state to extend dialogical links 
to individuals to include what Nozick calls “Having a Say Over What Affects You” 
rather than merely having a say over what violates your fundamental rights30. For 
example, the state may plan to build a maximum security prison in your neighbourhood. 
Such a move may not violate your right to self-ownership or property rights ( as the 
state’s proposed action may be taken by using land that it owns and in the name of 
protecting the citizens’ rights to biological integrity) but there is a sense in which one 
may wish to raise concerns with the state over such a move. While Nozick says we may 
have a say over what affects us, he is not heavily committed to a dialogical relationship 
between the individual and the state.
For Rawls, I assume that political civility, the nature of the respect we owe others in the 
political domain, comes from a blend of Kantian facts about the rational nature of 
persons, and a social fact, namely that it is a permanent feature of society that there is a 
‘diversity of reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines”31. 
These are embedded features of a liberal democracy for Rawls, and not just “historical 
conditions that may soon pass away. ” 32
29 Ibid p. 26.
30 Ibid, pp.268-71.
31 Rawls (1999) p. 14.
32 Ibid.
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Once the citizens of a liberal democracy who possess these deep and fundamental 
differences realize this fact, they ought to see, as rational agents, that they all have good 
reason to adopt a form of public reason. These are common reasons that can be 
exchanged between the disparate parties in a liberal democracy, reasons that specify the 
guidelines for public inquiry. For example, disparate groups in a liberal democracy have 
good reasons to conform to norms that stipulate that public processes must be open to 
all or inclusive, reasonable, embrace all viewpoints as worthy of consideration, and 
contain public officials who are held accountable in holding up these values etc. They 
must also specify some of the particularities of the outcomes of public deliberation such 
as that all outcomes are consistent with the liberal principles of continued equal political 
liberty for all, equal opportunity to exercise one’s beliefs, that all parties to deliberation 
are willing to accommodate outcomes that do not threaten their core beliefs, etc.
The derivation of political civility from this social fact of diversity explains also the 
motivation to take this principled stand towards others, such a motivation being, for 
Rawls, that of reciprocity. Individuals located in a pluralistic society have good reason, 
no matter what their fundamental beliefs, to live in a well-ordered society. They have 
good reason to treat others civilly if they know that in return they will be treated civilly. 
This assurance is essential. There is no point in assenting to a tax increase to improve 
public facilities if I am the only one who will be applying it. I require the assurance that 
all will pay more to make the arrangement feasible. The same kind of assurance is 
required with civility.
But this raises for Rawls the paradox of public reason33. Why should the citizens who 
value their own fundamental beliefs honour the limits of public reason if the latter 
erodes or conflicts with the former? For example, an ethnic group within society may 
not grant women speaking or voting rights in their own deliberative forums, yet as 
members of a liberal forum they are required to permit such rights to their female 
members at the level of public deliberation. Can some citizens in a pluralistic society 
legitimately believe that liberal pluralism and the tolerance associated with public
” See Brown (2003) for this term and Rawls (1993) p. 36 for the facts of reasonable pluraliam that underlie the 
paradox.
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reason is a transitory stage, and hope that their fundamental beliefs will finally persuade 
others to conform to their fundamental beliefs and dismiss liberal values? Rawls says 
they should not. He argues that it is in the nature of citizenship that it is founded on the 
facts of persistent and fixed disagreements about fundamental values.
Eric Brown argues that the linkage between fundamentally opposed worldviews and 
citizenship is not an analytic one, as Rawls implies. Rather citizenship can be based on 
shared cultural expression rather than shared disagreement about fundamental beliefs. 
Take the case of the citizenship of an extremist Muslim state. Being a citizen in this 
sense does not mean being a citizen in liberal sense. Being a citizen of an extremist 
Muslim state will be an expression of one’s fundamental identity and constitutive of 
one’s divine purpose and cultural identity. The framework of citizenship will still 
apply—the boundaries of membership, the duties to state and others, etc. However, the 
content of the laws will be formulated in line with Muslim principles and conformity to 
such a life will be enforced by theocratic force. Brown argues that Rawls cannot derive 
the (liberalist) duty of civility from citizenship because the latter is a contested notion. 
The derivation does not occur if citizenship is understood in sense other than the one 
that assumes liberalism itself.
What are the implications of this criticism against the link that Rawls makes between 
the purported social facts of plurality and citizenship? Must he find another basis on 
which to justify the reasons for civil union in place of those to do with what he takes to 
be facts about inherent social diversity? Rawls has tempered his views on the nature of 
social diversity by pointing out that it may merely be a robust contingency in liberal 
societies, and that his theory of justice should only be assessed in the light of this 
context. Could he turn instead to his point concerning the respect for person, thus 
transforming the justification of civility from the starting point of a purported fact about 
pluralistic society, and returning it to a Kantian sense of facts about persons? We might 
say that Rawls’ notion of civility is a contractarian one that is based on an inherent 
respect for the rational qualities of persons. We can see this in the way that Rawls 
entrusts the principle of impartial rational deliberation as a metaphysic of right, much in 
the way of Kant, to constitute just procedure and influence outcomes. Here it is assumed
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that the rational self will seek self-preservation. Under the veil of ignorance, for 
instance, the assumption is that it is irrational not to look after oneself and one’s 
interests. Once this is universalised then we could have the basis for political civility 
that avoids reference to social pluralism or diversity.
2.3 Prudential Reasons for Political Civility: Civility by Contract 
2.3.1 Hobbes and Political Civility
Before looking at how we could understand a Hobbesian interpretation of political 
civility, I want to address the issue of the sense in which we can categorise Hobbes as a 
liberal. Some doubt might be thrown on this. We might conceive of Hobbes as 
addressing issues of authority rather than individual freedom34. But Hobbes can be said 
to be a liberal in the sense of not equating freedom with authority35. Hobbes is clear that 
liberty begins where the law (or authority) ends, and he articulates this liberty as a 
material state of being. “By Liberty, is understood....the absence of externall 
Impediments: which Impediments, may oft take away part of a mans power to do what 
he would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according to his 
judgment, and reason shall dictate to him.” 36
We can, I argue, conceive from Hobbes’ writings an understanding of political civility 
that is derived not as a norm that combats our fear of the concentration of authority, as 
we will see with the case of Adam Smith, but instead as a norm that combats our fear of 
the incursions of other individuals. The motivation to civil union here is one based on 
the avoidance of fear. Hobbes believed that it is a fact that we are all, in the state of 
nature, a threat to one another. “And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, 
which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies, and in the way to 
their End...endeavor to destroy, or subdue one another.”37We are a threat to one another
34 See Raphael (1984) p. 27.
35 Ibid.
36 Hobbes (1968) Part I. Chapter. XIV.
37 Tester (1992) p. 55.
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because we are material beings with selfish desires. It is a natural fact, according to 
Hobbes, that men desire what they want—which “cesaith only in death”. Underlying 
this relationship between individuals is the following assumption about human worth. 
“The value, or Worth of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that is to say, so much 
as would be given for the use of his Power: and therefore is not absolute; but a thing 
dependent on the need and judgment of another. ” 38
Political or civil union for Hobbes is inextricably linked with agreement or consent. 
Oakeshott writes, ‘”’The word ‘civil’ in Hobbes, means artifice springing from more 
than one will. Civil history....is the register of events that have sprung from the 
voluntary actions of man in commonwealths. Civil authority is authority arsing out of 
an agreement of wills...” 39 Civility, then, is a human artifice that results from the 
coordination problems deriving from our essentially selfish natures for Hobbes. Such 
natural realities, for Hobbes, create the need for the art of civility40. There is no 
propriety in our nature; propriety is a construct that comes about through the making of 
covenants. There is no justice in nature—“every' man has a right to everything”. Justice 
only comes about by covenant41.
Hobbes endorses norms of civil compliance on the grounds that this will enable all to 
avoid a state of war—the basis of the contract that individuals have entered into with 
the state and their fellow citizens42. In addition to this, the seeking of civic peace, for 
Hobbes, is something that comes naturally to individuals. Hobbes writes, “These are the 
Laws of Nature, dictating Peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes; 
and which onely concern the doctrine of Civill society. ” 43 For Hobbes, the concern is 
for the protection of persons qua their identity as naturally self-preserving agents. We 
by nature seek self-preservation: “....no man can transferre, or lay down his Right to 
save himself from Death, Wounds”44. The commonwealth is the political mechanism 
that ensures self-preservation and freedom from the state of war of all against all. The
38 Hobbes (1968) Part 1 Chap. 10.
39 Oakeshott (1975) p. 28.
40 Ibid.
41 Hobbes (1968) Part 1 Chapter. 15
42 ibid. Chapter 15, p. 205. See also Chapter 15 pp.201-2.
43 Ibid Chapter 15, p. 214. See also Chapter 30 p. 377.
44 Ibid. Part I chap. 14.
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behavioural norms that produce orderliness and respect for others in the political 
domain are meant to “ ...craft the means of civil peace and so forestall within a citizenry 
the emergence of pernicious dispositions that would threaten to dissolve the 
commonwealth.”45
However, it should be noted that Hobbes’s commonwealth is not deliberative. The 
sovereign, empowered by covenant, deems what is necessary for peace and self- 
preservation46. A law is ‘the expression of the Will of a Sovereign” and is not an 
eclectic mix of legal judgment, public views, ethical consideration, etc. The sovereign 
has legibus solutus or unconditional authority to make or to repeal law47.This 
unconditional authority comes from the sovereign’s duty to protect citizens from the 
state of nature. It means that the sovereign can ‘make, repeal, interpret, administer and 
enforce rules...negotiate, make war, conclude peace, levy taxes...of such dimensions as 
he shall think fit.”48 The demands of citizenship for Hobbes are minimal and go only so 
far as to maintain overall stability and order. As Dietz writes, “ ....the Hobbesian citizen 
exhibits precious few of the attributes that equip him for a life of participatory self- 
government, the performance of public service, and the cultivation of political liberty.”49
2.3.2 Locke and Political Civility.
Locke is specific about the proper ends of government and how the state exemplifies 
civility to its citizens. Civil government for Locke, as with Hobbes, comes about due to 
the agreement by individuals to leave the state of nature, “ Wherever....any number of 
men so unite into one society as to quit every one his executive power of the law of 
Nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a political or civil society.” 
50 Civil society is constituted by having one unifying identity of ‘commonwealth’ upon 
which all members of society recognize and turn to a common authority to settle their
45 Dietz (1990) p.102.
46 Hobbes (1968) See Part II chap. 18.
47 See Oakeshott (1975) p. 43.
48 Ibid.
49 Dietz (1990) p. 113.
50 See “True End of Government” in Locke (1956)Chap 7. 89.
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disputes. “ For the end of civil society being to avoid and remedy those inconveniences 
of the state of Nature which necessarily follow from every man’s being judge in his 
own case, by setting up a known authority to which every one of that society may 
appeal upon any injury received, or controversy that may arise, and which every one of 
the society ought to obey”31. Individuals would only give up their natural right to protect 
their own rights to life and liberty if this power were transferred to an authority that 
agreed to protect such rights for all. An absolute monarchy, for Locke, that takes on no 
such agreement and rules on the basis of unchecked and arbitrary power is “inconsistent 
with civil society, and so can be no form of civil government for all” 52 An absolute 
monarchy, in other words, would involve subjecting oneself to the discretionary 
judgements of others, which was the evil of the state of Nature from which individuals 
sought escape53.
Another motivation to civil union, for Locke, is the natural need of individuals to 
protect their property. Locke wrote, “ The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting 
into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of 
their property.” 54 The state could only take property from individuals with the consent 
of those individuals. However, the state was granted the power to regulate, without 
dispossessing, the property of individuals for the public good55. Property ownership was 
central to identity of individuals. The labour and resourcefulness applied to property 
and the productivity that resulted from it were seen by Locke as vital elements of 
individual expression.
51 ibid. 90.
52 See “On Civil Government” in Locke (1956) p. 160.
53 It’s worth noting with Locke the Christian dimension to his notion of constructing a civic order—the influence of 
divinity in the overall explanation for why we should take a principled stance to each other and to the common 
authority that reigns over us. Locke offers us one of the best examples of how the liberal tradition has acknowledged 
the threat that arbitrary interference poses for an individual’s freedom, and how civility requires the protection of the 
private domain of individuals. For Locke, the capacity that others have in the state of nature for arbitrary interference 
threatens the natural law; where the natural law is taken to mean, for Locke, the moral law that is coterminous with 
being God’s creatures and servants. Individuals have an interest as God’s creatures, and these interests are violated if 
the individual is subject to the uninhibited influences of others to ‘judge and punish’ as they see fit. In order to 
protect our obligations to this divine source, Locke held, we need to consent to give up our capacity to interfere with 
others arbitrarily to an external authority. We need, to create a form of political authority that will defend the natural, 
and divinely linked, rights that are essential to the workings of the moral law. For judgement day, it is essential that 
the decisions made in your life are the result of one’s free will, and not the result of the influences of others. 
Authentic decision-making is essential for divine reasons, and a civil society needs to respect this aspect of persons.
54 Locke (1956) Chapter IX. P. 180. nt. 124. See also Chapter XI p.
55 ibid. Chapter XI p. 187-8.
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However, unlike Hobbes there is a deliberative component to Locke’s account of the 
political civility shown between the individual and the state. By including the right of 
appeal to include matters over any ‘controversy that may arise” Locke includes a greater 
level of engagement between citizenry and state than Hobbes. Grant writes that, for 
Locke, “governments are established to provide an impartial common judge” to which 
individuals can appeal when they feel that their rights are violated. It is in the state of 
nature, Grant says of Locke’s thinking, that each is the judge for one’s own affairs. It is 
the performance of this kind of action in the state of nature that threatens others because 
such “judgments are not likely to be reasonable because men will be partial to 
themselves....To remedy the inconveniences that follow from this state, government 
must somehow be capable of greater rationality in resolving men’s disputes than men 
exercise on their own behalf. And this capability depends decisively on the 
disinterestedness and impartiality of government”56 and “ Rational conduct requires 
unprejudiced consideration of all the evidence and arguments involved in a question.”57 
Such a concern for the impartial and reasoned judgments of the state in relation to their 
civil engagement with the citizenry is reflected in Locke’s conception of the importance 
of rational understanding58. It will only be reasonable government that will maintain a 
civic order that avoids the prejudices and subjective judgments of the state of nature.
2.4 Political Civility by Social Force.
2.4.1 Constant and the Political Civility of the Moderns.
Constant made the distinction between the liberty of ancients and the liberty of the 
moderns. The former gave individuals the task of “active and continuous participation 
in the exercise of collective power.”59 Whereas the latter sought “the peaceful
56 Grant (1987) p. 181.
57 Ibid. p. 184.
58 See Garforth (1966) p. 12. 
59Constant (1819) p. 547.
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enjoyment of individual or private independence. ” 60 Modern liberty, for Constant, 
required a minimal amount of laws that sought only to protect the private sphere of 
individuals61. It did not require individuals to partake in the day-to-day running of 
public business, as with the politics conducted within the Greek polis. While Constant 
did not use the terminology of ‘civility’ to describe the nature of the political relations 
between individuals and the state, I will adopt the same strategy as I did with Nozick 
and present an overview of the associative constraints that Constant stipulated. Such 
constraints, I argue, are worthy of comparison with our modern notions of political 
civility.
For our purposes it is important to see the basis on which Constant presents this 
distinction. His mission is not to accord the private/public distinction on any meta 
physical or ahistorical account of individual rights as we saw with Kant, Nozick and 
Rawls62. Instead, Constant’s justification for the liberal divide between private and 
public spheres is based on a consideration of, and reaction to, the prevailing social 
forces. Constant wrote in the revolutionary period of eighteenth century France. The 
extremes of democratic patriotism were in stark contrast to the established traditions of 
monarchical power. Constant feared the extremes of both. Democratic patriotism 
brought with it the fear of uninhibited majoritarianism, and monarchical power the 
concentration of power into the hands of the unaccountable. What was needed, from 
Constant’s perspective, was a civic force that existed between these extremes to temper 
them.
This intermediary force, was for Constant, a society of individuals who identified 
themselves as entities distinct from the state and from a collective, social whole. They 
were concerned primarily for their own welfare rather than devoting themselves to 
national identity or monarchical subservience. Holmes writes that De Stael wrote in the 
spirit of Constant by stating that public sentiment is based on an admiration of peace 
and the desire to obtain and preserve wealth. A society that wants such outcomes will 
focus more on the administrative issues concerning the state rather essentially political
6,1 Ibid.
61 See Hoffman (1980) p. 432.
62 See Holmes and Siedentap (1979) p. 32.
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ones63. Individuals, in other words, are primary interested in and should be left to pursue 
their own ‘occupations, undertakings and fantasies.64
Under Constant’s socially sensitive account of political thought, we are expected to 
view “the other” as worthy of respect as an individual because such an outlook will 
avoid the consequences of oppression by concentrated powers. Also, the state needs to 
act civilly towards individuals respecting the individual’s contingent rights to enjoy a 
private domain of existence. This ideal of modern civility towards others was 
constructed by Constant for pragmatic reasons. There is evidence with Constant of the 
demographic influences on political thought, and he placed more emphasis on the 
influences of these forces on political ideals. French society, circa 1798, was a society 
that had developed into one of mass and diverse culture, with a growing influence of 
commercial activity and openness to trade. Modern liberty and civility to others, for 
Constant, was more suited to the realities of the time; rather than the ideals of ancient 
liberty which were confined to societies that were “sparsely populated, territorially 
compact, religiously homogenous, and slaveholding warrior republics.”65
A middling social entity between the state and collective identity, concerned for the 
protection of private welfare, serves, for Constant, as a civic force. If the attention of 
individuals is deflected away from issues of national concern and orientated more 
toward the private, then the tendency for collective totalitarianism is reduced. But this 
does not mean that individuals ought to have an exclusive concern for their private 
lives. Constant expects individuals to vote for political representatives and to present, 
when required, “remonstrations, petitions, and demands which authorities are more or 
less obliged to take into account.”66 Through the form of the state, citizens are able to 
share information and decide what is the best course of action for the public good67.
However, in engaging with the state in this way, citizens are not to identify with a 
communal identity; they are to retain their individualism in the light of this
63 See Holmes (1984) p. 35.
64 See Constant (1988). p. 104.
65 See Constant (1819) p. 421-424.
66 Ibid. 2: 541.
67 See Holmes (1984) pp. 141-43.
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communication at a state level. The source of individual enlightenment does not lie with 
political association with the state, because the state is inherently a threat. The 
assumption is, as Kelly writes, “....for every power-holder, no matter how honourable, 
will find reason to transgress the rights of ordinary persons.”68 Enlightenment instead 
lies in the exercise of free choice by individuals. Constant wrote, “Man is not simply in 
need of relaxation, application, domestic happiness and private virtue. Nature has also 
given him faculties which if not nobler, are at least more brilliant. More than any others, 
these faculties are threatened by arbitrary government.”69 The state does not exist as an 
institution that persuades individuals about what sort of life to live, rather it is 
considered merely as a “protective agency, committed to protecting the orderly and just 
conduct of private affairs and to the common defence, prevented from impeding the 
normal advance of civilization by having its powers limited and checked.”70 Political 
life is essential for finding solution to common problems among free individuals, but 
political life does not constitute the identity of individuals. Individuals have value and 
exist independently from their political functions.
2.4,2 Adam Smith and Political Civility.
There is another liberal ‘interpretation’ of civil union I wish to present that is also 
understood as a as a force against absolutism. It is an account of political association, 
like Constant’s, that gives priority to privatism over public power. It is a notion of civil 
union in retreat in the sense that it is founded on a stance of ignorance towards “the 
other”, rather than one that holds that human identity is formulated by the edifying 
processes of political interaction. But his is not an ignorance that is justified because it 
is entrusted to rational persons. Rather, the allure of ignorance towards the other is 
based on the idea that it prevents the concentration of power into an absolutist form. 
Specifically, economic relations between individuals that produce this outcome are, for 
Adam Smith, constitutive of the principled stance we ought to take to each other.
68 Kelly (1992) p. 42.
69 Constant (1814) p. 206.
70 See Kelly (1992) p. 53. See Also Constant (1814) p. 231.
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For Smith we should have no direct concern for ‘the other’. Our social and economic 
union is based on the self rather than on “the other”. But there is however an indirect 
concern with “the other”. Concerns for ‘the other’ in Smith’s libertarian order is only 
held in the minimal sense that the outcomes determined by the operations of the 
invisible hand will be optimal for all. Smith wrote, “Every individual necessarily 
labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally 
neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting
it......He intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the 
worse for society that it was no part of his intention. By pursuing his own interest he 
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to 
promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the 
public good.”'1
Civil union is to be constructed so as to allow the fruits of unfettered social and 
economic union to appear. The biggest threat for Smith is the incursion on this process 
of absolute state power. Political civility as a way of combating absolute power is 
brought out by Smith with his ideas about the institution of private property and the 
exercise of one’s talents as one sees fit. The holding of private property and the exercise 
of talents out of a concern for self-interest only provides greater security for all than a 
society which holds property in common and calls upon individuals to act for the sake 
of the public good. This is so because such provisions unintentionally create edifying 
conditions of inequality. The assumption made here by Smith is that it is better to be 
subject to the unintended vicissitudes of fortune rather than the intentional interference 
of others72. This interpretation of political civility is not justified on the basis of 
individuals being intrinsically valuable ends in themselves. Rather, it is a form of 
civility justified on the basis of the greater utility it produces for all by the way of 
security.
71 Smith (1976a) 455-6.
72 Smith (1976a) Bk. 5. Part. 2.
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These conditions are consistent with civil union, Smith holds, because they force some 
to be subordinate to others- a subordination that produces stability for all. Smith wrote, 
“Men of inferior wealth combine to defend those of superior wealth in the possession of 
their property, in order that men of superior wealth may combine to defend them in the 
possession of theirs. ” 73 Material subordination thus places each individual in a polity in 
mutually advantageous relations to each other—the materially inferior have good reason 
to respect the materially superior because the latter are best equipped to protect them, 
and the superior have good reason to protect the inferior because in so doing the inferior 
remain subordinate to them.
The role of the state, then, for Smith is a minimal one: to maintain the rights of property 
that contingently prompt an unequal distribution of resources that, due to its production 
of subordination, creates civil order and security. Smith wrote,” Civil government, so 
far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of 
the rich against the poor.” 74 The state is to limit itself to “an exact administration of 
justice” 75 where this is taken to mean the maintenance of order and stability, and to 
avoid fraud and dishonesty. The state is limited in its knowledge of market realities so is 
therefore not justified in determining how economic arrangements should be 
constructed76. The state treats everyone civically if it promotes a stability that enables a 
utility-maximizing society to function. A civil society is one where it is crucial that all 
stand in some relation of dependency to each other77. “In a civilized society he stands at 
all times in need of the cooperation and assistance of great multitudes. ” 78
It is not surprising, then, that for Smith the division of labour is crucial for the 
maintenance of social and economic stability and civil union. Divided labour produces 
greater interdependence, thus it stimulates the need for all to associate with others and 
boost an economic multiplier effect that increases utility for all. The division of labour
73 Ibid.
74 ibid.
75 ibid. Part II p. 49, 178, 209, 445. See also Wealth of Nations I p. 264, 328.
76 See Reisman (1976) p. 195.
77 See especially Smith (1896) (B) pp. 160-1; (A) vol. VI pp.8-11.
78 ibid.
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thus necessitates interaction between strangers, and it is only through such extended 
interaction that we can come to have sympathy for each other.
But political civility in the sense that I have applied it here to Smith is not a progressive 
ideal. Social security gained via subordination and interdependence between different 
sectors of society will not necessarily imply the rational intellectual advancement of all. 
Subordination will mean that the poor will likely fall into a state of torpor making them 
unsuitable for political participation or engagement with the state. Smith wrote of the 
lower-class workers that “ The torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable of 
relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous,
noble or tender sentiment..... Of the great and extensive interests of his counting he is
altogether incapable of judging.”79. It should come as no surprise then that Smith did not 
see civil union as coterminous with democratic expression80.
Nonetheless, the freedom of economic relations is meant to awaken all to the 
importance of showing sympathy to others. Smith wrote, “Hardiness is the character 
most suitable to the circumstances of a savage; sensibility to those of one who lives in a 
very civilized society.” 81 Open and free commercial activity for Smith was meant to 
inculcate the disciplines in citizens of self-control and moderation in relation to the 
interests of others82.
2.5 Individuals, the State and the Metaphvsic of the Right
2.5.1 Political Civility and the Obligations of Individuals.
What we see from the above is that liberalism admits of different reasons for why an 
individual ought to be politically civil or identify, at the very least, with a particular 
form of civil union. But what we can deduce from these variations within liberalism are
79 Smith (1976a)p. 303. See also Part 3. Article 2.
80 For this point see ibid Part II p. 137, 259, 299, 342. See also Smith (1976b) p. 78, 338, 339, 358. and Smith (1896) 
p. 28, 54, 262.
81 See Smith (1976) IV ii.9, p. 456.
82 See Smith (1976b) VII.ii. Ipp. 11-14, pp. 270-72. See also. Muller (1993) p. 96.
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some general principles of liberal thought. Liberalism is a political theory made up of 
many arguments that nonetheless link to common themes.
Liberals hold that value does not exist independently of human consciousness. It is 
human consciousness that rationally seeks optimal states of affairs83, that performs 
consent, that chooses, that desires, that reflects, etc. Individuals, liberals hold, are the 
rightful determinants of what is in their interests. Individuals, however, may hold that 
they do not have the best knowledge about what is in their interest, but they do possess 
the right to consent to have someone else determine this for them. But such agreements 
are not necessarily permanent. Political civility from a liberal perspective requires that 
individuals maintain the right to exit this relationship and the right to give their consent 
to change it in the future.
Individuals are expected to show a respect for rule of law. Being civil in the liberal 
sense is respecting the rights of others to non-interference. The liberal notion of civility 
assumes that normative individualism is true for all members of a civil society; each 
member of such a society needs to acknowledge that every member of that society is 
individuated as persons and are entitled to certain rights. In this sense, liberalism 
implies a duty for each individual to see the other as equal in a certain sense. Equal in 
the possession of rational capacity, equal in the sense of exposure to arbitrary 
interference, equal in exposure to the general will, equal in being self-owning, etc.
One is motivated to be civil on the basis of reciprocity—by respecting the non­
interference of others I am investing in a relationship of reciprocation whereby others 
respect my right to non-interference. Tolerance, for example, is a civic virtue for 
liberals on this basis. If I tolerate the view of others I can expect others to tolerate my 
views. Toleration is not motivated out of a compassion for the other, but is ‘civically
R' The famous objection to this view is the prisoner’s dilemma. If I am an employer, it is in my self-interest that my 
labour force works for nothing. For my labour force, it is in their self-interest that they get paid for no work. We 
come together. Being rationally self-interested here produces a deadlock —not, in itself, an optimal outcome. Self- 
interest does not mysteriously or naturally work, in itself to produce an optimal outcome. But the view may only be 
that self-interest always works towards optimality. Both parties need to bargain here so as to reach a workable 
compromise. It is only human preferences and desires for optimal outcomes that forces individuals to seek another 
solution in such a deadlock, not the conflicting logic that produces the deadlock in the first place.
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motivated’—it produces a modus operandi outcome that is good for stability in a 
pluralistic society.
2.5.2 Political Civility and the Obligations of the State.
Liberals, as well, hold that the state must be held in a principled relation towards the 
citizenry. The state, in its actions, is required to act in accordance with the rule of law. 
Specifically, it is called upon to act according to the principles of procedural justice. 
Liberal civility here derives from the normative assumption about the equality of 
individuals (each counts once as a bearer of the right to non-interference); and the right 
to non-interference implies protection of these individual rights from suppression by the 
majority or by arbitrary means within institutional practices.
Procedural justice produces social benefits for all. Klosko writes of the importance of 
procedure in relation to securing conformity to rules, adherence with precedents, 
consistency across persons and over time, honesty in admitting institutional flaws, 
acting in the spirit of fairness, treat subordinates with respect, bias suppression and 
neutrality, accuracy, etc84. The state exists, according to liberalism, as a procedural body 
to decide between competing parties. People should be left free to work things out by 
themselves, and the state’s role is limited to a facilitative one. Liberal political theories 
generally argue that the public good is best understood within a framework of rights (or 
liberties) and duties within which people may pursue their separate ends85. The state 
takes no role in determining what conception of the good life individuals should adopt86. 
The state is only there to resolve disputes-parties do not seek shared outcomes because 
society is inherently plural with vastly different moral, religious and philosophical 
views. In deciding which policies to adopt and implement, the state is informed by the
84 See Klosko (2000) chapters 5 and 8.
85 “the state should leave its citizens to set their own goals, to shape their own lives, and should confine itself to 
establishing arrangements which allow each citizen to pursue his own goals as he sees fit—consistent with every 
other citizen’s being able to do the same.” “Jones (1989) p. 9
86 See Kukathas (1996)
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democratic legislature about policy goals and implements these in way that is consistent 
with basic rights of individuals87.
But state power in a liberal democracy cannot be concentrated power. In order to ensure 
that individuals and their rights are not coerced illegitimately, state power is divided or 
separated. The judiciary implements the rule of law —and the individual rights it 
contains —as a check against the powers of the executive and the legislature. 
Conversely, the executive and the legislature retain the right to implement the policies 
that are the result of their representative functions as authorised by democratic election. 
The legislature, in turn, checks the executive by way of constitutional procedure in the 
form of parliamentary practice.
The formalist or proceduralist function of the liberal state does not merely facilitate fair 
decision procedures with no concern for the outcomes or decisions reached by those 
procedures. There is a sense in which the liberal state is not merely formalist or 
procedural in its actions within a civil society. There is a sense in which we are justified 
in saying a liberal state is obligated to ensure that all outcomes of the free decisions 
made by individuals in their associations with each other must be consistent with the 
founding principles of liberalism itself. For example, the outcomes of freely chosen 
associations between rational persons must not violate the law; they must not violate the 
liberal principles of freedom of movement, speech, equal opportunity, etc. Ultimately, 
the outcomes reached by the free decisions made between individuals, or by the state’s 
protection of the rights of all, must not produce outcomes that are detrimental to their 
autonomy. Most of all, for my purposes, the liberal state is obligated to ensure that the 
outcomes of free associations are life preserving.
S7 For example, results cannot discriminate against the rights of minorities. See Cohen (1994).
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2.6 Rights
2.6.1 The Right to Life
So far I have emphasised liberalism’s commitment to the procedural relations that exist 
between the state and individuals. Individuals in a liberal polity are, in theory, expected 
to engage with the state as claimants. Their individual rights are entrenched in law and 
the right to access the legal institutions of the state upon purported violations of these 
rights, by other individuals or the state itself, is an essential requirement. The liberal 
state, in return, is constitutionally required to provide the legal institutions that facilitate 
this right of access, and must do so without discrimination or partiality. These are the 
core principles of civil union in a liberal polity.
However, the liberal state can be extended in scope beyond this procedural relation to 
one that ensures the prevalence of certain outcomes. The liberal state not only provides 
avenues for claims of rights violation, it also must maintain conditions of order and 
stability that enable individuals to exercise their rights. The liberal state is committed to 
ensuring that all individuals enjoy freedom from arbitrary incursions against their 
person and property by other individuals and other states. This commitment works 
under the assumption that individuals cannot exercise free choice in an environment of 
arbitrary invasion by others. The value of the private lives of individuals must be upheld 
by law, and indiscretions of the private sphere must be deterred by the threat of penalty 
and punishment. There will be laws against actions that cease life such as murder, 
manslaughter, omissions to assist, negligence, misadventure, etc.
This duty to protect the rights of individuals, to positively maintain conditions under 
which individuals can freely exercise their rights, extends to other forms of 
prioritisation by the state for some liberals, although not all. The liberal state will be 
expected to use its discretion to rank and favour some rights over others. For example, 
the right to life is seen as a fundamental right that will outweigh less fundamental (civil) 
rights as the rights to belief, speech, choice and property. For example, the judiciary in a 
liberal society can override the right of parents to choose when they take custody of
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children when the latter are denied basic medical treatment by the former. Take, for 
example, cases where parents with extreme religious convictions spurn the use of 
modern medicine on their seriously ill child. In this case, the liberal state will prioritise 
the child’s individual right to life over the rights of the parents to believe what they 
wish and to choose as they see fit.
The liberal state will also prioritise the right to life over property rights when, for 
example, it regulates the production of consumer goods to ensure that no products pose 
a serious threat to life. A liberal state is entitled to regulate the safety standards of 
protection equipment so as to ensure product quality, and to regulate the demand and 
supply forces in the production and distribution of drugs. A liberal state will also 
concern itself with regulating workplace conditions for workers to ensure that no 
serious threat to life prevails. Here the state uses its capacity as a legislative body to 
override the rights of business owners to choose and exercise outcomes according to 
their own conscience.
The right to life is held by liberals to be inalienable88. A right can exist for an individual 
in a latent sense. A right can constitute a claim of control that individuals can make over 
the domain of their life. In this sense, one may have the right to something—be entitled 
to choose as to the nature of its use—but not exercise that right. However, the right to 
life exists in a more fundamental sense for liberals. It is a right that individuals have 
even if they do not overtly express their desire to adopt its use. It is an essential right 
that all individuals are entitled to and which all are assumed, by the state, to want to be 
realised. This means that each person has a claim over the continued existence of their 
life prior to justifications or considerations that may be put as to why that life might be 
discontinued. Absent such justification and considerations, no one can have their life, 
and the issue of its existence or discontinuance, alienated by the arbitrary incursions of 
others nor the state. The distinction that Rawls makes between constitutional rights and 
urgent rights will clarify the point here. The former are rights that are rights of 
expression—the rights held equally among all citizens to believe, move, speak, own,
8S Liberals need not hold that life per se has intrinsic value. Life in itself is not of value in itself. The life of cancer 
cells or viruses is not held to have intrinsic value, and this life can legitimately be terminated for the sake of 
protecting human life.
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etc. The latter, however, are rights to existence itself; they are what we might call the 
rights of biological integrity. For example, we can speak of urgent rights as the rights to 
food and clean water.
2.6.2 The Harm Principle.
Liberalism prioritises the right to life, where such a right is understood as the right to 
avoid the unjustified cessation of biological continuance, over other rights in its lexical 
ordering. But is there a different interpretation of this ‘right to life’ principle within 
liberalism? Specifically, can liberalism hold that ‘the right to life’ implies not only an 
obligation on the part of the state to ensure biological continuance, but also a right to a 
life free from harm? There is a strong sense in which the liberal state is not only 
obligated to protect individuals from conditions that threaten their life, but are also 
obligated to protect individuals from conditions that threaten to harm them, even if such 
harm will not result in the cessation of their life.
Mill’s liberalism and harm principle implies such a right. For Mill, freedom is permitted 
where harm is absent. No one should be interfered with if their actions do not cause 
harm to others. Mill, however, does not go into detail about the sorts of actions that 
constitute harm to others. He believed that what constituted harm could be determined 
by community standards.”89 Rights to non-harm, in other words were to be determined 
by community considerations90.
However, there are principled stipulations as to what constitutes harm in a general 
sense. We can at least deduce from Mill’s writings that it is not sufficient to argue that 
harm results from the failure to fulfil desire. If it were, then the failure to fulfil the 
desires of those who wish to see what they take to be the ‘foolish, perverse, or wrong 
actions of others” would count as harm. But Mill denies that this is the case. The
89 Ibid.
90 Ten (1981) raises the objection to this idea that opinion or tacit understanding determines what our rights are. He 
holds that this exposes the determination of our interest and the degree to which they are considered in the public 
realm to the whims of majorities. Honderich also see this problem and propose the principle of utility as a 
determinant of what our interests are rather than majority opinion. See also Honderich (1969) p. 181-6.
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unfulfillment of these types of desires held for these reasons does not harm their 
possessors91.
Mill does not explicitly state what the interests are which, if violated, would constitute 
harm. The language he uses to describe the impacts we have on each other is varied. He 
speaks of ‘effects’, ‘concerns’ and ‘interests’ that come into consideration when 
alluding to harm92. Even if all action in some way imposes influences on someone else’s 
welfare to a varying extent, Mill holds that we need to be very wary of interfering with 
the perpetrator of those influences because the latter has a right to freedom. Our 
‘interest consideration’ in other words needs to be tempered by our right to freedom. 
The violation of the personal autonomy of the perpetrator here is just as damaging as 
the influences experienced by the victims of the action. In fact, Mill is more explicit 
about the harm caused by the violations of freedom when the state coerces individuals, 
rather than the non-bodily harm caused to others by those who exercise such freedom. 
When we coerce others to temper their freedoms we threaten the social security of all93. 
Mill does say “it must by no means be supposed that because damage, or probability of 
damage, to the interest of others, can alone justify the interference of society, that 
therefore it always does justify such interference.” (My emphasis)
The simplest sense of the harm principle takes it that we can only interfere with or 
coerce others if their actions are causing physical harm to others. Yet Mill does hold an 
exception to this rule. We can coerce others if they are not making their choices on ‘best 
evidence’ and the action under question poses a serious threat to their self-preservation. 
The example given by Mill is that of the person who intends to cross a bridge that he 
falsely believes to be intact. This is preventing someone from causing harm to 
themselves because they lack the important information pertaining to their fundamental 
interest in self-preservation. No one can be interfered with in the name of promoting his 
or her own good. But there is a sense in which coercion in the name of saving the life of 
another is justified if that other is not in full possession of the facts.
91 For this point see Ten (1981) .p 54
92 ibid p. 14
93 ibid. p. 55, 59.
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There is a ‘best information’ obligation here for the liberal state; ensuring that 
individuals make choices while at the same time have information about their salient 
interest at hand. Here we can see how the state’s influence in dialogical engagement 
between freely consenting parties could be justified on a Millian basis. Coercion is 
legitimate if it involves the delivery of important information to individuals about how 
to maintain their own self-preservation. But ‘the bridge’ case is a case of clear danger to 
self-preservation. Where does Mill stand in relation to other areas of life that may not 
threaten the immediate cessation of life but do affect, detrimentally, the quality of one’s 
rationality and well-being over time? Can we deduce from Mill’s preference for the 
higher rational pleasures that the state has an obligation to promote these where 
promotion means ‘informing’ others of the means to acquire such a capacity? There is 
no clear indication here as to what an interest amounts to, nor a clear emphasis on the 
nature of the state’s obligations in relation to the protection of higher-order interests.
However, what both the right to life and harm principles do is increase the scope of 
state concern. The liberal ideal of individuals being free to form associations and 
consent to treatment is constrained by the state’s responsibility to ensure that the rights 
to life and non-harm are protected for all. This will mean that liberal civility entails 
inclusive public consideration for every agreement reached between consenting parties. 
But it is only a minimal sense of inclusive public consideration at work here. There is 
evidence in Mill of the state taking the responsibility to offer avenues for assessing 
when the adverse effects of free action create a prima facie case for the violation of an 
interest, and setting up processes to make judgments on what the state response should 
be94. Mill does see an important role for parliamentary representatives. Mill expects 
elected representatives to act as effective intermediaries between citizens and the state. 
He wrote, “The expert representative is to expose himself (sic) to the committee of 
grievances and opinion and formulate a stance which can then be applied to public 
officials in the sense of ‘check by criticism, and eventually by withdrawing their 
support, those high public officers who really conduct the public business, or who 
appoint those by whom it is conducted. ” 95
94 M i l l  (1974) p. 74.
95 ibid. p. 42-43.
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But Mill’s expectation of representative government seems to be limited in such a way 
that takes the emphasis away from an open and deliberative arrangement with those 
who are subject to state rule. Mill wrote, “ ...the proper office of a representative 
assembly is to watch and control the government: to throw the light of publicity on it 
acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers 
questionable; to censure them if found condemnable... to expel them from office.... 
This is surely ample power, and security enough for the liberty of the nation. ” 96
But he does indicate that public participation may be required to protect the interests 
that all have in avoiding harm. Mill wrote that if power is held by an exclusive class 
there is always the possibility that the interest of those outside this group are always in 
danger of being overlooked.97 He is making reference here mainly to the interest of the 
working class in relation to the capitalist classes, and he adds that the ‘working men’s 
view’ ought to be respectfully listened to.”98Then he adds, “In addition to this, the 
Parliament has an office, not inferior even to this in importance; to be at once the 
nation’s Committee of Grievances, and its Congress of Opinions; an arena in which not 
only the general opinion of the nation, but that of every section of it...can produce itself 
in full light and challenge discussion.... where those whose opinion is overruled, feel 
satisfied that it is heard, and set aside not by a mere act of will, but for what are thought 
superior reasons, and commend themselves as such to the representatives of the 
majority of the nation....where statesmen can assure themselves, far more certainly than 
by other signs, what elements of opinion and power are growing, and what declining, 
and are enabled to shape their measures with some regard not solely to present 
exigencies, but to tendencies in progress”. Mill seems to hold that it is when we 
plausibly suppose that others’ interests are being harmed that we cast public jurisdiction 
over the action99.
96 Ibid. p. 42
97 See Mill (1882) pp.22-3.
98 Mill (1882) pp. 22-3. 
"Ibid. p. 132.
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Mill holds that “the rights and interests of every or any person are only secure from 
being disregarded, when the person interested is himself able, and habitually disposed,
to stand up for them.....each is the only safe guardian of his own rights and interests.”100
But what does ‘standing up’ mean here for Mill? Does it mean merely voting, or does 
one pursue one’s interest in a more thorough or inclusive relation within state decision­
making processes? As we have seen, there are avenues for complaint and grievance for 
citizens with relation to the state, but Mill’s philosophical analysis does not go into any 
depth about how either the state or the citizenry could identify specific categories of 
actions that are inherently detrimental to the well-being of persons. It is not clear from 
Mill’s writing what constitutes an interest nor what level of harm constitutes a violation 
of interests. Instead, Mill seems to focus more on what our rights are and sets the degree 
of state action on what violates our rights rather than what violates our interests.
2.6.3 The Right to Welfare.
Some liberals propose that liberalism implies the provision of welfare rights. Here it is 
held that the state must not only protect life and prevent harm, but also must ensure the 
outcome of an adequate level of welfare for all; and not just ensure procedural civility 
or the prevalence of ‘best information’ to those engaged in freely consented, dialogical 
processes. Welfare liberals endorse wealth redistribution as a means to promote human 
welfare. However, such a redistribution is done only in the name of promoting the 
liberal values of enhanced choice, and opportunity. The state does not redistribute 
wealth on the basis of satisfying welfare understood as needs or basic interest 
fulfilment, but in satisfying liberal requirements of benefits to individual freedom, 
equality, compensation for past, unjust interference. , etc.
Rawls’ liberalism, for example, promotes human welfare not on the basis of any 
intrinsic value that such a state of affairs has for humans, but on the basis that a state of 
affairs in which human welfare is protected is one that fully informed, rational beings 
would choose in the original position. We saw earlier that Rawls is influenced by the
100 Mill (1882) chap. 3 pp.54, 55.
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Kantian notion of individuals as primarily rational beings. King and Waldron state that 
with Rawls we move from a general knowledge of human psychology to “conclusions 
about the sort of social arrangements people could live with. Faced with great 
deprivation and inequality, people cannot be expected to live quiet and satisfied lives. 
They therefore cannot in good faith undertake or agree to live with such deprivation and 
inequality. ” 101 Thus, for Rawls, it is the rational nature of persons that justifies outcomes 
in a liberal order102.
Other welfare liberals value human welfare for different reasons. Hobhouse, for 
example, held that while the liberal state exists primarily to “secure the conditions upon 
which mind and character may develop themselves....upon which citizens are able to 
win by their own efforts all that is necessary for civic efficiency.”103, he holds in 
addition that such individuals are subject to arbitrary forces beyond their control. These 
forces, in turn, are such a threat to the autonomy of individuals that the state should 
protect all from them in the name of justice. Hobhouse wrote that for the individual “It 
is not his fault if there is over production in his industry, or if a new and cheaper 
process has been introduced which makes his particular skill, perhaps the product of 
years of application, a drug in the market....That is why it is not charity but justice for 
which he is asking. ” 104 The demand for human welfare can be made by welfare liberals 
on the basis of justice in the sense of ensuring that individuals get their just deserts.
SUMMARY
In this chapter I have examined the nature of civil union as espoused by some of the 
main proponents of liberal theory. I have highlighted the different reasons by liberals to 
justify the existence of this union in a political context. I began with a reference to 
Kant’s moralized notion of civil union based, as it is, on a respect for the intrinsic value 
of individuality. This aspect of Kant’s theory acts as the foundation for Nozick’s and
101 King and Waldron (1988)p. 441.
103 Hobhouse (1944)p. 83.
104 Ibid. p. 84.
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Rawls’ understanding of civil union in a modern context. Even though the overall 
position taken by both theorists are significantly different they do share this common 
ground. Nozick, however, does not stipulate that the civil union between individuals 
and the state must be based on a dialogical relation about appropriate ends or outcomes. 
Rawls’ liberalism, on the other hand, is more in line with an understanding of civil 
union based on this relationship.
The liberalism of Hobbes presents us with a very different explanation for the origins of 
civil union. Rather than being based on moral reasons to do with the nature of persons 
as rational ends, Hobbes’ liberalism presents fear as the primary motivation to political 
civility. Individuals in this context have good reason to agree to the creation of an 
authoritative force that will protect them from the state of nature. Civil union, in other 
words, is something that appeals to vulnerable individuals who have a deep concern for 
self-preservation. The state of nature, a state of existence where no such authority 
exists, is a threat to the self-interest of individuals. For Locke, civil union must also 
respect this ideal of individuals as self-preserving and self-perpetuating beings. The 
civil union between individuals and the state is created in order to protect individuals 
from the arbitrariness inherent in the state of nature, and to protect the property rights of 
all. Individuality, for Locke, is a trait that is inextricably linked with the possession of, 
and engagement with, property. Labour and property ownership are vital conduits for 
the expression of one’s individual essence, hence the importance of well-defined and 
publicly accepted notions of civil union. Each individual has good reason to be civil to 
other individuals, and to the state, so as to secure such property rights.
I also covered the liberalism of Constant and Smith, and showed how both viewed civil 
union as an essential aspect of avoiding totalitarian control by the state and other 
communal entities. The emphasis here is more on the dangers associated when 
concentrated power is wielded over individuals, rather than with any intrinsic moral 
features of individuality per se.
Even though there are different reasons given by liberals for why civil union is desirable 
or necessary, they do share points of common understanding concerning the rule of law
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and the obligations of citizenship. I have pointed out the common ground on which 
liberals are united. I have also indicated two additional features of liberalism that ought 
to be acknowledged when analysing the nature of civil union. Specifically, a liberal 
polity has to uphold the individual rights of all to life and non-harm. However, while 
liberals are generally committed to the idea that the outcomes of state action must be in 
accordance with the individual rights of all, they do not offer a clear indication of how 
to identity the conditions that harm individuals. This aspect of liberal theory is not well 
advanced. Welfare liberals have acknowledged that this is a major concern for liberal 
theory. I will pick up on this theme again in chapter four.
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3. REPUBLICANISM AND POLITICAL CIVILITY
In this chapter I look at the kind of civil union to which republican political theory 
commits itself. By looking at the prominent forms of republican theory in the current 
literature, I will show that the basis of concerns and obligations of the state in relation to 
citizens is focused on exemplifying a respect for autonomy, self-determination and non­
domination. This bond of concern is termed in republican theory as ‘civic virtue’ and is 
a socio-political trait comparable to that of political civility covered earlier. 
Republicans, I will show, speak less directly of basic human rights than liberals, and the 
way that others are deemed to be treated is subject mostly to the outcomes of 
deliberative process conducted between the state and individuals. These deliberative 
process themselves must ensure that outcomes are not detrimental to the autonomy of 
individuals, but I wish to note that this form of welfarism for individuals is driven, as 
with liberals, by the need to serve the self-determination of individuals and their 
interests within a social context.
3.1 Liberalism and Republicanism: A Theoretical Clarification.
It’s important to begin this chapter by pointing out the sense in which liberalism and 
republicanism are taken to be separate or distinct political idioms. Liberalism holds, as 
we have seen, that state authority and individual freedom are in tension. The affairs of 
the individual, in other words, are distinct and separate both normatively and socially 
speaking, from the affairs of the community and the formal institutions created to 
exercise legitimate coercion over them. The kind of liberalism that best illustrates this is 
that of Isaiah Berlin. Berlin holds that political freedom is a negative ideal in the sense 
that it defines freedom as the absence of interference or coercion against an individual's 
actions, preference formations, and choices. Specifically, Berlin holds, we can define 
freedom as the protection of this private sphere without addressing the issue of ‘Who 
governs me?”. Berlin writes, ‘Political liberty...is simply the area within which a man
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can act unobstructed by others'”. If freedom is measured merely by acts of intrusion or 
their absence, then the issue of who governs my life has no necessary link with my 
freedom. For Berlin, political freedom can exist, and in fact be optimal, in a world 
where the individual does not have any democratic rights1 2. We can imagine a scenario 
where a ‘liberal-minded despot would allow his subjects a large measure of personal 
freedom. ” 3 So, for Berlin, political freedom is one thing and the nature of the political 
authority that stands over me another.
Republicans, however, view political freedom as something more than a brute fact 
about the absence of coercion or interference. Political freedom, in addition, must 
involve the enjoyment of non-interference that is sufficiently secured. This means, for 
republicans, that the issue of ‘who governs me’ does matter. Specifically, those who 
exercise legitimate coercion over an individual do so not just in a way that instantiates 
the fact of non-interference, but instantiates it in such a way that ensures that I enjoy 
that level of non-interference resiliently. It is not enough that each just happens to enjoy 
non-interference for whatever reason, rather the non-interference one enjoys must be an 
institutionally entrenched feature of the polity to which one belongs. In a republic each 
is “to live in resilient, self-assured freedom”4.
So, republicanism holds that state coercion and individual freedom do not stand in this 
opposed relation. Individual freedom and state coercion are compatible notions under 
this theory. Individuals do not cede some of their freedom in order to gain greater 
security from an ontologically independent body such as the state. Rather, individuals 
are socially constructed beings whose very existence and identity is inextricably tied 
with a social context and public authority. Individual life is public life: we each stand 
not in a relation of independence towards each other but in a relation of 
interdependence. Traditionally, republicanism has had a strong connection to communal 
rather than individualistic bonds. The liberty of the ancients, for instance, held a notion 
of republicanism that was not individualistic or liberal. The Greek republic was of the
1 Berlin (1969) p. 122.
2 Ibid. p. 129-30.
3 Ibid. p. 130.
4 Haakonssen (1993) p. 572.
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following kind. While the freedom of ancient Greek democracies was coterminous with 
the possession of rights to political participation and property ownership and was 
contrasted with the deprivation of rights or slavery, there was no idea of individuals 
standing in independent relations to each other5. With ancient freedom, Constant tells 
us, freedom is sought within community bonds; freedom is not understood as being free 
from such bonds. Ostracism, Mulgan writes, was a practice of the Greek democratic 
model that illustrates the importance of community over individual’s rights. Individuals 
could be ostracised from the polis on the basis of their threat to the Greek community, 
and this exercise of state power took place without any rights of due process for the 
individual6. Mulgan also points to the censorship imposed on the prominent Greek 
playwrights when they dared to criticize the Greek community. As Mulgan states, ‘ in 
Athens individuals were fair game, but not the community. ” 7
But republicanism, in its modern form, takes on a more individualistic guise. Modern 
republicanism is based on the idea that individuals are the primary ontological political 
entities, as opposed to ancient republicanism which had no such comprehension of 
individuals. What are the individualist features of republicanism? Harrington’s 
republicanism informs us of how economic independence for all individuals was a 
necessary prerequisite of living in a republic. Individuals had to possess a sufficient 
amount of property to free them from bondage to land owners. Such independence via 
the acquisition of private property for all was a means to “release men to take part in 
citizenship. ” 8 Not only were all individuals to possess a sufficient amount of property as 
a way to empower them to participate in the republic, but the overall distribution of 
property to all had to be such that no one or group of people could use their ownership 
of property to the detriment of others. Hence, the overall distribution of property was 
not to allow grave disparities in wealth. There had to be, in other words, a harmony of 
propertied individuals9. However, this point shows that Harrington’s republicanism 
differs from some of the mainstream forms of liberalism we covered earlier. Due to the 
interdependent relation between individuals, intrapersonal power is of significant
5 See Mulgan (1984) p. 9.
6 Ibid. p. 14.
7 ibid. P. 15.
8 See Pocock (1977) p. 163.
9 Ibid p. 164.
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concern to some republicans. The abilities that powerful individuals may have to 
influence the public destiny was a major threat to republicans, although it is not to all 
forms of liberalism.
Liberals and republicans also differ on their stance in relation to interpersonal ability. 
Interpersonal ability, or the ability that individuals may possess to influence and impact 
on the choices and views of others outside of formal norms, rules and procedures is, for 
liberals, of little concern at the level of political theory. We may all have the right to 
free speech or freedom of belief but an unequal possession of abilities on the part of 
individual right’s holders to access the information that will help them to effectively 
operate in society with these rights is of no concern to the liberal. The issue of 
individual ability does not impinge on the degree to which someone is free. I may have 
the right to move freely about the community I live in, but if I am unable to do so for 
lack of money or resources this does not mean that I am unfree to do so. It merely 
means, for liberals, that I lack the means to act on my rights. What is more, the fact that 
someone else has a greater ability than me to effectively bargain against me and satisfy 
his interests over mine, say within the framework of a contract, is of no concern to 
liberals. Each party to a contract comes to it with their own natural advantages and 
disadvantages and the consent, if given, given to the contract is an act of will —not an 
issue of ability. State coercion is fundamentally in opposition to the freedom of 
individuals. The two come together only when a contract is entered into; only when 
individuals agree to give up some of their freedom to the state in return for a greater 
overall freedom from other individuals whose threat to them is greater in the state of 
nature. Republicans have a greater concern for the way people fare in a society, 
especially in relation to them maintaining their status as effective citizens of the polity. 
Here the inequalities of interpersonal ability will be of more concern to republicans. 
Republicans have more of a concern for how people ought to fare in a society, rather 
than merely with their formal status as holders of rights in a juristic framework. This 
concern for moral outcomes in the political context is another factor that distinguishes 
republicans from liberals10.
1(1 See Haakonssen (1993) p. 571.
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This does not mean, it should be noted, that liberalism denies the existence of 
communal features in a polity. Isaac" holds that it is too simplistic to see liberalism 
merely as the exclusive promotion of the rights of individuals. He points to 
MacCallum’s12 schema that extends our understanding of freedom to include the 
attainment of proper ends for liberal society in general. Freedom, under MaCallum’s 
schema, is freedom from an impediment in order that someone can be free to become a 
certain sort of person or perform a certain kind of action. Similar restriction on the ends 
that liberal individuals ought to be allowed to pursue are proposed by Charles Taylor13. 
Isaac adds that William Galston14 specifies the goal of liberalism as to support ‘liberal 
humanism” which, inter alia, involves a respect for equality and tolerance within a 
pluralistic society. The respect for tolerance may extend further to a respect for 
appreciation of inherently fundamental worldviews. The language of tolerance implies 
that disparate parties put up with the differences of their fellow citizens for reasons of 
modus operandi benefits. The language of appreciation, however, for liberals would not 
see this liberal virtue in this sense. It would see a fundamental respect foe the inherent 
differences in humanity. The liberal community, in other words, admits of varied 
conceptions of the good life and certain traits of character are expected to be inculcated 
in the citizenry as a response to these facts.
But there is a sense in which liberalism and republicanism are separate and distinct 
concepts15. Liberalism places greater emphasis on individual rights in isolation from 
community and republicanism places greater emphasis on our inescapable social 
relations. We will see in this chapter more evidence of the individualistic nature of 
modern republicanism.
11 Isaac, J (1988).
12 MaCallum, G (1967)
13 See Taylor ‘What’s Wrong With Negative Liberty?’ in The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honor of Isaiah Berelin, ed. 
Alan Ryan (Oxford, 1979). P. 193.
14 Galson, W (1982).
l5Dworkin (1984) p.72 andMacIntyre (1985). P ..241,219, 220, 236. See also Pocock (1981) p.53
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3.2 Pettit’s Republicanism: The Primacy of Freedom as Non-Domination.
An understanding of Pettit’s position on the nature of civil union in a republic cannot be 
fully understood without a general understanding of his republican theory of freedom. 
The principled or civil stand we take towards others is determined by, or seeks to 
maximize, the value neutral goal that lies at the foundation of his theory of freedom. It 
is to the task of setting out Pettit’s republican theory of freedom that I turn first. Pettit 
presents republican freedom as an ideal that is conceptually distinct from liberal 
freedom16. He holds that non-interference is a concept distinct from that of non­
domination. The latter is defined as the absence of the capacity for others to interfere 
arbitrarily with individuals; the former as the absence of intentional impediments to 
choices and actions. Pettit holds that someone can enjoy non-interference yet not enjoy 
non-domination. For example, I may not be impeded in my choices and actions by the 
intentional actions of others, but I may stand in a relation to others whereby they could 
impede me arbitrarily if they so wished.
The evil of domination is that it exposes individuals to coercive acts and relations in 
such a way that the implementation of such coercions need not track the interests of 
those concerned. If others can interfere without consulting those upon whom the 
coercion is inflicted then the latter will be subject to unaccountable and capricious 
power. There will also be important psychological costs of being subject to such an 
arbitrary power. One would never know when, how, or to what extent one’s present 
security is ensured, nor what the near or long term future holds. Pettit adds that we can 
have interference without domination. Interference or impediment of action or the 
exercise of choice may occur as the result of a decision process whereby all those 
involved were not subject to arbitrary incursions. All parties in the process would be 
able to articulate how the proposed interference impinges on their interests.
16 Pettit, P (1997).
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Pettit holds that liberalism with freedom as non-interference at its core is distinct from 
republicanism with non-domination at its core. What is more, he proposes, non­
domination exists both as an institutional test as well as a social goal for the state. Let 
me explain firstly how non-domination is meant to operate as an institutional test. The 
only intuitions in society with legitimate authority are going to be those that have built 
into them process of non-domination. They will have within them the means by which 
the interests of all those affected by the coercive forces of authority are tracked. In this 
sense, non-domination exists as a form of legitimacy17.
Non-domination is not only a test that is to applied to state decision-making functions, 
but is also a goal of the state. Specifically, for Pettit, the goal of the state is to reach 
outcomes whereby each enjoys non-domination with a significant degree of intensity 
and extent. In order to reach the goal of providing each citizen with an equal intensity of 
non-domination, a republic gives everyone equal constitutional rights. The powers of all 
citizens are equally constrained by legal and constitutional forces, and this secures non­
domination for everyone18. The intensity of one’s non-domination is constituted by the 
degree to which one is legally protected from the arbitrary incursions of others.
In addition to enjoying a sufficient intensity of non-domination in our relations to 
others, all citizens for Pettit need to enjoy a sufficient amount of the extent of non­
domination. The extent of one’s non-domination is constituted by the range and nature 
the of undominated choices one has. The extent of non-domination refers to ensuring 
that the range of choices available to people and the extent to which they can act on 
these choices is secured. Some ways to ensure that it is easier for people to act on the 
undominated choices they have is to empower them to read and write; to give them 
greater mobility; to improve their living relations; to giving them better access to 
commination mechanisms and information access, etc.
17 Institutional tests of the kind mentioned exist so as to implement a relationship of what Pettit alludes to as non- 
imperium between individuals and the state. See Pettit (1997) pp. 112, 150, 166, 171.
18 The constitutional relations between individuals here ensures a relationship of what Pettit referes to as non- 
arbitrium between citizens. See Pettit (1997) p. 55
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There are a couple of caveats worth noting about Pettit’s task of increasing the extent of 
non-domination. The first is that the state itself must not take this on as a major task. If 
the state gets too involved in the issue of redistributing resources in the name of 
increasing the extent of non-domination, then such a role may make the state itself a 
dominating agent, the state itself could become a compromiser of people’s freedom19. 
The second, and related, point is that material equality is not a goal of the state. Non­
domination can be realized and distributed equally in both its intensity and extent 
without there being an equality of material possessions among the citizenry. Pettit 
acknowledges that equalizing measures between material possessions may be required 
in certain cases, but he adds that there is no conceptual link between enjoying such 
equality and enjoying non-domination.
The only form of strict equality or egalitarianism required by republicanism, then, is 
going to be of the structural kind20. For a society to give more constitutional weight to 
some groups over others would be to subject those others to arbitrariness, and hence to 
domination. Those with such greater constitutional empowerment would be able to 
function in such a way that did not require them to take into consideration the interest of 
those without such power. Pettit sticks steadfastly to a strict notion of structural 
egalitarianism.
We may be concerned that even with structural egalitarianism in place the realties of 
how individuals would fare in relation to one another would be a matter of what relative 
power each individual possesses21. For example, those well disposed in terms of 
effective institutional access to the mechanisms of legal contestation will have greater 
relative power than those who do not, and hence would have greater power to acquire 
outcomes that fit with their interest than those who do not have a high concentration of 
relative power. In such a case, would we be justified in endorsing an unequal 
distribution of constitutional powers to offset the disadvantages experienced by those 
with less relative power?
19 See Pettit, P (1997) p.105
20 Ibid. pp. 110-11.
21 Ibid. p. 114.
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Pettit says that we should not. He writes, “ Any anti-equality initiative will make at least 
two parties less equal in their intensity of non-domination. It will do this by increasing 
the advantaged person’s powers or by decreasing the powers of the other party or by 
doing both at once: in whatever way, it will worsen the power ratio of the disadvantaged 
party. But if the initiative is intended to raise the overall intensity of non-domination by 
the same margin by which it raises the intensity of non-domination of the favoured 
party, it is ill designed. For the shift in the power-ratio that raises the advantaged party’s 
absolute intensity of non-domination by interval A (for advantage) will serve at the 
same stroke to lower the disadvantaged person’s intensity of non-domination, in 
absolute terms, by interval D (for disadvantage. The weaker party’s absolute intensity of 
non-domination is a function of their relative powers, and the anti-equality initiative is 
bound to worsen it. ” 22
From the above we can see a nice illustration of Pettit’s promotion of non-domination 
as a non-moral or neutral goal. The normative task of correcting power imbalances is 
beyond the scope of concern for such a goal as non-domination. The goal of the state is 
to implement non-domination without being selective about who is deserving of it, nor 
to what purposes different groups have in society. The right to non-domination is based 
on an entitlement—all those who have an interest within the jurisdiction of public 
authority are entitled to equal protection from arbitrary interference.
Pettit here shares a normative commitment with libertarianism. Both hold that the only 
goal of the state ought to be that of protecting freedom. For libertarians, the only goal of 
the state is to protect the rights of all individuals to non-interference; for Pettit the only 
goal of the state is to protect the rights of all individuals and groups to non-domination. 
What individuals and groups do with their undominated choices is of no concern for the 
state. For Pettit, all the state does is ensures that all the actions and decisions within the 
polity are consistent with the interests of all who are subject to the consequences of 
such decisions. The republican state, for Pettit, is not founded on a substantive notion of 
‘the good’. Trying to redress any imbalances, outside of those that constitute a threat to 
one’s extent of non-domination, in society by undertaking anti-equality measures would
22 Ibid. p. 114.
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be “bound to be less beneficial than the change that could have been achieved under 
some corresponding, pro-equality step.” All redistributions in a Pettit’s republic can 
only be justified in relation to processes of change that are inclusive —in relation to 
decisions about redistributions that are the result of non-dominating decision 
procedures.
What is it about non-domination that makes it something that can be shared universally 
in this way, and supplied by the state on a neutral basis? Pettit holds that non­
domination appeals to all on two basic levels. First of all, it is a psychological good that 
should appeal to all persons. We are the sorts of beings who dislike subjection to 
arbitrary forces or living under the capricious power of others. A life with such 
subjection—a life of forever seeking to adhere to or evade the controlling powers of 
others—is one that is not conducive to our psychological well-being.
Second of all, persons qua beings who seek psychological stability not only have good 
reason to value non-domination, but persons qua rational agents do also. The 
performance of rational and deliberative action requires a stable and predictable social 
environment through which one can be secure in moving. The confidence acquired from 
such an environment enables me to act with decisiveness and purpose in this world 
towards goals of my own making and desires. A benefit of such a world is that one can 
devote more of one’s own time and energies towards constructing a good life rather 
than spending them on toadying to the powerful23. What is more, Pettit adds, there will 
be common knowledge that each is entitled to this status of non-domination, hence each 
knows that they are able to ‘stare the other in the eye’ or deliberate amongst each other 
as equals. Taking all these benefits on board, Pettit concludes, leads us to view non­
domination as a primary good—a good that all have good reason to possess no matter 
what their private purposes are.
If a republican state is constrained by the test of non-domination and embraces the goal 
of equal constitutional protections for all, then how are decisions and laws made in such 
a polity? The model of the republican order is that of a contestatory democracy. Based
23 Ibid. p. 85-87.
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on the Roman model of governance, it holds that law making powers lie primarily with 
the elected representatives of the people. In more contemporary terms, the state 
executive exists to facilitate the representitives in formulating and implementing 
policies. The rule of law will be paramount and the legislature and executive is 
constrained by the judiciary. Each sector checks the powers of the other to guard against 
the pursuit of private interest and corruption, and in so doing this enables the interests of 
citizens to be tracked when laws are made and implemented.
But importantly for the citizens of a republican polity, all state action is open to 
contestation. The state must publicly propose legislation and polices but each citizen 
has the right to contest such proposals before they are implemented, or to contest the 
effects of a law already in place. Such contestation ensures that each has an opportunity 
to articulate how their interests are affected by the implementation of laws24. The 
decision made, or the law passed, may not be in the end to my liking and I may not 
directly consent to such a law. But for Pettit, laws and policies are not legitimated by 
consent, but by contest. An important part of what makes a law legitimate, for 
republicans, is that it is formulated without dominating anyone —law that is formulated 
without ignoring the rights of all to be free from arbitrary interference.
But the expectation will be that fundamental disagreement over the content of laws will 
be the exception rather than the norm. Pettit’s republicanism shares in the spirit of 
social capital that laws and state actions will produce outcomes that all have good 
reason to agree with—that laws are more accommodating to the personal interests of all 
as well as to the those interest of the public. The workings of a contestatory order will 
do its best to ensure that all ‘salient’ concerns are catered for. Pettit endorses such a 
commitment when he supports a debate-based form of institutional decision-making 
over a bargain-based one25. The latter involves the contesting parties engaging with the 
state on the basis solely of seeking the satisfaction of their private interest. Other 
contesting parties are viewed as competitors and concession or compromise to them, 
under the bargain-based model, is considered as a cost26. The former, the debate-based
24 Ibid. p. 105.
25 Ibid. p. 187.
26 Ibid.
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model, is different to the bargain-based model for Pettit. Under this model, contestants 
do not face each other as competitors or bargainers with the state, but as individuals and 
groups who share a national interest and who ‘try to agree on what arrangement answers 
best to considerations that they can all recognize as relevant. ” 27 It is intended with the 
debate-based model that the process of deliberation itself exemplifies a form of 
dialogical engagement through which contesting parties appreciate and lean about the 
interest of others in their political community. Pettit writes, “In bargaining-based 
decision making, preferences are given, in debate based decisions preferences are 
formed. ” 28
What sort of institutional measure can be taken by the state and its officials to create 
such conciliatory environment among contesting parties? Pettit answers this question in 
the following way. The formulation of preferences must be facilitated by neutral 
mechanism, or by “considerations...brought forward as reasons that all have to 
countenance as pertinent, under accepted canons of reasoning”29. This means, for Pettit, 
that the contestants that come before the state must agree on certain neutral conditions 
of procedure. They must agree that the procedures undertaken with the state and 
between each other will be one that subjects personal preferences to scrutiny and 
transparency, and that agree to reach an outcome within a workable time frame. These 
are, Pettit holds, the neutral procedures that are consistent with the standards of 
reasoned deliberation30.
Pettit does not lay down any other requirement for the outcomes of contestatory 
democracy other than they are consistent with the enjoyment of equal non-domination 
for all. Faith is put in the methodology of reflective equilibrium; that all individuals will 
fare well as a result of inclusive engagement with the state. Pettit’s republicanism leaves 
the determination of substantive outcomes up to the engagement between the myriad 
forces within a society. As Pettit writes, “Once the contestatory mechanisms are in 
place everything is up for grabs. ” 31 It is important for my purposes to highlight this
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid. p. 188.
30 Ibid. p. 195.
31 Ibid. p. 201.
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point by Pettit that there are no objective or substantive goods for the state to protect or 
implement other than to uphold non-domination and provide fair processes of 
deliberation.
3.3 Pettit and Republican Civility
We are now in a better position to look at the nature of civil union as it appears under 
Pettit’s republicanism. I take it that the republican account of civic virtue is 
conceptually equivalent to the notion of civic engagement and union I covered in the 
first chapter. Political civility or civic virtue for Pettit is a concept that serves the value 
of freedom as non-domination. Our civic virtues are to be “consistent with, and indeed 
supportive of, a dispensation in which everyone enjoys freedom as non-domination.”32
What is a civil society for Pettit? Pettit writes of civility or civil union as applying to 
two domains: in the sense of individuals as they relate to the each other as political 
agents acting and engaging with the state; and in the sense of individuals making and 
forming associations outside of the state. With reference to the latter application of 
civility, Pettit talks of laws being made to conform to the standards of a community. A 
community will only give its respect to laws that cohere with their values. Pettit writes, 
“ The laws must be embedded in a network of norms that reign effectively, 
independently of state coercion, in the realm of civil society. Civil society is a society 
under the aspect of extrafamilial, infrapolitical association; it is that form of society that 
extends beyond the narrow confines of family loyalty but that does not strictly require 
the existence of a coercive state.”33 For Pettit, the state’s laws need to be constructed 
with respect to what civil society deems to be acceptable.
But Pettit also points to the state as an exponent of civic power. The state, and not civil 
society per se, will lay down norms and laws constitutive of its sovereign role. Only the 
state can make laws and exercise legitimate coercion. Arguably, the coercive force of
32 Ibid. p. 245.
33 Ibid. p. 241.
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states has forged in the general public a respect for the norm of obeying the laws of the 
sovereign. But, Pettit notes, the laws will only to continue to survive as norms if society 
endorses them34. What is more, it will be what Pettit refers to as the ‘relevant groups’35 
in civil society that will lead the way in giving approval and demanding compliance to 
the laws and the norms that underpin them. This raises an interesting issue about justice 
and the sociology of civil society that I will cover in the next chapter.
What is the motivation to civility for Pettit? Why does every individual in a polity have 
reason to be virtuous in a civil sense? In short, for Pettit, the answer lies in that civility 
produces pay-offs in the form of the non-domination we each receive. Pettit writes, 
“The first and most important reason why a republic is going to need to have its laws 
embedded in a network of norms is that people enjoy a higher degree of non-domination 
under a regime where there are norms to support republican laws. ” 36 Political civility, in 
other words, is of instrumental value to each citizen. It is rational to respect the laws and 
adhere to the fair procedures of a contestatory democracy because these actions endorse 
the institutional practices of non-domination; such an endorsement means an increase in 
the security of everyone’s freedom from arbitrary interference. When a citizen respects 
the rights of all to non-domination, she/he is also strengthening her/his enjoyment of the 
same. Conversely, if a citizen is dominated by another then all are dominated in the 
same manner; all will be equally exposed to the same force of arbitrary interference. It 
is in this sense that Pettit identifies non-domination as a communitarian good37.
This commitment to civility is consistent with a consequentialist notion of civility. 
Being civil is a matter of conforming to those practices that help to realise a value- 
neutral gaol; being a productive cog in the wheel that achieves an outcome that all have 
good reason to possess. Another example of a consequentialist account of civility is that 
of Jeremy Bentham. Here the desired motivations and dispositions that go to strengthen 
civic bonds are those that serve the value-neutral goal of the greatest happiness. 
Bentham wrote, “ ...so in a constitution which has for its object the greatest happiness of
34 Ibid. p. 243.
35 Ibid p. 245.
36 Ibid. p. 246.
37 Ibid. pp. 120-126.
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all, the great object will be to maximize it...and in the reception given to whatsoever 
shall promise to be in the highest degree contributory to tis effect, may be seen, the 
most instructive test that imagination can frame of appropriate moral aptitude, on part of 
rulers.”38 In addition to sovereign probity being based on the expectation to satisfy 
happiness for all, the appropriate aptitude for private civility, for Bentham, is 
beneficence or self-regarding virtue. For Bentham, we need to protect the citizenry from 
rulers who apply self-regarding virtue to the public realm—what he terms as ‘securities 
against misrule.” The focus on outcomes of this sort lies at the foundation of Pettit’s 
notion of consequential republicanism.
3.3.1 Pettit and Honour as a Regulative Ideal.
It is no surprise to see that this consequential account of civility motivates civic virtue 
on the basis of rewards and disincentives or punishments39. The reward for civility 
under Pettit’s account is not only non-domination for all, but also honour for those who 
exemplify a respect for the norms that support this outcome. Conversely, the 
disincentive for incivility is dishonour. Honour, for consequentialists such as Pettit, is in 
essence viewed as a regulative ideal.
The role of honour for Pettit is to prompt a ‘culturally reinforced civility’ that must 
prevail so as to increase the security of non-domination for all. Pettit and Brennan offer 
the intangible hand model as a way of understanding how honour works as a regulative 
ideal40. Under this model, what makes conformity to rules and norms worthwhile for 
rational actors or prudent political agents is that civility gives one a significant amount 
of esteem in the eye’s of one’s contemporaries. “The intangible hand helps to nurture a 
pattern of behaviour by holding out the prospect that its manifestation will earn the 
good opinion of others.”41 And “if we assume that people care about the regard of 
others, seeking their high regard and fleeing their low regard, then it is natural to think
38 See Roser, F (1983) p. 51
39 Ibid p. 212.
40 Brennan and Pettit (1993).
41 Ibid p. 254.
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that the intangible hand can be an important way of establishing and securing certain 
patterns of behaviour.... it can be an important and positive influence in encouraging 
fidelity to civil norms. ” 42
Pettit sees honour and civility here as role-based concepts. One exercises one’s civic 
virtue if one performs one’s role in conformity with the agent-neutral good to be 
realized. This way of understanding civility is found with others writers and applies 
civility at a communicative level43. An implication of this understanding of civility is 
that the notion of ‘the public interest’ will have a ‘processual meaning’44. The public 
interest is served when a basic requirement of shared justice is achieved, namely when 
each has an equal right to pursue their notion of the good within a dialogical process 
that tracks the interest of all concerned. The assumption is that the outcomes of this 
dialogical process, due to their inclusiveness, will serve the public interest. There is no a 
priori notion of outcomes that set the standard for the common good beyond those that 
constitute the principles of procedural fairness. This understanding of the public interest 
is similar to Cicero’s notion of ‘utilitas communione. Cicero wrote, “A 
commonwealth.... is not a collection of human beings brought together in any sort of 
way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with 
respect to justice and a partnership for the common good. ” 45
What is also exposed is how Pettit’s consequentialist republicanism is based on an 
empiricist account of rationality. Rationality does not concern itself with ends, but 
rather on the proper ordering of the deliberation that takes place in order to decide on 
what those ends will be. This notion of rationality is in the Humean tradition where 
irrationality is only a failure of the belief formulating process, not a failure of the 
actions one decides to take or the sort of ends we pursue46. We cannot be irrational 
about the desires we have for particular ends, and the role of civil engagement with 
others within a contestatory process will be an attempt to seek a conciliatory result
42 Ibid.
43 See also Galston (1991) and Spragens (1981), (1990).
44 See Mansbridge (1983) for this term.
45 See De Republica I 25.in Zetzel, J (1999)
46 Assuming of course that one is not acting involuntarily against one’s beliefs e.g. in an hypnotic state.
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between the conflicting expectations about ends. There is no explicit rational critique of 
ends.
3.4 Dagger’s Republicanism and Political Civility
Pettit is not the only republican to take a procedure-based standpoint with relation to 
civility. Richard Dagger offers an account of civil union where we ought to respect 
others because in doing so we protect the autonomous status of individuals. Dagger is 
concerned about the detrimental effects of a society where the relations and discourses 
between individuals, and individuals and the state are based largely on ‘rights talk’. His 
concern is that such a society becomes insular and ignores those conditions or outcomes 
that are in the common interest of all. Dagger does not deny the importance of rights for 
individuals, but he wishes to bring rights back into a close relationship with the notions 
of civility and autonomy as a way of maintaining a concern for the public, and not just 
the private, good. Having rights, for Dagger, provides the framework for one’s 
autonomy, but one cannot be autonomous unless one recognises and respects the crucial 
bonds that make such a liberal polity possible.
The nature of the civil union between individuals and the state is, for Dagger, 
constituted by a manner of behaviour that upholds these crucial bonds which preserve 
individual autonomy. Civility, as with Pettit, is a role-related concept where certain 
excellences will enhance the ability to be publicly-spirited citizens, and in so doing 
respects the rights of all to maintain their own sense of autonomy. Dagger holds that if 
the common good is taken to be nothing more than the maintenance of ‘cooperation, 
social cohesion and solidarity’ and the preservation of each individual’s right to self- 
determination, then each individual has good reason to see that autonomy is not a 
private good but is instead a part of a cooperative enterprise.
Take for example, Dagger asks us, a situation where society is corrupt. In such a society 
private interest dominates the public realm. Here there can be no equal or effective 
development of autonomy or self-determination for all. Corruption or factional
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dominance makes each of us dependent on the whims of those with the power to 
influence outcomes in society. One cannot be self-ruling or self-determining if there is 
widespread factional dominance that pursues only the private interests of its members. 
This is why one should seek to participate on a public level; to endorse public activity 
so as to avoid creating the conditions for corruption. Dagger writes, “Thus the 
autonomous person has a reason to exhibit civic virtue, at least when the community or 
polity as a whole plays a significant part in fostering personal autonomy.”47Civil union 
then for Dagger, as with Pettit, is a prudential matter. Dagger quotes Rousseau on the 
citizen’s motivation to civility, “He loves virtue, unquestionably, but he loves it in 
others because he hopes to profit from it. ” 48
It’s also important to note that Dagger’s account of civil union is non-perfectionist49. A 
perfectionist ideal would demand that a polity “attempt to maximize some form of 
human excellence of virtue”. But Dagger disassociates himself from this. He holds that 
there is no universal “yardstick against which every effort is to me measured.” Instead, 
all that a liberal republic does is “aim to promote the civic virtues that enhance the 
individual's ability to lead a self-governed life as a cooperating member of a political 
society.”50It’s interesting to note here that Dagger adopts some of Rousseau's thinking in 
articulating his notion of civility. But there is an important difference that is worth 
noting. Rousseau did have in mind the idea that civic participation would inform 
individuals about their ‘real natures’.
Dagger does not go into great detail about how decision making processes work in a 
liberal republic so as to ensure that the rights of autonomy and self-determination are 
protected for all. He does make a general commitment to deliberative democracy and 
sees a place for civic participation through the means of ‘town meeting and 
neighbourhood assemblies. ” 51 He states that campaign finance restrictions, deliberative 
opinion polling, the restriction of wealth disparities and interest group dominance, 
power decentralization, compulsory voting, the fostering of civic virtue in the arts,
47 See Dagger, R (1997) p. 17.
48 Rousseau (1960) p. 24.
49 Dagger, R (1997) p. 194.
50 Ibid. p. 195.
51 Ibid. p. 152.
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media, workplace, voluntary associations and the like would assist in empowering 
people’s autonomy and, hence, their level of well-being52. Not only can autonomy be 
promoted by cultivating civic virtue at the societal level, it can also be served by 
improving the civic relations between state officials and the general public. Dagger 
mentions the nature of engagement between citizens and municipal officials, school 
principals, teachers, etc53. However, little is said about how the state itself could adapt 
its institutional practices and public training of officials to make such deliberation 
effective among the citizenry.
3.5 Sandel’s Republicanism and Political Civility
Michael Sandel is a republican whose notion of civil union is not of the communicative 
or procedural kind. Firstly, Sandel is suspicious of liberal proceduralism54. The liberal 
positioning of ‘justice, fairness, and individual rights for all’ admits of a neutralism that 
ignores, for Sandal, important social or societal goals. The liberal notion of a just or 
civil society is, according to Sandel, one that does not specify certain ends crucial to the 
nature of the particular polity in which they are set. He only demands that each has a 
right to pursue their own interests with the obligation to respect the rights of others.
Sandel identifies the following assumption behind this neutral proceduralism. It is that 
we are each identified as unencumbered ends in ourselves. We each have, the 
assumption goes, the capacity to exercise choice about who we are to become; a 
capacity to choose and an expectation about choice that exists independently from our 
historical or traditional realities. “For the unencumbered self, what matters above all, 
what is most central to our personhood, are not the ends we choose but our capacity to 
choose them.”55
52 See ibid for the notion of autonomy p. 191.
53 Ibidp. 199.
54 See Sandal (1996) in Goodin, R.E and Pettit, P(eds) (1997).
55 Sandel (1984b) p. 250.
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What is required, Sandel argues, to make republicanism a more accurate or coherent 
account of who people are and what sort of decisions they ought to make, is a 
recognition that the self is an ‘incumbered’ entity. The self, in other words, is an entity 
embedded in a community and has certain obligations to reinforce the social bonds that 
make her/him what she/he is. In addition, Sandel, like Dagger, offers an account of civil 
union based on autonomy, or what the former terms as self-government.
The account of self-governance that Sandel presents is one that takes place within a 
communitarian context. First of all, we each need to recognize the context in which we 
are to govern ourselves. We each need to recognize a social fact about ourselves, 
namely that a political community is more than a mechanism for administrating the 
rules of impartial justice. Rather, a political community is a community with a shared 
history and with a shared commitment to maintaining the norms that have made the 
society what it is. The robust social and cultural forces that last the test of time in a 
community are those that, due to their durability and longevity, require respect and 
protection within a republican polity.
I interpret Sandel’s theory in such a way here to conclude that the state is civil, and 
individuals are civil to each other, when they make their decisions with respect to these 
communitarian facts. The state needs to maintain a ‘political economy of citizenship’ 
through which it fosters for each individual an ability to govern themselves with respect 
to their communitarian identity. What is more, the state needs to ensure that economic 
arrangements do not damage this communitarian identity56. Sandel holds that republican 
government cannot stand in isolation from individuals with no concern for the 
development of their civic abilities. Instead, it has to assist in promoting such abilities in 
the name of overall welfare.
What are some examples of the crucial communitarian bonds that serve as the 
framework for self-government? To show this I think it is important to set out exactly 
what Sandel means by communitarian here. There are two senses of communitarianism. 
The first sense of communitarianism is one where there is a recognition of the unique
56 See Sandal (1996) p. 124.
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facts that make a society what it is culturally. For example, national heritage, 
indigenous music, national employment, family and marital fidelity, respecting 
parenthood in the law, self-employment, etc57. In Australia and New Zealand there is a 
strong concern to preserve national identity in arts, film, literature, architecture, and the 
like. A communitarian would argue that in order for members of these states to be 
autonomous they must be inculcated in the values and traditions that make up their 
unique cultural identity. Therefore, the state must protect and promote these areas of our 
lives. So, such things as property-rights restrictions on national heritage sites and 
buildings is required; there would need to be opposition to the dangers of free trade 
agreements on national identity and national quotas, public ownership of certain forms 
of media would be required.
Secondly, there is the sense of communitarianism that holds that there are facts that 
need to be adhered to if communities are going to function effectively (this need not 
take on the special character of the particular community). Sandel writes here of the 
socio-economic conditions of citizenship. For example, that citizens must be free from 
the stresses of life so as to be active and take part in public duties58. This means that 
work or labour would be progressive or that citizens should be protected from working 
conditions that are detrimental to the cognitive and psychological capacities required for 
citizenship59, be protected from the detrimental forces of deceptive advertising60, enjoy 
an environment of decentralized economic power free from monopolistic influence61.
It’s important to note the sense in which Sandel justifies these provisions for the 
protection of self-determination for the individual. Self-determination is valuable or is 
owed to persons on the basis that it serves an established national or communitarian 
purpose. We are, factually speaking, members of a community that lives out its 
identity —its identity is not formed solely by formal rights. We are members of a 
community whereby each individual shares its destiny.
57 Ibid. pp.338-349.
58 Ibid. p. 191.
59 Ibid. p. 170
60 Ibid. p. 222
61 Ibid. p. 212.
84
3.6 Sunstein’s Republicanism: the Rule of Law and Political Civility.
I conclude this section on civility and republicanism with an overview of Cass 
Sunstein’s position on the nature of the principled stance that the state should take 
towards citizens, and that which citizens should take between themselves. Sunstein’s 
notion of this stance takes place largely within the framework of the rule of law. I will 
set out the extent to which Sunstein equates civil union with good legal procedure. The 
principled stance we ought to take towards each other is not determined first and 
foremost, in Sunstein’s republicanism, by facts about persons, social facts about 
pluralism or the intrinsic value of our autonomy. Rather such a principled stance is 
guided by certain legal and constitutional facts.
Before looking at Sunstein’s legalism, I want to set out the sense in which we can call 
Sunstein a republican. For Sunstein, it is a requirement that each individual possesses 
political rights. What is more, it is vital that these political rights are held equally by all. 
The reason why we owe individuals these rights is that they control and limit 
governmental power. In other words, as with all the republican theorists, civil 
empowerment is of value in that it contributes to our political freedom. Sunstein 
highlights certain prescriptions required to reach legitimate outcomes in a republican 
polity. Generally speaking, in the spirit of civility as social capital, deliberative process 
must formulate preferences in the public interest. The way this can be done is by legal 
processes and background norms that interpreters of statute should adopt62. Sunstein 
assumes that the norms, which he accepts are relative to time and place, lead us to 
promote deliberative government63. What justifies this is what can be identified in 
constitutional sources as evidence supporting the pursuance of deliberative engagement. 
The separation of powers, for example, implies deliberation and openness. They are 
guides to interpretation of statute and to how government agencies should think about
62 See Sunstein (1990) p. 160.
63 Ibid. p. 161.
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their constitutional role. But they are only guidelines that should be used when 
interpretation is called for64.
For Sunstein there are constitutional facts that can be drawn upon to formulate 
constitutional principles. These principles in turn inform the judiciary of certain 
interpretative norms. Let me cover briefly what these constitutional principles are and 
the norms they imply. Sunstein holds that the following are constitutional principles that 
we can derive from the nature of the US constitution. The constitution is inherently 
deliberative thus it implies the interpretive, judicial norm of enhancing and protecting 
deliberative processes. The idea here is that the constitution is inherently opposed to the 
dominance of a private interests determining the lives of the public. What interests there 
are in society, held by those who hold legitimate authority or those outside of this, 
needs to be checked or held accountable. This implies the interpretive norms of 
authorising judicial reviews over power holders65, avoiding the empowerment of the 
politically unaccountable to make important decisions that affect the public66, all 
reasons expressed by the legitimate power holders must be done so in a public- 
regarding way67.
Sunstein’s assumption appears to be that people acting in concert through the law is the 
best way of ensuring that all lead ‘satisfying lives’. For example, judges have 
implemented the ‘aggressive statutory construction’ principle via their rulings on social 
welfare. In the 1950’s welfare support for children was tied to the condition that 
paternity was established. Benefits were terminated to mothers if they failed to support 
the process of determining the paternity of the child. The courts ruled that the 
congressional legislation did not intend to leave the needy child without any means of 
subsistence if the mother was unwilling to name the father”. The court ruled that if this 
were intended, the congressional legislation would have explicitly accounted for it. 
Even though in this case the court turned to legislative intention in making its decision, 
it certainly privileged the needs of the vulnerable—in this case the children68.
64 Ibid. p. 161.
65See Sunstein (1990).
66 Ibid. p. 170.
67 See Sunstein (1993) p. 17.
68 See Melnick (1994) p. 98.
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There is no coherent account of what it means to live a ‘satisfying life’ under Sunstein’s 
republicanism; no explicit moral principle that can guide official state action. The only 
provisions we know are those gained indirectly by legal interpretation, and those that 
result from effective, equal and deliberative processes.
Before closing this section on Sunstein’s republicanism I will cover one aspect that he 
addresses to do with the notion of welfare. Sunstein holds that there are interpretive 
norms that can be derived from constitutional facts that favour the promotion of welfare 
or well-being for persons. Sunstein holds that a republic caters for human well-being 
based on this constitutional source. Here is how the argument goes.
Sunstein holds that we can derive from the constitution a principle of impermissible 
ends69. The constitution informs us of what ends are impermissible to persons. We have 
seen already that ends that are contrary to the spirit of the public concern or deliberative 
democracy are impermissible due to the favour they could give to the influence of 
private interests. But this has further implications. Underlying this is an assumption 
about political equality—namely that all citizens are entitled to equal protection under 
the law. What does equal protection imply? It implies equal protection of basic or 
minimal levels of well-being; or what Sunstein calls a right to be free from a state of 
desperation70. Sunstein informs us that this is why property rights are justified common 
law rights granted by the judiciary to the citizenry. People are assisted in securing their 
well-being by possess the rights to private property ownership.
What is more, it is assumed that freedom from subjection to private interests is crucial 
for well-being, and hence the ability to participate effectively in a deliberative 
democracy is equally as crucial for one’s overall freedom from dependence and 
desperation. One is more likely, the assumption goes, to maintain one’s basic interest in 
being free from despair if one is empowered with the skills of citizenship. Sunstein 
holds that there are states of human existence that are inherently inimical to the exercise
59Ibid p.31.
70 Ibid. p. 137.
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of good citizenship, and hence can be constitutive of the interpretive norms that the 
judiciary adopts. Such states of existence are addictive behaviour, freedom from ill- 
health and unsatisfying lives, having a good education, adequate and secured supply of 
food, shelter, and medical care71.
It is important to reinforce the idea here that Suntein’s understanding of the principled 
stance that state officials ought to take towards the citizenry —the civility owed to 
citizens that derives from constitutional principles—has value in so far as it serving a 
civic function. The well-being of persons, in other words, matters to the state because it 
serves the civic function of citizenship and a cohesive political order for all. The state is 
also expected to draw upon such constitutional principles—especially with respect to its 
institutional functions in the area of a respect for deliberative democracy. However, 
there is a sense in which the state is not as closely tied with the constitutional principles 
as the judiciary given that the latter is meant to act as a check on the former.
SUMMARY
In this chapter I have set out the nature of civil union between individuals, groups and 
the state as presented by republican theory. The nature of this union is significantly 
different in part to that encountered in the previous chapter covering liberalism, 
although there are points of overlap in terms of the respect for law and the need to avoid 
arbitrary coercion. I have focused on modern conceptions of republicanism in particular 
in the form of the theoretical standpoints presented by Pettit, Dagger, Sandel and 
Sunstein. All are republican in the sense of acknowledging that the normative 
principles guiding the relations in a polity must recognize the inherent social context of 
individual and group identity. There needs to be for republicans, in other words, a 
strong recognition of the role that the ‘common good’ plays in determining the 
normative parameters that demarcate the extent of private enterprise. Not only this, but 
each of us in our private lives is obligated to acknowledge certain public duties and 
exemplify a respect for the common good.
71 Ibid.. P. 137
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The nature of civil union for Pettit is determined by the overriding goal of realizing a 
sufficient amount of non-domination for all. This is achieved primarily, for Pettit, 
through structural equality within a political domain that is institutionally or 
procedurally geared to track the interests of all. The latter is to be done through the 
processes of law and contestatory democracy. Such processes track the interests of 
citizens with the support of open and deliberative engagement between the state and the 
relevant parties to the state policies under consideration. All parties in a polity come 
together under clear and fair rules of engagement to share ideas and express viewpoints 
so as to produce outcomes that are in the interests of all. Each participant in this process 
can be expected to exemplify civic virtue on the basis that it will pay-off them by 
promoting their enjoyment of non-domination.
The notion of civil union for Dagger is founded on the basis that it is a necessary 
condition for the achievement of self-determination for all. The best distribution of self- 
determination for all cannot be achieved in isolation, and all must recognise their 
obligation to seek self-determination in a way that is consistent with the public good (or 
in terms of the general goal of the right to equal self-determination for all). This 
understanding of civil union lies also at the core of Sandel’s republican theory. For 
Sandel, civil union must take place on the basis that it enables self-government for all. 
To be self-governing, according to Sandel, one must know the nature of ‘the self’ in 
terms of its communitarian origins. Who we are as individuals is determined in large 
part by historical and cultural forces unique to our shared history with others. The civil 
bonds that bind individuals and the state, therefore, must be of the kind that preserve 
and enhance our communitarian identity.
Sunstein’s republicanism, I showed, also places emphasis on the ideal of the self its 
subjection to a social context. The nature of the civil union between individuals and the 
state in a polity, for Sunstein, is based on certain legal realities. From the law, and 
constitutional law in particular, we can derive normative principles that inform us of the 
nature of civil union. From an observation of robust legal practices we can acquire
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certain normative principles, such as the requirements of deliberative engagement, 
respect for law, equal protection, property rights, and the like.
What this chapter has shown is that republicans are united on the basic theme of closely 
linking the private realm with the public. Along with the theoretical commitments of 
liberalism, republicanism has played a prominent role in formation of western political 
theory. The chapters that follow are made in response to the points covered so far that 
have established such dominance. The next chapter presents a critical response to the 
general assumptions underlying some of the key aspects of liberal and republican 
notions of political civility. By questioning these assumptions I will create the 
opportunity to explore a different way of justifying our civil relations in a political 
context.
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4. PROBLEMS WITH CIVIL PROCEDURALISM
Liberalism and republicanism are united on the view that the state exists as a neutral 
institution that imparts impersonal goods upon all equally. For liberals, the impersonal 
good of non-interference for all is imparted by the neutral state; for republicans, the 
impersonal goods of non-domination and autonomy. In this chapter, I challenge the 
notion that the state limits itself to the role of distributing such impersonal goods 
equally to all. By questioning the assumption that it does, I will bring the liberal and 
republican trust in civic proceduralism under question. Under this notion of trust, shared 
outcomes amenable to the interests of all are expected as the result of fair and just 
decision-making procedures between the state and the citizens. But if the state itself is a 
partial operator in the polity, and not a neutral or impartial one, then we can question 
whether the outcomes of ‘fair’ procedures sufficiently cater for the tracking of the real 
or essential interests of all. Liberalism, I argue, is better placed than republicanism to 
respond to this fear of procedural partiality. Liberals explicitly uphold welfare rights in 
the face of concerns about state partiality. I argue that republicanism does not offer a 
sufficient response to such a concern.
4.1 Challenging Classical Pluralism.
The idea of political civility as a form of social capital, and its operation within the 
public realm, is based on the expectation that reasoned engagement between the various 
groupings in society will produce outcomes agreeable to all. Each will have a reason to 
endorse the outcomes of a dialogical process due to the neutral rules of reasoned 
engagement that all participants deliberate within in order to reach such outcomes. If 
decision processes are transparent, allow the free flow of information, are fair and 
known by all, then the outcomes that result will be acceptable and legitimate.
This idea is based on the theory of classical pluralism. Pluralists hold that the state 
should seek the unitary ideal of ‘goal consensus, the harmony of interests, and the
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implementation of power as a neutral and positive force. ” 1 Citizens come together with 
the state and “interact with potential synergetic outcomes. ” 2 The force of reason is 
expected to be a great unifying and equalizing force among the different members and 
powerholders within a society. Pettit writes, the attraction of the process of contestation 
is that it is open to anyone who can make a general case against the line of public 
decision making; you do not have to have any particular weight or power, at least not in 
principle, in order to be able to mount a reasonable challenge to a reasoned decision.” 3 
The state’s role, it is expected, is to facilitate the debating process to ensure that the 
force of argument prevails and not the force of economic clout or political advantage. It 
is the “accepted canons of reasoning” 4 that ensure that all participants in a contestatory 
democracy are focused on what we have good reason to deem as the essential interest of 
person. Two contesting parties, for example, may want different outcomes, yet both will 
be expected to see the value of agreeing to an outcomes that shares the interest of both.
Pluralists may agree that it is idealistic to believe that all individuals and groups in a 
society have equal structural capacity to influence the policy formation processes of the 
state and its institutions, but they do assume that all groups and individuals will have a 
roughly equal capacity to at least raise their voices in protest when they come across a 
policy proposal that they see as contrary or detrimental to their interests. Pluralists reject 
the idea that such a process of contestation is inhibited by the disparities of wealth and 
influence in society. Mulgan, for example, argues that there is no evidence of a unitary 
power elite that effectively controls the decision making processes of the state nor 
overwhelmingly influences outcomes for their own benefit.5 He argues that instead of 
united power elites in society inflicting structural dominance, there is rather a 
‘heterogeneous network” of power holders. He asks us to consider the diversity of 
business interests such as the tensions between the interests of the primary and tertiary 
sectors; owners versus investors; importers versus exporters, and small business and 
corporations on issues such as tariff protection.
See Rawls (1993) pp. 218.
2
See Giddens: The Constitution of Society in Chua. Critical Perspectives on Management Control.
3 See Pettit. (1997) p. 188.
4 Ibid.
5 See Mulgan (1997).
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Both liberalism and republicanism are based on this idea of classical pluralism. Both 
assume that social reality is deeply divided along the lines of conceptions of the good 
life, ethnic identity, religious belief, economic and class interests, historical origins, 
natural abilities, and political beliefs. Such divisions lie across all individuals and 
groups in a polity. The way to respond to this social reality, for both liberals and 
republicans, is to create a decision-making process that is inclusive of all parties while 
at the same time retaining the rights of individuals and groups to autonomy. The value 
of this delicate balance between inclusiveness and individual and group autonomy for 
both idioms can be seen in their united opposition to what we might term ‘unitarist 
rule’. A unitarist polity would be one where there was a single authority that exercised 
the authoritative use of coercion over all without the latter being included in deciding 
which policy or goals should be enacted, and without the latter holding any rights to 
protection from authority. For example, a unitarist authority might one composed of an 
ethnic or religious elite implementing coercion over the members of a polity according 
to traditional ethnic law or religious doctrine.
Is the pluralist explanation of the effectiveness of dialogical networks, and the 
ineffectiveness of power differentials to unfairly influence outcomes, plausible? 
Schattschneider writes, “The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus 
sings with a strong upperclass accent. ” 6 The wealthy and well-resourced members of 
society can use their qualifications and backgrounds to engage more effectively with 
social and political institutions than those less well resourced7. Think of professional 
unions or associations, such as the Medical Association or Teachers’ Union, and how 
effectively they can engage with the state in pursuit of their interests. A rubbish 
collector or sewerage plant worker offers just as important skills to the public welfare 
yet does not get the same benefits as those better able to use their resources for their 
own interests8. How effective are low wage workers in contesting the wage and salary 
earnings of professional groups?
6 Schattschneider, E (1975) p. 35.
7 See Mulgan (1997) p. 137-138.
8 See Kariel, (1961); Lovi (1969); Bachrach, P (1967): and Reisman, D (1955).
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Decision-making and bureaucratic workings are complex and multi-layered and the 
ability of one sector of society to contest another is affected by this. Contestatory 
networks favour the interest of organized and easily identifiable groups in society. 
Unorganised social groupings such as patients or airline passengers, for example, have 
essential interests. Yet it is more difficult for them to unite into a single voice of reason 
to put their case against the established power structures of pharmaceutical companies 
and airlines respectively. Lindblom argues that there will be “gains for union labour at 
the expense of non-union, gains for organized agriculture at the expense of smaller 
unorganised farms, or gains for producer groups at the expense of consumers9. 
Lindbolm writes, “every organized interest will take at least some of its gains at the 
expense of “unrepresented millions at the bottom of each natural economic grouping.” 10
Think of other ways in which economic inequalities affect the capacity that people have 
to engage with the state. There will be a bias in favour of those with connections to the 
workings of the state, and a disadvantage to those external to such operations. Take, for 
example, employment flow between the private and public sectors and the overlap of 
skills that make communication between these two sectors compatible. Jane Kelsey 
reminds us that those outside ‘the system’ face a series of practical hurdles. They need 
to know, she writes, that “a Bill has been introduced; be able to locate a copy; read and 
understand its legalese; and find the human, financial and information resources to 
prepare a submission in time to meet an often impossibly tight deadline. ” 11
Kelsey also reminds us that the process of contestation in the form of appearing before a 
select committee will often be merely a perfunctory process. A short meeting by a 
citizen with the “Bill’s originators who have already been through extensive 
negotiations with the economic and political power interest behind it will have little 
effect. Even if the views expressed by the public do resonate, there is no guarantee they 
will be implemented given that higher tactical political manoeuvring with relation to the
9 See Lindblom (1993) p. 141.
10 Ibid. See also Johnson (1968). Here Johnson covers the problem of elite domination by contesting groups in a 
pluralistic mechanism, namely that groups come to dominate individuals. “.... equal rights for groups implies the 
grossest inequality of rights for individuals.” See also Dahl and Lindbolm, (1953) pp. 504-5.
"Kelsey (1993). p. 167.
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Bill and where it stands in the political climate won’t later or dismiss it.”12 There is also 
a palpable advantage for those interest groups that engage with the state frequently as 
opposed to those who occasionally or rarely do so13.
There may also be psychological restrictions on people’s ability to access the 
procedures of a contestatory democracy. Think of those who do not feel comfortable or 
competent enough to express themselves in such a forum, maybe coming from a 
background where activism is treated with suspicion and disproval from their support 
network (e.g. spouse, family, workplace). Or think of the student that is being sexually 
harassed by a lecturer. There may be formal structures of contestation in place to 
respond to this wrongdoing but the lecturer may be able to pull the weight of her/his 
position behind her/him to make contestation unpleasant and unfeasible for the student, 
and that the prospect of a student working in a workplace environment after such 
contestation may be unattractive to that student. If contestatory processes are going to 
favour one personality type or skill-base over another then it is important to 
acknowledge this and review our assessment of the legitimacy-function of such a 
process. The value of such processes may be publicly symbolic—knowing that one has 
the right to contest if one wishes—but it is worth considering the more practical aspects 
of such a system and the extent to which it delivers the ideals it promises.
4.1.2 The State and Political Economy.
Pluralists believe that the state is a neutral referee between the competing interests in 
society. The state’s role is to facilitate fair and reasonable forms of dialogical 
engagement where only relevant facts are considered and transparent and mutually 
agreed decisions are made. An objection to this view holds that the state itself has 
interests and purposes of its own that favour some worldviews over others14, namely the
12 Ibid.
13 See Galanter (1974) for the difference in effective influence between those who engage on a frequent and regular 
basis with the sate, and what he calls the ‘one-shotter’ or those who are only likely to do so once. See also Galtner 
(1983).
14 For the idea that this is the nature of state institutional power see Lukes on the mobilization of bias in such 
organizations. Lukes, S (1974) See also Bachnach,P and Baratz, M.S (1970)
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view of the importance of economic growth and advancement. Under such a view it is 
argued that state power itself is dependent on the process of capital accumulation that 
provides the state with revenue'5. This revenue recirculates to produce conditions 
conducive to the effective operations of a capitalist economy. Foucault calls such 
relations “discursive formations.” They are “historically situated fields of knowledge 
that a state uses to reproduce itself with and protect its established interest.” Such 
formations will influence the state’s position on what counts as reasonable in dialogical 
exchanges between competing interest groups; what counts as a reasonable discussion 
of welfare, safety, health, etc. Foucault writes of the domination that occurs within such 
state functions. His attack takes place on two levels. The first is to do with the role of 
knowledge and language. States will always take up the position of establishing 
epistemic authority in its institutional dealings with citizens16. The state, for example, in 
laying down and implementing the rules of neutral procedures can’t help but take a 
partial standpoint on what is to be considered as normal or abnormal belief; what counts 
as an acceptable form of engagement and what does not. The state will take a position 
on what is to count as a salient and serious concern to be pursued, and what does not17.
It is important to note the importance of this geneological investigation into the nature 
of interests in a deliberative polity. Foucault argues that “the art of government.... is 
essentially concerned with answering the question of how to introduce economy...the 
correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family...the 
welfare of population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of wealth, 
longevity, health, etc. 18 He adds, “the core categories of civil society —law, rights, 
autonomy, subjectivity, publicity, plurality, the social, show that.... far from articulating 
the limits to domination, they are instead its supporters. ” 19
What evidence is there that the state is partial in the way that Foucault suggests, and not 
merely a neutral referee facilitating the fair processes of dialogical engagement? Doubts 
about the plausibility of such neutrality are strong in the literature. Walzer holds that
15 See Offe,C and Ronge (1975) p. 250. See also Giddens and Held (1982).
16 See Cutting (1994) for this term.
17 See Dreyfus and Rainbow (1983).
18 See Burchell (1991) p. 103.
19 Ibid.
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the state is a traditional artifice of entrenched power structures, and it has to “interface 
with a capitalist economy and operate in a culture where money is effectively a 
dominant good, transmutable into political power and social influence. ” 20 Walzer points 
at the imbalance of influence in relation between the state and the public when he adds, 
“In the eyes of government officials, therefore, businessmen do not appear simply as the 
representatives of interest groups do. They appear as functionaries performing functions 
that government officials regard as indispensable. ” 21 “The interests of the state are 
linked with the interest of economic elites in ways in which the state is not linked with 
each citizen. Consequently, government officials cannot be indifferent to how well 
business performs its functions. Depression, inflations, or other economic distress can 
bring down a government. A major function of government...is to see to it that 
businessmen perform their tasks. ” 22
Dryzek locates the problem by stating, “States in capitalist economies are becoming less 
democratic to the extent that public policy becomes dictated by the need to compete and 
flourish in the transnational political economy.... public policy is constrained by fear of 
upsetting actual or potential investors.” 23 Dryzek goes on to state that government and 
the business sector live in an interdependent relation to each other. The state protects 
private property and upholds a stable currency on the global scale, and the capitalist 
sector provides investment and production, which in turn increases national wealth24.
Lindbolm refers to the notion of polyarchical constitutionalism and the idea that people 
with power and authority can have, over and above the formal rules of institutional 
engagement, access to informal power networks that enable them to get what they want. 
Lindbolm refers to this informal feature of institutional practice “extended use”. For 
example, Lindbolm gives the example of an incumbent congressman who can use 
her/his authority to acquire campaign funds that others in society find very hard to 
acquire25.
20 Walzer (1983) p.. 10.
21 ibid.
22 ibid.
23 Dryzek, J (1996) p. 3.
24 Ibid. pp. 24-26.
25 See Lindblom (1993) p. 141 for this point about the collusion of elites. See also Presthus, R (1964), and 
MacPherson, C.B(1971).
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Let me give some more examples of the points just raised about the power differentials 
in a democracy. Look at the collusion between the military and the private sector. The 
state has an interest in securing the private interests of technology producing companies 
that give it greater power militarily. Think of the way the state takes it upon itself to 
further the quality of trade relations for its exporters. The state also supports and 
implements universalised production standards that add operating costs to business 
which, in turn, tends to hinder the viability of diverse and small business development.
The prominence of the ideology of political economy is seen in the way the public 
service has adapted in some places. Jane Kelsey maps how the ideologies of private 
business came to significantly influence public sector strategies and goals in New 
Zealand in the 1980s26. She points to how the public sector ethos transformed into one 
that sought a balance between profit-making and public service delivery. The interest of 
citizens were placed in the hands of state-owned enterprises that were given their brief, 
through statutes such as the Public Finance Act, to return a profit to their 
shareholders —the state. Ministers of the Crown and chief executives drew up 
performance agreements or corporate plans that specified the outputs that were to be 
attained over the financial year27.
The chief executive acquired the responsibility for the employment of her/his staff. This 
effectively gave the chief executive the power to employ officials best suited to meeting 
the goals of the corporate plan. It was prudent, therefore, for executives to bring in 
workers of a more corporate mind. This altered the institutional environment in which 
policy formation took place, and changed the way the interest of citizens were catered 
for in New Zealand society28. Kelsey argues that these reforms had detrimental effects 
on the functioning of a deliberative democracy. There were still official processes of 
contestation in place, but the wider political realities meant, Kelsey argues, that the state
26 See Kelsey (1993).
27 Ibid. p. 61.
28 Ibid.
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Treasury had a significant influence on what policy directions a government department 
should take29.
4.1.3 Challenging Neutrality
The practical concerns I have raised above about the presence of power differentials in 
deliberative processes should concern those who place great faith in civil 
proceduralism. There is little coverage in the literature on republican political theory on 
the presence of such problems. It’s important to note how such practical realties can 
influence the way that the ‘neutral rules of dialogical engagement’ work in a 
deliberative process. It is important to see the affects that power differentials could have 
here as so much of social capitalism rests on a faith in such processes.
Think of the culturally determined value assumptions that can be said to lie behind the 
“neutral rules of engagement in a dialogical process.” There will be cultural 
assumptions about how long the dialogue should proceed before a decision is made, 
how long each person can speak, who gets to speak, what language is used and what 
form the expression should take. Such norms are value-laden and in a liberal democracy 
will be constructed in relation to the pressing needs of economic interest.
Take some of the other rationality norms. Take the determination of what is to be 
understood as transparent proceedings with a free flow of information and a 
consideration of relevant issue only. A liberal democracy in a corporate context will 
favour certain exceptions to these norms over other considerations30. For example, the 
protection of commercially sensitive information for one or more of the contesting 
parties may be allowed by the state, or the acceptance or rejection of anecdotal evidence 
may be arbitrarily applied. Rulings on these matters will be justified by ‘reason 
giving’—the state will remind deliberators about the importance of not threatening 
business stability by disclosing commercially sensitive information to the proceedings.
29 ibid Chapter four.
30 See Dean (1991) p. 13.
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It is important to note that the state has discretionary power here and there are the 
greater needs to commercial interest that the state serves.
I should make a point about the nature of my analysis in this section. There is a strong 
push in the literature towards the virtues of a deliberative democracy. But unless these 
ideas acknowledge the role played by informal and underlying forces of influence, then 
such a system can never be totally assured. If the state is, de facto, a partial entity as 
Walzer, Lindblom and others claim, then in what sense can we say that it fairly 
undertakes a neutral role in facilitating citizens towards shared outcomes? I do not 
dismiss the value of building a democracy that is more deliberative —non-arbitrary 
power must surely have greater pay-offs for people’s security than a closed system of 
government. But it is important to assess the nature of such a system and to see whether 
it produces a morally optimal outcome. It’s important to assess whether civility offers a 
sufficient account of our principled stance towards others. In particular, we should be 
concerned about the extent to which partial forces in a polity influence the processes 
undertaken in that society to track the interests of others.
I specially want to highlight the potentially conservative nature of a deliberative 
network. Pettit holds that civility is produced in large by the dictates of ‘relevant 
parties’ in society. He argues that such ‘relevant parties’ will establish the civility norms 
via their approval and disapproval. For example, Pettit adds, the ‘relevant parties in 
society’ will hold that civility requires us to demand that all parties in a republican state 
ought to see an obligation to contribute to a regime from which they benefit. Free­
riding, in other words, will be deemed as an uncivil action. Pettit, however, is not clear 
on how these norms evolve or are generated, nor who the ‘relevant parties’ are who 
construct it. We can speculate that it is a norm that the entrenched power structures or 
stakeholders in a society—the intellectual and economic elites—endorse. This raises 
some discomfort with Pettit’s account of civility. It is, I argue, an essentially 
conservative ideal if it takes this to be the way civility is generated in a society. It 
endorses a polity where the traditionally established groups will be most effective in 
maintaining their interest and confronting those that challenge them.
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Iris Young challenges the ideal of a civic polity united by a neutral state31. Young 
argues that an objective or impartial standpoint for any form of moral, normative or 
political assessment is not possible. She holds that such assessments or forms of 
reasoning cannot be removed from the particularities of context and feeling32. What is 
more, Young holds that this assumption about impartiality, when used as a foundation 
for state power, produces negative consequences. For instance, power that is legitimised 
due to its impartiality nonetheless discriminates against and isolates others33. Young sets 
out how impartiality avoids matters of difference in society and seeks to create a 
unifying force. Young terms this process as the ‘depoliticalization’ of a society34. Such a 
process means that differences among the members of society are sidelined in favour of 
the state’s view of people as economic entities. Citizens are viewed not as people with 
distinct origins and experiences, but rather as abstract entities in the form of “taxpayers, 
health services consumers, parents, workers, residents of cities”35.
The categorization of people into economic abstracts enables the state, Young argues, to 
exercise power in accordance with the principles of welfare capitalism36. The latter 
assesses ‘welfare’ exclusively in relation to the furtherance of material life or the 
‘growth imperative’37. The nature of the relationship between citizens and the state is 
one bound by the obligation of the latter to provide distributive justice to the former. 
The focus with such a relationship, Young argues, is with such economic issues as pay 
hours, benefits, and union rights rather than with a concern for work values, ultimate 
ends, and a critical analysis of the decision processes themselves. The welfare of 
citizens are determined by the needs of a capitalist society; one where the ends of 
economic growth determine the way the state treats its citizens.
Young holds, in addition, that welfare capitalism contributes to the hegemonic power of 
the state. State bureaucracy is rationalized in such a way to uphold a value system that 
favours exclusively the economic ends of society, and eliminates a concern for human
31 See Young (1990)
32 ibid p. 102
33 ibid p. 100
34 ibid. p. 66
35 ibid. p. 73
36 ibid. Chapter 3.
37 Ibid, p.71
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needs38. Such things as the provision of education, the protection of the environment, 
and the regulation of lifestyles are rationalized in such a way as to produce outcomes 
commensurate with economic ends. Young holds that this way of conducting public 
affairs is too narrowly construed. It does not recognize, in her view, the influence that 
the origins of decision-making procedures plays on the way people are perceived and 
treated by the state39. Such a conception of state power implicitly ignores many facts of 
social existence that do not fit into economic models.
In order to rectify the partiality of state power Young offers the following solutions. She 
wishes to democratise many of the decision-making procedures of the state40. She holds 
that there needs to be institutional mechanisms through which citizens can engage with 
issues concerning their own ends and means. For example, decision-making should, in 
her view, become more locally orientated rather than conducted by a centralized 
bureaucracy. At the local level it is expected that there will be a greater capacity for the 
expression of diverse viewpoints, more services implemented and supplied by the 
people who are stakeholders, and a greater awareness by all of the varying needs held 
by people in different social and cultural contexts. By deconstructing public decision 
making in this way Young hopes that people will live more satisfying lives; lives that 
are regulated by decision-making structures that serve the ends that people perceive 
themselves rather than the narrowly construed economic ends of a welfare state41.
Participatory democracy is, for Young, the best way to overcome the partiality of state 
power and refocuses our concerns towards the basic human needs of all. In this sense 
Young shares the concerns I have raised in this chapter about state power. But it is 
worth briefly stating the difference between my position and Young’s. Young seeks to 
demote the power of state bureaucracy in making decisions over the lives of citizens. 
However, my task in this thesis is to retain for the state a crucial role to play in 
decision-making procedures. I hold that the essential interests of people are best 
protected when they are dealt with to a large degree by public service professionals
38 ibid. pp. 74-76.
39 Ibid. pp. 76-88.
40 Ibid. pp. 81-88.
41 Ibid. p. 91.
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engaging appropriately with the relevant knowledge sectors in society. I do not deny 
that more inclusiveness is required to prevent people from feeling overwhelmed by state 
authorities, but I would not go as far as Young to decentralize decision-making itself to 
a local level. Even if this were to be done there would have to be provision, I hold, for 
the inclusion of professional and expert knowledge to ensure that the decisions made 
were done so with informed consent. I argue in this thesis that the state plays a crucial 
role in providing this informative and guiding information in the lives of its citizens.
Will Kymlicka offers another way in which the state can be structured so as to protect 
the interests of the oppressed, isolated and disadvantaged42. He offers this specifically to 
ethnic minorities that have lost their autonomy due to the dominance of majority forces. 
For example, majority groups tend to dominate over the control of resources in areas 
such as educational values, notions of the body, healing, health, immigration, land 
rights, language etc.43 Kymlicka presents a liberal approach to minority rights by 
granting minorities certain group-based rights that seek to restore autonomy. He makes 
a distinction between group-based rights as internal and external protections44. A group- 
based right that constitutes an external protection for an ethnic minority is one that 
ensures that “the resources and institutions on which a minority depends are not 
vulnerable to majority decisions. ” 45 In other words, external protections shield minority 
groups from majority domination by enabling the former to retain its identity and 
cultural resources. A group-based right that constitutes an internal protection for an 
ethnic minority is one that enables that minority to control or regulate exclusively the 
members of that group. Kymlicka holds that a liberal understanding of minority rights 
must only provide external protections for minority groups, and not internal protections. 
Internal protection is not granted to any groups in a liberal society. All members of a 
liberal order whether a part of ethnic majorities or minorities must possess, according to 
Kymlicka, the ability to review and revise their social situations46. On the other hand 
external protections can actually enhance autonomy. This is due, Kymlicka points out, 
to the fact that all individuals can only express their autonomy and free choices when
42 Kymlicka (1995).
43 Ibid. p. 1.
44 Ibid. Chapter 3.
45 Ibid. p. 7.
46 Ibid. p. 152.
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grounded in their own societal culture and all the benefits that go with it47. By 
protecting a minority group’s culture, a liberal state will also be upholding the societal 
culture that enables the individuals in that group to make informed decisions.
In addition to external protections, Kymlicka holds that ethnic minorities may need to 
have their autonomy enhanced by the provision of other collective rights. In this he 
includes such rights as the right to special representation in decision-making procedures 
or consultation programmes, a right to self-government, and such polyethnic rights such 
as the right to receive support and recognition in the areas of language development, art 
expression, educational needs, etc.48 It is through the provision of external protections 
and polyethnic rights that we can see how Kymlicka provides a way of protecting the 
basic needs of ethnic minorities. The disadvantages and oppressions that many ethnic 
minorities face will be avoided if such minorities are given the freedom to flourish as 
social and cultural entities. These minorities will not enjoy internal protections, but they 
will retain their autonomy to shape their lives according to their own cultural identity. 
The crucial support networks that facilitate the crucial areas of life such as birth, 
marriage, work, food acquisition, death, etc will be maintained by the ethnic groups 
themselves free from external influence.
Kymlicka shares with Young a concern to protect the basic interests of all with a 
commitment to the need for participation on the part of those with a unique stake in 
those interests. Both are concerned with combating a centralized notion of state activity, 
and with enabling people to realise their interests in terms of outcomes that are 
consistent with their cultural identity. However, Kymlicka does not take an indepth look 
at the tensions that may result from an ethnic group expressing its autonomy and a 
liberal society upholding liberal rights. It is going to be a contentious issue, for 
example, if an ethnic view of biological sustenance and well-being is at odds with the 
liberal right to be free from harm. It is a difficult problem to overcome and any 
proposed solution to it needs to be sensitive to the complex and dynamic nature of the 
situation. However, I argue later in this thesis that the state, at the very least, ought to
47 Ibid. Chapter 4.
48 Ibid. p. 37-38.
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play an educational role in its relationship with the citizenry. Given that Kymlicka holds 
that all rational members of a liberal polity have a right to review and revise their life, I 
hold that there is room for an interconnection between my theory of essential interests 
and Kymlicka’s work. My aim is to set out a notion of the state as an informative source 
of public authority with regards, inter alia, to matters concerning essential interests. 
This aim can link with Kymlicka’s view that all members of a liberal polity, irrespective 
of ethnic membership, have a right to review and revise their lives. The theory of 
essential interests I set out in this thesis can cohere with this aspect of liberalism 
highlighted by Kymlicka.
4.2 Liberalism and Welfarism
Has liberalism, as a political theory, reinforced itself to combat the contextual power 
inequalities prevalent in liberal and procedural democracies? It is a central concern of 
liberals to protect individuals and their status as autonomous beings from such coercion. 
The right of individuals to self-determination is held in high regard by all liberals. The 
way to provide the right of self-determination to individuals, however, has divided 
liberals. Some liberals adopt the negative strategy of realising self-determination for 
individuals merely by ensuring that they are free from coercion. Other liberals adopt the 
positive strategy of realising self-determination by holding that what is required is not 
merely that individuals have the opportunity, free from interference, to determine their 
own destiny, but that they also possess the ability to do so by the way of being 
empowered with the skills and resources to do so. It is a central concern of what I term 
welfare liberalism to protect individuals and their status as autonomous beings from 
such coercion. Welfare liberals acknowledge the forces of non-intentional hindrances 
that can be imparted on individuals such as the role played by misfortune, chance, luck, 
etc. Welfare liberals do not hold that freedom for individuals is the sole value of 
liberalism. In addition, they hold that other values such as equality, justice and welfare 
are of value to individuals because they promote their autonomy. Such liberals put faith 
in the state as a mechanism to regulate the distribution of resources so as to achieve 
such an outcome for all individuals.
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What brought about this shift of concern within liberalism from classical or negative 
notions of self-determination to an understanding of welfare liberalism where the state’s 
promotion and protection of individuality was not contrary to liberal principle? The 
main reason for this shift has been historical rather than metaphysical. It was the 
victimization of the ability of individualism to determine their own destinies in a rapidly 
changing, and often brutal, capitalist market system in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century that initiated such a shift a liberal thinking. Bruce Ackerman indicates 
that the ideals of classical liberalism lived only in the political imagination of theorists, 
and it was the social realities of society that motivated a major re-think of the 
relationship between rational, self-determining individuals and the contextual sources of 
power that influenced their well-being49. It is one thing for individuals to be idealized as 
fully informed, autonomous rational beings choosing freely their own destinies in a way 
that is commensurate with enabling other individuals to do the same. Yet the realities of 
social and capitalist power, natural and constructed inequalities, and the forces of 
chance and luck that made some liberals more concerned not with the opportunity that 
individuals had to be autonomous, but with their ability to be autonomous and to fare 
well as members of a polity in doing so50.
The shift from classical liberalism to welfare liberalism can best be seen by the latter’s 
adoption of a notion of distributive justice. Classical liberals justify distributions of 
resources on the basis of ownership rights and the right of each individual to freely 
consent to the terms of contract. In other words, the emphasis of classical liberal notions 
of justice is based on the notion of fair procedures of free choice for all. The 
distributions that result from such procedures are justified by virtue of their deriving 
from the appropriate origin. Welfare liberals, have taken the ethical assessment of 
distributions beyond this reductionist trust in fair procedure. Instead, welfare liberals 
have focused on ethical assumptions about human needs and the constitutive elements 
of individuality as a way of constructing an account of distributive justice. Under this 
account, taxation and the redistribution of wealth to the vulnerable and those in need is
49 See Ackerman (1980) Chapter 8.
50 See Green, T.H. (1941), Hobhouse, L.T. (1922), Mill, J.S. (1882)(1936) and Dewy (1931) especially.
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justified because it promotes the realization of individuality across populations. All 
individuals or rational and autonomous beings need good health, decent employment, 
acceptable housing, healthy living environments etc if they are to perform their role as 
individuals and pursue the good life. Welfare liberals, therefore, do not see taxation or 
wealth redistribution as violating the rights of individuals to the enjoyment of their 
private property or the fruits of their free choices and associations. There are specific 
features of individuals themselves that warrant the state to use its coercive powers to 
redistribute resources from the fortunate to the needy.
The provision of basic welfare for all in a world of potentially harmful forces has been 
expressed in more detailed form by the following liberals. For example, liberal 
egalitarians hold that liberal rights fit into two categories: non-interference rights and 
recipience rights51. The former are the liberal rights we are already familiar with—the 
rights not to be interfered with or coerced by the state in the areas of individual belief, 
association, speech, movement, ownership, etc. The latter, however, are rights that each 
deserves to have or receive in order to maintain individual welfare. They are not rights 
to be left alone, but rights to have one’s welfare reach a minimal level of acceptability 
in the areas of education, health, housing, etc.
On what philosophical basis do liberal egalitarians add recipient rights to non­
interference rights? Dworkin argues that such rights can be derived from the notion of 
equality. The state ought to have equal concern and respect for the lives of its citizens. 
This means that it ought to respect the rights of all citizens to commit to their own 
worldviews so long as in so doing it does not harm anyone else. But it also means that 
the state should not allow a liberal society to produce outcomes with grave inequities; 
where some through their own actions or through no fault of their own suffer under 
conditions of economic deprivation while others, for the same reasons, do not. 
Liberalism, Dworkin informs us, holds that all lives matter equally in the sense that no 
one’s salient interest should be sacrificed for their own good in the long run, nor for the 
overall welfare of the majority52. All people in a liberal order are entitled to live a life
51 For this distinction see Gutmann (1983) pp. 25. 
5252ibid. p. 7.
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that they consider, and which is considered reasonably, to be of value. The liberal 
notion of equality, therefore, holds under this account that individuals are entitled to 
more than an equal enjoyment of the rights of non-interference; they are, in addition 
entitled to live with self-respect. All are entitled to possess equally with others a life that 
is free from degradation, excessive sacrifice for the sake of others, and free from 
poverty that inhibits their functioning in a liberal order. However, Dworkin merely 
states equality in this sense and does not present an argument for it. He states that 
liberalism ought to deduce ‘self-respect for all’ from the notion of equality, but does not 
give us a substantive argument for why such a deduction is justified.
Bernard Williams’ egalitarianism53 gives us another account of recipience rights. For 
Williams, there are human needs that it are essential for all to enjoy—the need for 
shelter, work, the absence of illness, etc54. Human sustenance is intuitively valuable to 
humans. This claim is justified on the basis of our common sense or ordinary language 
understanding of persons and their natures. Whastmore, the implications of such 
ordinary language intuitions have implications for the principles that ought to underlie 
our distributive commitments. Williams writes, “the proper ground of distribution of 
medical care is ill-health. ” 55
Gutman points out that Williams’ egalitarianism is committed to cultural relativism. She 
points out that the foundation of his egalitarianism is based on the shared moral 
assumptions of a community of believers rather than any inherent moral argument56. 
She points to the fact that a community of believers, or the determinants of ordinary 
language moral assumptions, could hold that the absence of ill-health is not an essential 
human need to which each individual is entitled. She points to Plato’s point that the 
seriously ill carpenter does not deserve medical treatment because it is unlikely that we 
will, in the future, be able to apply his skills to the good of the polis. Human needs may 
exist but according to the cultural relativist view of egalitarianism it depends on the 
views of a community as to the degree to which such needs are valued in relation to
“̂ Williams is not overtly an egalitarian. He speaks of individual needs rather than collective, and Gutman (1980) links 
his egalitarianism with liberal theory.
54 See Williams (1970) p. 127.
55ibid.
56 Ibid. p. 106.
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other, competing ideals. Should egalitarianism based on cultural relativism upset us? I 
argue that it should. Subjecting human needs to the vagaries of community belief is to 
deny humans the essential moral right to freedom from harm. Again, a theme I want to 
emphasise is that human needs are not of value with reference to the degree in which 
they fulfil civic goals; they are intrinsically valuable to humans and constitute a 
foundational theory of human dignity. But it is not only self-determination that matters, 
for those not capable of self-determination matter morally to us just as much. I develop 
this idea further in the next chapter.
The liberalism of John Rawls also has at its core a response to the unfair powers in 
social contexts. For Rawls, it is the arbitrary role played by such non-intentional forces 
as luck and fortune and how this impacts on human welfare that moves him to present 
his unique liberal theory of justice. We cannot, according to Rawls, accept a concept of 
justice that bases its distributions according to the workings of arbitrary forces such as 
natural talents or favourable contingencies. What we all need to observe is that each is 
subject to these forces equally, even though each is not affected in the same way by 
them. Rawls point is that those who possess good fortune and productive talents were 
no more responsible for acquiring these than are the people with less good fortune and 
unproductive talents57. This is why the veil of ignorance sits at the centre of Rawls’ 
theory of justice. It removes knowledge of one’s position in society and gauges what it 
would be rational to support as a system of justice if this were so. Also, because we all 
share equally in this subjection to fortune, no one can legitimately claim to own 
exclusively their own talents and the rewards earned from the exercise of those talents. 
A society is justified, therefore, in making claims on the private spheres of individuals. 
This is the basis on which Rawls derives the difference principle that holds that the 
people who have gained from good fortune can only do so on the basis that the benefits 
they possess are not held at the expense of those with less (and those who have in no 
way deserved less because of their own choices).
The liberal welfarism of John Stuart Mill is played out on two different levels. The first 
is that of protecting the individuality of persons against social and traditional forces.
57 See Rawls (1971) 101-2. See also Sandel (1984b) p. 251.
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Mill writes, “ ....that in things which do not primarily concern others, individuality 
should assert itself. Where, not the person’s own character, but the traditions and 
customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the principal 
ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social 
progress. ” 58 Individuals, in other words, must have their individuality or ability to self- 
determination protected from customary and traditional social forces. This is not to 
deny, for Mill, that the customs and traditions of a society should be followed, but it 
does mean that each person ought to retain his/her powers of individuality to be able to 
assess the validity of those social and customary rules for him/herself59. To be 
otherwise, for Mill, is to violate the natural dignity and progressiveness of persons. 
People must not only be free to make and express decisions in a society, they must also 
be empowered to enact enlightened conduct The fear is of subjecting individuals to a 
state where “every one lives as under the eye of a hostile and dreaded censorship. ” 60 To 
combat the possibility that people will be subject to unenlightened influences61, Mill 
indicates that the state needs to be geared towards providing enlightened leadership62.
Secondly, we have seen that liberalism also takes the form of ensuring that all 
individuals, irrespective of their rational capacities, are entitled to be free from harm. 
John Stuart Mill’s harm principle is the locus classicus here. Mill’s liberal 
egalitarianism gives us a more direct argument for what it is about individuals that 
warrants them as deserving of equal respect. Berger holds that Mill is committed to a 
notion of “base equality”, which is to be understood on the grounds of recognising the 
prima facie wrongness of serious human deprivation and subjection to a social 
environment that contains extreme inequalities of opportunity and welfare63. Political 
and economic existence is a shared task, Berger attributes to Mill, and the inherent 
interdependence of persons means that all have an obligation to endorse the 
redistribution of wealth so as to avoid harmful inequalities64. A civilized state, for Mill,
58 See Mill (1974) Chap. 3, 1 p.261.
59 See ibid p. 262.
60 Ibid. p. 264.
61 The tendency of such forces to proliferate in a democracy is mentioned by Mill in On Liberty, (1974) Chap. 3, 13 
pp. 268-9; Chap 3 18-19, pp. 274-5).
62 Ibid. chap3, 13. p. 269
63 See Berger (1984) pp. 159-160.
64 Ibid. p. 161.
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is one were there is an adequate level of social security that prevents citizens of that 
society becoming isolated, deprived or alienated65.
Such conditions, for Mill, harm persons psychologically. This aspect of Mill hints at a 
sense of inherent human worth. But Mill does add that the existence of such hardship is 
wrong due to its detrimental effects on individuals’ autonomy and social functioning. 
Poverty and inequality places individuals into relationships of dependence on others, 
rather than interdependence between others, and this is harmful to one’s autonomy and 
to overall social order66. Dependence on others is inherently bad—it violates human 
dignity in terms of failing to maintain the individuality of persons. I will respond to this 
point by Mill later when I deal with the issue of the relationships between essential 
interests and democracy.
4.3 Republicanism and Welfarism.
Both liberalism and republicanism are counterbalanced, as political concepts, by 
principled and pragmatic forces. Liberalism, for example has a principled commitment 
to individualism, freedom, equality, individual welfare, tolerance, and the like. But we 
cannot hold this principled aspect of liberal theory in isolation if we are to understand 
liberalism outright. We also need to acknowledge the pragmatic concerns that 
contributed to liberalism’s development. For example, the socio-economic conditions 
we saw in the second chapter that led Constant to articulate modern liberty as non­
interference as a distinct alternative to the liberty of the ancients, and the effects that 
nineteenth century industrialisation had on the formations of welfare liberalism at the 
end of that century and the beginning of the next. We have also seen the pragmatic 
response from welfare liberals to the threat that non-intentional forces place on the 
security of individuality.
65 See “Civilization” in Mill (1974) p. 129.
66 See Mill (1936) pp. 766-769.
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Republicanism, too, is marked by a history that records the interplay between principled 
and pragmatic forces. As we have seen, republicans have a principled commitment to 
freedom as non-domination, civic virtue, rule of law, natural law and the workings of 
institutional checks and balances. But, likewise, we cannot understand republicanism 
outright until we grasp the pragmatic forces that facilitated the move to entrenched 
conceptual and institutional commitments of this kind. Here I will show that the forces 
that produced republican theorizing were not driven primarily or explicitly by a concern 
for human welfare. For instance, there is evidence in the literature on republicanism that 
such a drive to anti-arbitrariness was driven by class interests rather than by a concern 
for the welfare of all. Wirszubski writes that the Roman republic was modelled along 
such lines so as to protect the interests of the aristocratic classes against the general 
populace. The popular assembly was composed of those who did not possess noble birth 
or high rank in roman society, and “could not on its own initiative propose candidates 
for public offices, nor introduce bills or motions....The People had to listen to what they 
were told, and to cast their votes according to the motion. . . ” 67 While the popular 
assembly possessed the power to approve or disapprove of proposed legislation, the 
right to deliberate about policy was left in the hands of the senatorial class and the 
popular assembly existed as a checking mechanism against this power source rather 
than a separate policy making body68. The senate was the “advisory council of the 
Executive. ” 69 and both controlled the financial and policy operations of the state.
Republicanism’s tendentious drive towards the protection of established interests is 
illustrated in two other areas. Cicero considered the chief purpose of republican 
constitutions and communities to be the protection of private property70. It was 
possession of property that enabled individuals to develop an enlightened life71.
Kramnick also writes of the bourgeois origins of republican thought72. He notes that the 
expectations of civic virtue—devotion to one’s public duties— derived from the class of
67 See Wirszubski (1968) p. 18.
68 Ibid. p. 19
69 ibid. p. 21.
70 See Atkins, E.M. (1991) Bk. II. Notes: 73, 78, 79.
71 See Wood, N (1988) Chapter 6.
72 See Kramnick, I (1990) p. 1. See also Dunn, J (1994).
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independent landowners. Implicit in this preference for a class of individuals cultivated 
in the virtues of citizenship, is a deep fear of political participation on the part of those 
who are not so constituted. Republicanism, in general, has seen the need to check the 
unfettered workings of the majorities. This way of thinking was most evident in the 
republican arguments presented during the formation of the United States Constitution. 
Sellers notes how this period in America’s history was dominated by a concerted effort 
by some to combat the ideal of direct democracy.
Republicanism, at its core, is driven by an underlying pessimism about individuals and 
groups operating in a social and political context. Not only were majorities and factions 
feared by republicans, but also the very nature of humans themselves in their role as 
private individuals partaking in public business. Republicanism tends to operate with a 
deep pessimism about individuals and their motives when they are operating in the 
public domain. Erring on the side of caution, republicanism has tended to design 
institutions on the basis that individuals will primarily act out of self-interest, and not 
have a direct or primal concern for the public interest. Machiavelli asks us to assume 
that all are knaves. A republic divides itself into separate powers so that the energy of 
self-interests drives one component of the structure to check the other, and thus make 
the republican system a publicly viable one. As Sullivan writes, Machiavelli had the 
idea that “His is a republic that positively bristles with the energy emanating from the 
members of each class, the patricians and the plebeians, attempting to quench their 
unquenchable desires at the expense of the other. ” 73
The pragmatism of Machiavelli’s republicanism also comes through when we consider 
another reason for why the political stability and order to factions in a polity were of 
benefit, namely to defend the polity itself from invasion. Sullivan again writes 
Machiavelli “ ...insists on a republic that gives a prominent place to the people....on a 
democratic republic on the model of Rome. His concern for the people’s incorporation 
and for the degree to which a republic must placate their demands derives not from an 
interest in the self-development of the individual....or a belief in the justness of the 
people’s cause, or an assertion of the equality among all human beings despite their
73 Sullivan, V (2004) p. 31.
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social status. ” 74 Rather, “Only a republic that allows the people some voice will be able 
to deploy a large army to conquer and maintain an empire.”75But at the same time as 
fearing the unfettered operations of majorities, republicans also feared corruption and 
factional power. The Upper Houses themselves were to be the domains of the propertied 
(males exclusively) who possessed enough wealth and status to be free from undue 
influence or the allure of making public decisions based on private gain.
The pragmatic use of civic virtue is also represented in Pettit’s treatment of civic honor 
as a regulatory device, as seen in the previous chapter. Civic virtue is interpreted and 
applied in a practical way in order to produce outcomes consistent with the agent- 
neutral value of non-domination. I also have a concern for the sufficiency of the 
behavioural norm of honour presented by Pettit. We saw how Pettit presents honour as a 
regulative ideal, an ideal that promotes non-domination. Citizens will obey the civic 
norms of a society if they can gain honour or social acclaim from so, and will be 
censored with dishonour if they fail to do so. If all have good reason to value non­
domination, then rewarding those who assist in promoting non-domination for all are 
worthy of our respect. Conversely, those who violate non-domination by seeking to 
subvert the interests of others deserve our disapprobation. For example, shaming has 
been used as a regulative ideal. By shaming petty criminals—by exposing them in 
public and forcing them to experience firsthand the public hurt and disapproval their 
actions have generated—it is hoped that criminals will reassociate themselves with the 
community standards of non-domination. They will see that their actions, in other 
words, have violated the norms of law-abidingness and respect for the property and 
security of the public.
The motivation to honour for Pettit is self-interest; the honoured are those who seek 
honour as a valued possession. What matters for Pettit, as a consequentialist, is that 
non-domination is upheld as an agent-neutral good for all. The nature of the motivation 
to reach this outcome is not of primary concern. I hold that this account of honour is at 
odds with a common sense comprehension of honour. Under this account, possessing
74 Ibid. p. 32.
75 Ibid, p.32
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honour is not merely a matter of being held in high esteem by others. This is a necessary 
feature of honour but, as I argue, not a sufficient one. Instead, what is required for 
someone to possess true honour in the eyes of others is that they live honourably—or 
exercise their abilities towards goals and outcomes that are honourable.
In this sense honour is a matter of showing one’s allegiance not just to what the 
accepted community standards of conduct are, but also one’s allegiance to universally 
acceptable outcomes for all. Being honourable is not the same as being honoured by a 
community of believers. Slobodan Milosevic was someone who was held in high 
esteem by supporters of the Serbian state. The supporters of the regime lauded his 
relations with the public and commitment to the ideals of Serbian Nationalism-he led a 
life of exalted position. What is more, the attribution of this esteem to Milosevic may 
have reinforced his commitment to such principles and, in this sense, the operation of 
social esteem served its function as a behavioural and institutional norm. But it violates 
the norms of common sense to say that Milosevic led a honourable life.
Living a honourable life involves another dimension of concern—living appropriately 
or in such a way that one’s actions attribute to persons what they deserve. It is also a 
tenet of honourable living that one performs this life with a certain motivation, namely a 
motivation to be that sort of person exactly because it brings about appropriate 
outcomes. It sounds odd to say, under the common sense understating of ‘living 
honourably’ that such a person would be motivated to lead such a life because of the 
rewards they receive from being held in high esteem by others. The common sense view 
is what holds sway in the awarding of public honours to members of the community for 
the work they do for charity. It is more likely for such persons to react to the esteem 
they are awarded by the community with humility and self-effacement. Pointing either 
to the efforts of others in making their charitable actions possible or to the nature of the 
work they do to help others. This sense of honouring I hold is another dimension to 
honour not captured by Pettit’s republican account of honour as a regulative ideal. 
There is a sense in which we expect more of honour than its being a regulative ideal 
appealing to the self-interested calculations of public officials, and that it actually be 
something that resonates with those persons for more morally substantive reasons.
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Pettit’s account of honour under the framework of civility is only a narrowly construed 
account of honour, and I will go on in the next chapter to articulate a sense of honour, 
under the heading of decency, that is more attuned to the common sense understating of 
the term.
The point of these observations is to reflect the non-philosophical origins of republican 
theory, and should act as in insight into the spirit of republican thinking. This aspect of 
republicanism is important to acknowledge when it comes to assessing the role that 
republican theory should play in contemporary political climate. While Pettit holds that 
his republican theory is not bound by republicanism’s historical origins, and can be 
selectively altered so as to apply to contemporary political ideals, it is nonetheless an 
important feature of the essence of republican thinking and of the nature and parameters 
of its theoretical commitments. I argue, what is more, that republicanism is narrowly 
construed as a contemporary political ideal to the extent that it has not updated itself to 
include within its prescriptions a commitment to philosophical welfarism.
Does Sandel’s communitarian civility give us a better way to ensure that the salient 
interests of citizens are actually met in a polity? After all, Sandel does stipulate that a 
republic must not permit outcomes that are detrimental to the functioning of citizens as 
self-determining agents; agents that operate by their nature within a particular or unique 
political and social setting? The communitarian argument for republicanism is based on 
the idea that the state ought to treat people well, be concerned for their welfare, on the 
basis, similar to Pettit, that it produces better citizens. The state is only concerned for 
the welfare of its citizens on the basis that the maintenance of such welfare will produce 
more diligent and engaged citizens playing their part in the institutional life of the 
polity. Sandel is aware of the power imbalances that can influence outcomes in a polity, 
especially the imbalances brought about by the concentration of wealth in a minority 
class and effects this wealth disparity has on the ability of citizens to engage in 
decision-making processes76. Sandel holds that Roosevelt’s “New Deal” reforms sought 
to address such imbalances and institutional realities by undertaking “antimonopoly and
76 See Sandel (1996) p. 255. See also p. 258 where he refers to ‘industrial dictatorships’.
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regulatory crusades. ” 77 The republican goal after such power imbalances were addressed 
would be, according to Sandel, to restore a sense of public character to civic life. 
Republicans would do this by implementing a public philosophy that would resew the 
fabric of a cohesive community. The state, for example, would secure employment so as 
to create stable and non-fragmented communities, and in so doing create the conditions 
for each individual to engage with others for the benefit of mutual advancement. 
However, the republican mission was thwarted, Sandel adds, by the voluntarist strategy 
imposed by Keynesian liberalism. The state empowered individuals with rights to 
material welfare instead of producing policy that enhanced a public morality. The 
liberal state implemented policies of material advancement rather than community 
cohesion.78
Sandel’s republicanism is more explicit about the notion of human welfare than other 
theories of republicanism; welfare is an important precondition of good citizenship. 
However, I hold that the state’s concern for the welfare of its citizens can be articulated 
in way that does not make reference to the benefits of citizenship. In other words, there 
are reasons that the state should cater for the welfare of its citizens that do not make 
direct reference to civic benefit. The following examples offer instances where the state 
promotes welfare for non-civic reasons. Take the case of the state offering health care 
for those with Parkinson’s disease or dementia; or the case of providing palliative care 
for the terminally ill; or the provision of facilities for the mentally handicapped. Or take 
the normative issue of how we ought to treat those we deny citizenship rights to, for 
example imprisoned criminals. In these instances the people involved are not expected 
to perform the tasks of citizenship. In addition, they do not have the capacity to be 
tracking their own interest nor to be self-determining, and it sounds odd to say that we 
promote civic self-determination for people in this position. But there is a very strong 
intuition that the state ought to protect such persons in their vulnerable state. Sandel’s 
republicanism itself does not give us a reason for catering for the welfare of these 
groups. The state’s role in society, I argue, goes beyond that of promoting freedom as 
non-domination or communitarian concerns, and includes, a more direct obligation to
77 Ibid. p. 264.
78 Ibid p.268-70, p.285, p. 294.
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promote human dignity. This notion of dignity exists independently of the civic realm; 
it can be comprehended as an essential normative principle for the state to follow that 
exists outside the realm of civility.
Does Dagger’s republicanism provide us with a more direct notion of human welfare 
prescriptions over and above procedural ones? Dagger is concerned with the 
fundamental right of autonomy for all, and is more cognisant of the arbitrary forces that 
can threaten this such as power imbalances and influences of private interests79. This 
right, when granted to each, implies certain duties to others. For example, we have a 
duty to ensure that a political community exists where individuals can express their 
choices peacefully and in a stable environment80. Dagger states in general terms that 
what is needed to create such an environment is a state that is designed to create and 
implement ‘enlightened public policy’ consistent with these goals81.
However, Dagger does not go into great detail about how the state could be designed to 
channel policy of this nature. He suggests that civic education for school children could 
create an awareness among the educated sectors of the future about the importance of 
respecting the autonomy of all82. While this would be an important precondition of a 
civically and morally aware public service it is not a detailed account of how individual 
welfare could be catered for in public institutions. Also, the criticism I directed at 
Sandel’s republicanism holds also for Dagger’s. There is a sense in which we can 
demand from the state a concern for the welfare of its citizens that goes beyond 
protecting their status as self-determining or autonomous beings. The welfare of citizens 
matters for these reasons and the republicanism espoused by Sandel and Dagger is right 
to include this. But I hold that there is more to say about the state’s concern for human 
welfare beyond these concerns. I will have more to say about this in the following 
chapters.
79 Ibid. p. 139.
80 See Dagger, R (1997) pp. 46-47.
81 Ibid. p. 143.
82 Ibid. p. 131.
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Finally, does Sunstein’s republicanism give us an adequate account of how 
republicanism caters for the fulfilment of the salient interests of all? Isn’t it the case that 
the nature of constitutional law is underpinned by basic rights of individuals to 
conditions of human dignity? Sunstein's republicanism is more detailed on how salient 
interest of persons can be catered for. He gives the institutions of the state, especially in 
the form of the judiciary upholding the rule of law and constitutional principles, a more 
prominent role to play in the protection of interest, rather than being merely facilitative 
in the sense of operating the procedures of a contestatory democracy.
However, I hold that there is also a sense in which Sunstein’s republicanism does not go 
far enough in making the tracking of salient interest of all optimal in its intuitional 
functions. Human dignity is partly acquired, for Sunstein, via the structure of the 
separation of powers. The judiciary is meant to constrain state action to ensure that it 
respects the human dignity of persons that is entrenched and implied in constitutional 
principles and the law. Under this republican model, those non-judicial components of 
the state, the parliamentary and the public service, do not necessarily function with an 
ethic for human dignity. They will operate, as we saw above, primary for political and 
economic concerns. I hold that while constitutional principles may check government 
policy and actions, and in so doing play an important role in promoting human dignity, 
there are other institutional options open to us to promote the principles of dignity 
within the domain of the public service, and hence the formation of government policy.
In the light of the practice of power differentials in society, are the foundations of 
republican civility sufficient to produce a normatively sound polity? I hold that 
republican civility, and social capitalism in general, does not fare well in relation to the 
sociological analysis of state power above. There is enough doubt about the 
effectiveness of such rights to contestation for us to query whether a contestatory or 
deliberative democracy is sufficient, in itself, to cater for the salient interest of citizens.
Republican civility—the propriety of being free from arbitrary incursions —is, as with 
liberalism, a fearful response. Only power that is decentralized and checked against 
other power is effective in protecting individuals from domination from one centralized
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group. The primary concern of republicanism has been to implement a regulatory 
framework against the exercise of arbitrary power, rather than to articulate a 
philosophically prominent account of welfarism that contributes to realisation of 
welfarist ends for persons. Such a mechanism is not sufficient, as I argue above it is not, 
then there are no other substantive guidelines presented by Pettit to assist the formation 
of policy by the state that effectively tracks and ensures that people’s real or salient 
interest are respected. Pettit only gives us behavioural norms —norms about how to 
regulate political interaction so as to keep people focused on the rights of others to 
contestation, not on the rights of others to the actual protection of their salient interests.
Summary
In this chapter I have questioned the assumption made by liberals and republicans that 
the state can effectively distribute impersonal goods without bias. In particular, I 
challenged the assumption made by republicans that engagement between the state and 
the citizenry is an edifying one, producing positive outcomes for all. I showed that the 
state itself is a distinct entity with its own interests, and that it often acts in collusion 
with other sectors of the community to further them. This creates a power imbalance 
and potentially leaves other sectors of the community marginalized. The recognition of 
such imbalances is minimal within modern republican theory. Sandel and Dagger offer 
a greater awareness of such influences but Pettit and Sunstein do not place a great 
emphasis on the impacts of state partiality. More is needed, I argued, to track the 
interests of all in a pluralistic society than merely the provision of open and transparent 
rules of deliberative engagement. States, as I will argue in the following chapters, 
should be geared so as to pursue more substantive outcomes for citizens.
It should be noted that I do not deny decision-making by inclusive, contestatory 
processes is a worthy goal of the state. Such processes have great value to those 
societies inculcated in democratic principles and ideals. My concern, however, is with 
the view that such processes are sufficient to adequately track the interests of all
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citizens. It needs to be recognized that tracking the interests of all in a divided and 
pluralistic society is a complex and dynamic undertaking. The current literature within 
liberalism and republicanism, with its reference to rights, the rule of law and 
contestatory democracy, places great faith in the procedural structures in place to 
implement them. Tracking the interests of all, let alone determining what is in the 
interests of all, is a difficult task given the disparate views and stakes held by all in a 
modem democracy. But the implementation of procedural mechanisms to combat such 
complexity is way of ‘muddling through’ at least to achieve social cohesion and to cater 
for the well-being of all in such an environment. But I doubt whether such procedural 
prescriptions are the last word that can be said about how we could go about tracking 
the interests of all in a pluralistic world. I offer, in the chapters that follow, a case for 
why the creation of an enlightened public service, with its own sense of professional 
autonomy, should be seen as a further step to tracking the real or essential interests of 
all.
This addition is not intended as a way of overcoming the power imbalances I present in 
this chapter. It is rather a suggestion for how we could go about protecting individuals 
from such imbalances. Some may be sceptical about turning to the state, given what I 
say in this chapter, to protect the essential interests of individuals. However, I will show 
that we can at the very least entrust such a role for the state if it is facilitated by 
professional standards. Such standards are entrusted to many occupations where the 
official practitioners also hold many interests and are influenced by the many forces at 
work within their working environment. Yet we still hold that it is important to maintain 
standards of professionalism, and to place our trust with them that they will uphold such 
standards, for such practitioners as a way of protecting the essential interests of those 
who engage with them. It is in this spirit that I argue for the implementation of 
professional autonomy within the state as it operates in a pluralistic world.
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5. UTILITARIANISM AND ESSENTIAL INTERESTS
So far I have demarcated and detailed one principled stance towards others in a political 
community, namely that of political civility. I have set out how this principled stance 
coordinates and facilitates relations within liberal and republican political networks. 
However, I have argued that there are concerns with these positions, namely that 
inadequate interest consideration can still exist even within a society that is geared for 
civil order. In response to this issue I argue in this chapter that we need the state to be 
concerned about a second principled stance towards others, namely, they need to 
acknowledge an obligation to uphold, and advocate in favour of, people’s essential 
interests. Specifically, I argue that we can conceive of a politically feasible notion of 
essential interests on utilitarian grounds. I argue here that interest-based utilitarianism, 
based as it is on naturalist foundations, gives us a good foundation for understanding 
such a notion. I present these utilitarian interests as an important addition to our 
normative thinking about political society. By presenting these arguments I will offer an 
idealist utilitarian account of essential interests as an important addition to civil society.
5.1 The Utilitarian Account of Essential Interests.
All utilitarians are united by the core belief that morality is concerned with instantiating 
in the world a state of affairs that produces or maintains utility. Utility is understood as 
a positive state or a state of well-being for humans. However, even though there is 
general agreement that positive consequences for humans are what make actions 
morally right, utilitarians differ over the issue of what exactly it means to be better off 
or to enjoy a state of well-being. Classical utilitarians, for example, held that it pleasure 
or happiness as experienced by an individual that made that individual better off. Later 
utilitarians made distinctions between different states of pleasure and happiness and 
held that some produced more utility than others. Mill, for example, argued that such 
pleasures as the enjoyment of beauty or rational thought were intrinsically more
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valuable and promoted more utility for an individual than, say, purely hedonistic 
pleasures.
Utilitarians have also differed over the different domains to which the assessment of 
utility can be undertaken. So far I have mentioned forms of utilitarianism that are 
concerned with what produces well-being for individuals, whereas other utilitarians 
have applied a utilitarian consideration of morality not on the basis of what individuals 
ought to possess for themselves but, more generally, on the basis of what state of affairs 
would produce the most optimal amount of utility across a range of individuals. 
Outcome utilitarianism, for example, holds that the moral thing to do when faced with 
normative decisions about resource distribution is to produce an optimal amount of 
average utility for all concerned. In other words, utility assessments can take place on a 
private as well as a public level.
Other utilitarians such as preference utilitarians hold that an action is morally right not 
because it produces solely pleasure or happiness, but because it produces in the world a 
state of affairs where the desires and preferences of rational actors are satisfied. 
Utilizing a state of affairs, under this view, is to give each person the highest level of 
preference satisfaction commensurate with the preferences sought by others. We can 
ask, as we did with the issue concerning pleasure above, whether the satisfaction of 
some desires or preferences outrank, morally speaking, the satisfaction of others. In 
other words, whether the satisfaction of some desires and preferences produce, in 
themselves, more utility in terms of cohering with what produces effective preference 
satisfaction, overriding other desires and preferences of a different nature. If this was 
the case, then it would not simply be the satisfaction of desires and preferences that 
produced utility, but instead the satisfaction of certain desires and preferences which, by 
their nature, would produce the morally optimal state of affairs.
I hold that there is an objective account of essential human interests that can expose for 
us why the satisfaction of some desires and preferences produces more utility than the 
satisfaction of other desires and preferences. I call this ideal preference utilitarianism. 
The best example of utilitarian theory in this form is presented by Peter Singer. It is a
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utilitarian theory that highlights the moral importance of protecting essential interests 
over and above certain categories of desires and preferences. His interest-based 
utilitarianism holds that all sentient creatures share the vital properties of human well­
being. Under this account of utilitarianism, ideal conditions are established which all 
preference holders, and all potential preference holders, ought to have. These ideal 
conditions I refer to as our essential interests. According to Singer, the essential 
interests of human animals are understood in the sense of “ ...avoiding pain, in 
developing one’s abilities, in satisfying basic needs for food and shelter, in enjoying 
warm personal relationships, in being free to pursue one’s projects without interference, 
and many others. ” 1 Under this account of utility the mission is not to satisfy the 
preferences on a nominal basis —the preferences of the greatest number according to 
base preference satisfaction or the fulfilment of such goals as pleasure or happiness. 
Instead it is to ensure that salient or essential interests are satisfied for all. This may 
involve the minor interests of a majority being overridden by the major interests of a 
minority.
The importance of essential interests for all potential and actual preference holders is 
reflected in the principle of equality that Singer attaches to such ideal or essential 
interests. At the foundation of interest-based utilitarianism is the equal consideration of 
interests principle. All beings with one or more of the essential interests defined above 
are entitled to count as one and no more than one when being evaluated. This means 
that such interests are impersonal. It does not matter who one is or what one does in 
terms of who gains favour under a moral decision involving distributions or outcomes 
that effect our interests. All that matters is that the essential interests in existence 
prevail, no matter who holds them. This may imply, for Singer, that some bearers of 
essential interests will be non-persons, hence the animal rights component of his 
utilitarian theory.
It needs to be noted that essential interests as just stated are specific interests different 
from other types of interests. We can, for example, be said to have a different type of 
interest in terms of having our wants satisfied. If we have certain wants or desires for x
Singer(1993) p .30
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then we will know that what goes with this is the satisfaction of conditions that make 
the achievement of x possible. For example, if my wants are for a peaceful 
neighbourhood then I have an interest in the activities that occur around my 
neighbourhood, such as what gets built in adjoining or nearby property, etc. If I want to 
have a peaceful neighbourhood then I have an interest in local developments. Here 
interests have an instrumental value towards the achievement of wants2. Or if I want to 
be the best table-tennis player in my area then I have a general interest in the 
maintenance of table-tennis clubs that can record, document and publish the local 
rankings within which I compete.
But essential interests are fundamentally different from interests to do with want- 
satisfaction. For instance, while it is necessary for one to be aware of the wants that 
need to be satisfied in order to identify the corresponding interests that are needed to 
achieve the desired outcome, one can possess an essential interest without being aware 
than one possesses it. Here we might talk about interests as something that exist prior 
to, and therefore are not in an instrumental relationship with, wants. Being maternalistic 
or paternalistic are examples of treating someone not in terms of respecting their actual 
wants, but in terms of promoting their ideal interests over and above these when they 
are not consistent with the latter. For example, take the case of caring for children. An 
interest here becomes essential, and not merely general, by virtue of its being an ideal 
interest that children have to be rationally autonomous. Children often want things that 
would be detrimental to not only their current state of welfare but also to their long term 
welfare in terms of becoming fully rational and independent beings. In this sense, 
interests are not understood as conditions that are conducive to the satisfaction of 
particular wants held by the individual, rather they are ways of being that an individual 
ought to have the best opportunity to become. These are the sorts of interests that 
Hamilton, for example, refers to as agency needs3. I will detail later what I take to be 
this idealized sense of the self, but for now I just want to note that interests of the kind I 
have just mentioned will be taken to be essential interests, and not merely general one’s 
that are concerned with want-satisfaction.
2 See Barry (1965) for the view that an interest is a want-regarding concept. Chapter 10. 
1 See Hamilton (2003) p. 35.
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Health needs lie at the core of essential interests. Most health needs are going to be 
constitutive of essential interests. A health need is a state of being that is crucial for 
one’s biological integrity. Geuss writes, “’Needs’ are defined relative to the successful 
functioning of an individual....if the ‘needs’ of the organism are not satisfied, it will 
malfunction. A human being needs a certain minimal intake of calories, proteins, 
vitamins, etc. This means that is a human being does not obtain that minimal level of 
nutrition over an extended period, it will malfunction, become lethargic, have lowered 
resistance to disease, perhaps die. ” 4 It seems straightforward that all human needs are 
also essential interests. No matter what an individual may desire, or even if she/he is not 
capable of expressing wants, it is in the essential interests of all sentient creatures to 
have their health needs protected and satisfied5.
Is it the case that all essential interests are health needs? Here I want to say that they are 
not. Something can be in our essential interests to have—something that essential to our 
well-being in a specific social context—without it being a health need. For example, it 
can be argued that it is an essential interest, in certain cultures, for a child to be raised 
by its biological mother, but we would not say that it is a human or health need that this 
be done. Children can be raised by people other than their biological parents. There are 
clear advantages to being raised by one’s biological parents, but it is not that case that 
one is deprived of a basic human need if one is not. Human growth and development is 
just as viable with parents and social networks that are removed from one’s biological 
origins. Likewise, we can say that such interests as being autonomous or rational are 
essential interests but not human needs. We can protect the basic needs of others 
without their being fully rational or autonomous.
But this is not to deny that an essential interest can be something like a desire to be 
raised by one’s biological parents. If there is a contingently established stigma, for 
example, in one’s cultural context associated with not being raised by one’s biological 
parents then we might say that it is in the essential interests of a child to have the best
4 Geuss (1981) p. 46.
5 See also Hamilton (2003) on the notion of vital needs, p.27.
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opportunity to be so raised. Avoiding a life where one is subject to undeserved stigma 
qualifies as an essential interest in this context. Or take the case of what Hamilton refers 
to as social needs.6 There can be contingent social needs that are not inherently health 
needs. For example, to be an effective member of one’s social community, and to 
function as an effective social being, one may need to acquire certain skills of 
technological competence in the form of computer training, or one may need to have 
access to efficient and trustworthy mobility devices. One can maintain one’s essential 
health needs without such social goods, but, nonetheless, it is a requirement of one’s 
essential interests as a preference holder to have such social needs satisfied.
To show how interest-based utilitarianism differs from classical forms of utilitarianism,
I want to conclude this section by showing how the latter views suffering as inimical to 
ideal human functioning, and not merely pain which needs, according to the classical 
tradition, to be outweighed by such properties as pleasure or happiness in order to 
morally justified. It is the capacity to experience pain and pleasure that entitles such 
creatures, which includes human and non-human animals, to be protected from 
suffering. For example, creatures that do not possess the capacity to formulate rational 
preferences, such as rabbits and chickens, are nonetheless entitled to avoid suffering in 
their lives. Such creatures may not be able to comprehend the way in which the pain 
states they encounter are detrimental to their overall interests, but nonetheless it is the 
experience of the pain states themselves that are intrinsically disvaluable for Singer.
It is important, as an aside, to set out the different dimensions of pain and suffering. 
Specifically, it’s important to make the point that pain is not in itself contrary to one’s 
health needs, whereas suffering is. Firstly, there is pain that is physiologically 
beneficial. Pain avoidance has been deeply grounded in the utilitarian tradition. 
Bentham stated that “nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure. ” 7 The goal of utilitarian moralism was to seek the 
acquisition of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. However, pain itself, I hold, is a 
physiological state that is not intrinsically bad for biological functioning. Pain is after
6 ibid p. 31.
7 Bentham (1907)
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all a vital neural state that plays a crucial role in regulating the homeostatic operation of 
the body. The absence of pain would be detrimental to the biological functioning of the 
body.
There is pain whose existence is not morally troubling due to its being consented to. 
The pain that a marathon runner subjects herself to is endured by the runner for the 
benefit of achieving her goal of winning or finishing the race. Or, the pain consented to 
and inflicted in the case of sado-masochistic acts is not morally troubling because the 
pain is experienced in order to achieve a certain level of sexual pleasure. In these cases 
involving consent, the pain experienced is monitored and controlled by those upon 
whom the pain is inflicted, and is done in the name of achieving the satisfaction of 
preferences, thus it poses no moral problems from a utilitarian perspective.
There is pain that is intrinsically disvaluable for sentient creatures. Let us take, first of 
all, sentient creatures that are not capable of consenting to or monitoring the degree of 
pain to which they are subject. The infliction of pain on such creatures produces 
unpleasant sensations for them. The experiencing of such sensations is itself morally 
undesirable. The malnourished dog or an animal that is destroyed due to a long and 
lingering death experience the intrinsically disvaluable forms of pain. The pain 
experienced here neither promotes homeostatic balance nor achieves a higher gaol of 
attainment for the victims.
Intrinsically disvaluable pain can also be experienced by sentient creatures that are 
rational or self-conscious. The prisoner that is put to death by electric shock experiences 
prolonged, unpleasant pain states. The wrongness of this form of pain occurs not only 
during the expectation of it, but as it is experienced by the victim during the act of 
execution. The intrinsic wrongness of inflicting such pain and distress occurs in the 
short period before and during the acts of execution, but not afterwards. There is no 
sense of the pain inflicted here being detrimental to the long term interest of the victim. 
We might want to question whether, in this instance, the victim actually experiences the 
intrinsically disvaluable state of pain. We might say, for example, that the victim in this
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case deserves, in a moral sense, to be inflicted with such pain due to the pain he/she has 
illegally inflicted on others in the past.
All of the cases above deal with the value of pain states experienced in specific acts. But 
there is, I hold, an understanding of suffering that should be articulated in relation to 
these points. Suffering, I hold, can occur on two different levels 1. where the 
circumstances under which the pain inflicted on others produces distress in the victims, 
and 2. where essential interests are violated—even if there is no experience of pain 
states nor an awareness, with the corresponding negative responses, of one’s essential 
interests being degraded. In the latter sense I define suffering as disablement rather than 
distress.
Suffering in the first sense, where distress is produced in the infliction of pain, means 
that there is a considerable degree of awareness on the part of the victim of the pain that 
the discomfort experienced is unjustified or reprehensible, to be prolonged and 
repetitive, uncontrollable, degrading, or that it will be detrimental to one’s long term 
interests. For example, one suffers distress and not just isolated pain states if one is 
unjustly imprisoned, physically abused once an hour during every hour of the day at 
irregular times, knows that one’s incarceration has little hope of immediate cessation 
and that the prolonged experience of such conditions is bound to have harmful 
psychological effects.
The second sense of suffering occurs when no such awareness prevails, but where there 
is, nonetheless, an equally evident force of disablement on the part of the victims. 
Suffering here is not an expression of distress on the part of the victim, but rather is to 
be understood as an instance of a decline in ability to function and maintain one’s own 
bodily integrity. One is detrimentally effected in isolation from the awareness of the 
victim is the victim’s short and long term essential interests. For example, take the case 
of the child whose diet that consists mainly of takeaway food is detrimental to her long 
term interest of sustaining a healthy lifestyle over her life. She does not experience pain 
at present but her expected long term interests in maintaining good health are seriously 
eroded the more she eats fast food and refrains from exercise. Even though she does not
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suffer distress her current states of bad eating and no exercise there is a sense in which 
she is suffering. Her long term, essential interests are potentially disabled by her current 
actions even those though actions do not produce any anxiety or misery.
To see this point more clearly, it should be noted that the experience of pain nor an 
awareness of suffering is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of experiencing a 
decline in one’s quality of essential interests. This is the case due to the fact that one can 
have one’s basic biological capacities eroded without the presence of such factors. One 
might be placed painlessly in a biologically malfunctioned state of existence. For 
example, someone could painlessly remove one’s mobility capabilities. Or someone 
could constantly drug someone into a state of immobile ecstasy, and in so doing 
removing their awareness of their incapacities. In both cases we can still say that the 
previously mobile and rational person suffers. Having one’s capacity to lead a 
purposive life or a life directed towards one’s own goals eroded is to subject that person 
to suffering.
It is important to note that I do not include under the heading of basic biological 
functions what I call the extended biological functions of humans. It may be the case 
that a natural function I may have—one I am especially gifted with—is to be extremely 
proficient at high jumping, or that I can throw a tennis ball a long way. But these 
biological functions that extend beyond those that we all have qua biological beings, 
and which will depend on natural talents and the development of such talents, is of no 
concern to a utilitarian account of essential interests. Essential-interests utilitarians, I 
argue, will hold that we treat sentient beings appropriately only when we protect their 
basic natural functions: the functions necessary for survival. While extended natural 
functions may make life more enjoyable to live—for an athlete say and the people who 
derive enjoyment from watching him/her—it is not necessary for human survival to 
have these functions. Only base functions serve survival hence only they are listed as a 
requirement for showing decency to others.
It might be objected that there are no universal facts of persons, and that what a person 
is an evolving and unfixed notion. The libertarian, for example, might argue that
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personal development is a matter for the free choice of individuals, and that a life where 
people choose courses of action that may be detrimental to their biological development 
should be tolerated if they are freely chosen.
Sher seems to agree that our identity as humans and persons is not entirely fixed, but he 
makes an interesting observation when he states that the “facts of personhood” (like 
rationality and a desire to understand the world around us or exercising reason-based 
plans) are not inherent capacities in persons but rather they are contingently ‘near- 
universal’ features of human existence. There are also such things as, he argues, 
contingently near-inescapable social bonds (eg. warm relations, parenting, friendship, 
moral goodness, awareness of beauty). Sher believes that in these areas there is there is 
value independent of enjoyment, desire and choice8. So while we may be tempted to say 
that biological identity is not fixed, it is fair to say that there will always be contingently 
robust facts about biological wellbeing that need to be satisfied.
My account of natural biological functioning does not hold that the natural state of 
humans is static. The biological functions of humans alters as they evolve. Teenage 
girls in the affluent west, for example, are experiencing their first menstrual cycle at an 
earlier stage on average than twenty years ago. Changes in diet and lifestyle are altering 
the timing of the biological function of reproduction but the basic function remains the 
same. Another example is the biological function of body hair. As clothing has become 
more and more prominent in human society the need for body hair for warmth has 
reduced. The result is more hairless bodies and the evolution of a reduced natural 
heating system for the body.
Am I saying that cases such as this are contrary to the essential interests of humans? 
That to allow diet and clothing to alter natural functions such as menstruation and body 
cooling is tampering with what people really deserve qua biological beings. The answer 
to this is no. The basis of this reply is an appeal to consequentialism. The rightness or 
wrongness of an alteration in the biological functioning will be decided on the basis of 
whether or not the alteration brings about suffering to the individuals involved. The
See Sher (1997) p. 11
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detrimental results will be obvious and palpable whether in the short or long term. The 
development of clothing and the eventual reduction of the body’s natural heating system 
is not uncivil because an essential biological function —maintaining body heat— is 
enhanced. Likewise, the time period of reproductive cycles may change due to social or 
economic forces, but the healthy performance of such cycles is what matters from the 
perspective of substantive civility. Consequentialism fixes right or normatively 
legitimate actions according to their conformity with agent-neutral value. There is then 
little problem associated with connecting indecency with acts that violate value-neutral 
qualities of persons, namely the basic natural necessities that maintains life.
Another point to note is that essential interests can be violated without the current moral 
norms of a society condemning such actions. Take the case of the marital rape and 
retrospective moral evaluations. In the 1950’s, it was illegal to perform sexual acts on 
women without their consent, but it wasn’t illegal for a married man to have sex with 
his wife without her consent. There were no legal or moral norms in place during the 
1950’s that prohibited or sanctioned the practice of marital rape. But take the case of a 
victim of marital rape who seeks some form of compensation from her husband for the 
forced sex acts he performed in the 1950’s. We do not say of this man that he 
committed an immoral act in the 1950’s —at the time there were no moral or legal 
norms informing him of the immorality of his actions. Nonetheless, there is a sense in 
which we can say, retrospectively, that the women’s essential interests in maintaining 
her biological integrity were damaged in the 1950’s, even if the full scale of her 
awareness of the psychological damage done to her may not have fully surfaced, in her 
mind say, until moral and social norms altered so as to bring to light the immorality of 
such actions.
On this basis it is quite straightforward to establish standards of interpersonal 
comparisons among humans. While we might accept that pain thresholds will differ 
across populations or subjective beliefs, the physiological condition of non­
suffering—the absence of unnecessary, excessive pain or interest erosion that is 
detrimental to one’s effective, biological continuity, is universally held to be of value. 
This physiological value holds even if one is not consciously having the psychological
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state of appreciating non-suffering, we are being decent to others when we ensure that 
the physiological state of non-suffering prevails. Given the choice between inflicting 
pleasure or excessive pain on humans it is self-evident (given the nature of humans) that 
the avoidance of suffering outweighs positive pleasures.
Evidence of the interpersonalised standardisation of suffering in moral theory is found 
within the dictates of negative utilitarianism. There is, as Barrington Moore points out, 
more room for epistemological agreement on what constitutes misery than what 
constitutes happiness9. The latter cannot hold unless there is an absence of the former; 
on this we can all agree. In other words, we can claim to know that the avoidance of 
misery is a morally universal goal while at the same time being agnostic about whether 
there are any universal reasons for believing that there is a unitary understanding of 
happiness10.
Misery here is equated with the experience of conditions where one’s basic biological 
functioning is seriously inhibited. For example, it is a base function of being a human 
that one avoids excessively stressful environments—say, the blaring of noise over a 
certain amount of decibels. It is a base biological function of humans that their actions 
are consistent with their biological realities. I weigh 78kg therefore I cannot lift a three 
tonne weight. It is a base biological function of humans that we have access to spacious 
areas or that everyone needs to get regular and frequent sleep. Forcing one hundred 
people to live in a room no bigger than the average house size violates the base 
biological fact of humans that they need space to move. There is no room for subject 
discretion, as there was with indecency at the level of social relations, in these areas as 
to the value that these states of affairs have for humans. These states of affairs are 
detrimental to humans irrespective of the subjective beliefs held by the victims towards 
their condition.
9 See Moore (1972). Chapter One.
10 However, it should also be noted that the negative methodology being used here to define the term ‘decency’ does 
not imply that decency can only be realised via negative action. To be decent to others may not only require that we 
refrain from inflicting misery upon them, but it may require that we act towards to them so as to prevent or eliminate 
imminent or existing misery respectively.
133
Smart does not find negative utilitarianism or the avoidance of disutility a very 
attractive goal11. Here is why he believes this. He holds that negative utilitarianism 
would have to be consistent with the extermination of the human race. Smart asks us to 
imagine a benevolent tyrant who will destroy the world and all those who live on it in 
order to eliminate human misery, thus eliminating disutility from the world and 
satisfying the goal of negative utilitarianism. This consequence, Smart argues is 
unpalatable and hence negative utilitarianism should be thought in the same way. He 
further concludes that it is probably best to see negative utilitarianism only as a 
subordinate rule of thumb and not as an ultimate principle of human action.
I hold, in response to Smart’s objection, that negative utilitarianism need not be reduced 
to a subordinate rule of thumb. An understanding of the sort of ideal utilitarianism I 
covered earlier should help here. Destroying the world and hence all disutility is not 
consistent with ideal preference utilitarianism, namely because it thwarts existing 
preferences to continue life and the plans laid out for it. Interest-based utilitarianism is 
based on a respect for the natural functions of individuals, functions that have intrinsic 
value for each individual. A vital part of our natural functioning is that we are purpose- 
driven beings, and eliminating such beings for the sake of removing things with the 
capacity for disutility is wrong because such beings possess positive goals. Being 
committed to the preservation of one’s rational and biological capacities is an essential 
interests for all.
We are now in a position to see where negative utilitarianism should fit in. It eliminates 
disutility so as to create the conditions for the ideal existence of personhood. The 
removal of disutility is not a good in and of itself, and this is where Smart is mistaken to 
attribute the destruction of the human race as something that is implied by negative 
utilitarianism. I don’t think Popper ever had the sort of negative utilitarianism that 
Smart attributes to him—the sort where it is the sole and ultimate goal to remove 
disutility12. Popper wanted to protect Kantian individualism and this means respecting 
the individual as an end in him/herself. Destroying the world and eliminating things that
11 See Smart and Williams (1973).
12 See Popper (1966).
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are ends in themselves is not going to be the kind of negative utilitarianism that a 
Kantian would be interested in. Rather negative utilitarianism is a view that seeks to 
remove those circumstances that threaten the status of individuals as ends.
The moral importance of the natural state of non-suffering highlighted by Singer, I hold, 
has important implications for an understanding of a normatively constructed political 
order. Specifically, it gives us, in contrast to the act and rule utilitarian accounts covered 
above, a utilitarian understanding of political and moral propriety that is interpersonally 
standardized. In these cases, it will always be the case that the acts in violation of 
essential interests will cause humans to suffer, and the presence of such suffering will 
itself constitute disutility irrespective of the subjective beliefs held about whether 
persons in particular circumstances do or do not actually suffer. I argue that causing 
people to suffer in this way is universally indecent, and will always be an instance of 
violating an objective moral fact.
5.2 Knowing Essential Interests.
I will now deal with the issue of how interest-based utilitarians can come to know what 
our essential interests are, and how they acquire moral guidance from them? To answer 
this question I will look at two assumptions about human psychology that utilitarians 
can use to determine what we ought, morally speaking, to do. The first is that 
utilitarians assume that all rational actors are motivated to act for self-regarding reasons. 
Classical utilitarians held that it is a fact that we are all motivated to act for the sake of 
our own pleasure or happiness. Preference utilitarians hold that it is a fact that we are all 
motivated to act for the sake of satisfying our own preferences. Implied in this is the 
assumption that rational actors who wish to have their preferences satisfied, or live a 
life full of rewarding pleasures and happiness have good reason to endorse a normative 
system that protects their capacity to formulate and express such preferences. The 
second is that there is an idealized sense of self-interest that assumes that we not only 
naturally pursue pleasure, happiness or preference satisfaction, but that we, as rational
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agents, also naturally pursue our own welfare or essential interests. Under this notion, 
psychological utilitarianism holds that rational humans naturally act so as to improve 
their welfare, and to avoid conditions detrimental to their welfare. Effective preference 
formation and expression cannot, for example, occur in a state of suffering. Suffering, is 
by its nature, debilitating and degrading.
Here unnecessary pain and suffering is not only consistent with the function of effective 
formation or pleasure and happiness pursuit, but is also inconsistent with the essential 
functioning of sentient beings. We can deduce this simply by observing the evasive 
action taken by sentient beings when threatened or inflicted with acts of unnecessary 
pain or suffering. Utilitarians gain moral knowledge though the performance of 
empathy or compassion under this latter view. Pains and sufferings are held to be 
universally negative states of affairs. This is, after all, what partly lies at the foundation 
of the ‘each to count as one and not more than one’ maxim of utilitarian thinking. It is 
only the fact of experiencing unwanted pain or the detriment of one’s essential interests 
that counts in moral assessments, and not other facts such as whose pain it is or whose 
essential interests are damaged.
It’s important for the purposes of clarification to make the distinction between interest 
that are essential and interest that are important or objective. Objective interests for 
rational actors may be of the kind that Raymod Geuss talks of where we have an interest 
not only in expressing preferences but also in formulating them with the best possible or 
perfect knowledge. Interests might be important to us such as the interest each of us has 
in having the best opportunity to achieve the life-goals we set ourselves, or interest 
might exist in another form such as the interest the dead might be said to have in being 
honoured or remembered well. Essential interests are different from the kind of interests 
just stated. While the interest just stated are important to the people who hold them they 
are not essential. We can reasonably be expected to live a life of non-suffering without 
have perfect knowledge ourselves of the factors pertaining to the choices we make, and 
we can live a decent life without having the maximal opportunities to flourish as 
musicians, artists, sportspeople, etc.
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The strength of our moral entitlement to essential interests is something that separates 
the latter from other forms of interests. We can be said to be morally entitled to have 
important or objective interests realised over frivolous or minor interests. But there will 
be a prima facie moral entitlement to have one’s essential interests considered and 
ranked above all other interests. It should be noted that one’s freedom from misery and 
suffering or bodily and psychological degradation will outweigh others moral 
considerations on a prima facie basis. Why do I say only on a prima facie basis. The 
reason is that there will be cases where essential interests will be overridden by lesser 
interests. For example, I have an interest in maintaining my status as an autonomous 
decision-maker, therefore it is not justifiable to force me to give a healthy kidney to 
someone who needs it more than I do. Even if I can do without the kidney and still lead 
a life of effective biological functioning, and the recipient of my kidney would gain a 
life of effective biological functioning rather than a life of degradation, it is not morally 
justifiable to force me to give up my kidney.
However, it’s not the case that we can conclude from the above that the right to free 
choice trumps the right to have one’s essential interests protected. The freedom to 
choose among luxury goods is not unjustifiably thwarted if I am taxed so as to provide 
poverty relief or basic medical resources for the ill. Free choice does not trump 
biological integrity outright in a normative sense. In the kidney case the healthy person 
has a right to his own bodily integrity—this is what prevents us from forcing him to 
give his kidney. Disabling another so as to remove their kidney violates their right to 
choose what they wish to do with their body. However, we do not say that the healthy 
person is morally obliged to give his kidney to the needy person. The healthy person has 
a right to freely choose to maintain his bodily integrity, even if so doing means that 
he/she denies bodily integrity to someone else.
This last point, I hold, is crucial for our understanding of the essence of an interest. A 
theory of essential interests must have a specific ranking module that informs us of how 
to rank preferences. A brief argument will show why the universal, background 
preference of avoiding suffering outweighs the expressed positive preferences of 
individuals. Take the expression of such positive preferences as the preference to have a
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wide range of consumer choice across product ranges or the preference to spend one’s 
spare time studying astronomy. These are explicitly goal-orientated preference hence 
their positive nature —they require the presence of specific outcomes in the world in 
order for the preference to be satisfied. The satisfaction of these preferences is 
contextually crucial to the welfare of the holders of these preferences. Having a wide 
range of consumer choice increases the quality of decision satisfaction for the 
consumer; contemplating the wonders of the universe brings a sense of intellectual 
fulfilment for the astrology enthusiast. These individuals will fare well in the sense that 
their preferences will be satisfied in this context.
But it is another thing to address the issue of what it means for an individual to fare well 
in his or her life, and not just in terms of having his/her positive preferences satisfied. 
Having a preference for a wide selection of consumer choice or to enjoy astrology is of 
little worth if one does not fare well in the vital aspects of one’s life. Nor is the 
satisfaction of such positive preferences as the preference to be in possession of the 
latest model in luxury yachts going to be equivalent to the satisfaction of having one’s 
preference to be free from the stress that results from uncertain income prospects. The 
cost of having one’s preferences thwarted is intrinsically higher for the latter than it is 
for the former. Losing out on a luxury yacht upgrade is not as vital to one’s fundamental 
interests as losing out on employment or income security. For the yacht purchaser, 
income security is highly stable and any loss of preferences over and above such vital 
interests is not going to outweigh those who are losing out on the satisfaction of vital 
interests in all parts of their lives.
Importance-functions that expose moral knowledge can also be seen in the following 
example. Imagine that someone has a button in front of them. They are permitted to 
make only one of two choices: push the button and save thousands of people from 
torture or not push it and receive a piece of chocolate cake. What is more, the person in 
this scenario is well fed and is not in desperate need of food; the consumption of the 
cake would be a luxury to this person. What should this person do? Does this person 
have better reason to act one way instead of another? It would be, normatively 
speaking, implausible for this person to rank the pleasure of eating the cake above that
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of the pain that the thousands of people would incur. Major interests cannot, from the 
perspective of synthetic justification, be sacrificed for the sake of minor ones. It is a fact 
that in this scenario the pleasure of cake-eating is a minor concern when weighed 
against the pain of torture for thousands. What tells us that it is implausible to argue that 
this pleasure should be satisfied at the cost of these pains? The answer is that we know, 
via experience, that this pleasure has less cost on human welfare than the costs of 
torture. It is an experience that we expect all rational agents to identify; the world needs 
to be rationed in such a way so that such pleasures are always outweighed by the 
avoidance of such pains in all such scenarios.
To argue for my view that suffering is intrinsically morally wrong, think of the opposite 
view—that suffering itself is not intrinsically morally wrong. Can it ever be the case 
that we are justified, morally speaking, to remain indifferent or amused in the presence 
of suffering? This sounds odd. An intuition containing indifference towards suffering 
can never be a moral intuition, according to my account. All moral intuitions must 
assume suffering as something of disvalue to humans, otherwise they would not be 
moral. Morality requires that we not only be other-regarding, but they we regard others 
in the sense that we wish them to fare well.
5.3 Essential Interests and the Fact/Value Objection.
The allure of the utilitarian account of essential interests—what should pull us to see it 
as a vital attachment to any normative theory of political society —is that it appeals to, 
inter alia, universal natural facts about persons. The psychological facts of the 
importance of non-suffering to effective preference formation, and the intrinsic 
undesirability of unnecessary pain sensations have implications for how we ought to 
act, morally speaking, in response to such matters. But there is a standard philosophical 
objection to an argument of this kind. There is a strong objection in the philosophical 
literature to inferring values from facts13. Hume says there is no logical connection or
13 “Perhaps the simplest and most important point about ethics is purely logical. I mean the impossibility to derive 
nontautological ethical rules—interpretations; principles of policy; aims or however we may describe them —from
139
implication between a fact about the world and how we ought to value such facts. For 
example, we might consider the fact that torturing innocent humans causes extreme 
pain. However, we cannot logically deduce from this fact that torturing humans is 
wrong, or that we have good reasons for holding that we ‘ought not’ to torture humans.
The fallacy holds in the following way. Hume holds that it is a fallacy to deduce values 
from facts in that in a logical syllogism it is impossible and illogical to derive moral 
prescriptions from ‘ought free’ premises. What is needed, Hume’s argument holds, in 
the above example before we can conclude that we ought not to torture humans is 
another premise containing a value assumption, namely that it is wrong to inflict 
unnecessary and extreme pain on the innocent. Only then are we justified in logically 
inferring the conclusion that we ought not to torture innocent humans, because then we 
would be inferring an ‘ought-conclusion’ from a premise containing an ‘ought reason’.
There is another type of objection to the fact/value relation in my argument for the 
normative salience of essential interests. G.E. Moore’s version of the fact/value 
distinction hold that there is no syonymity or definitional relation between moral terms 
and facts. Moore argues that it is a fallacy to define moral terms with reference to 
natural properties; this, he holds, just cannot be done. Moral terms defined solely with 
reference to natural properties will always leave an open question about whether the 
natural properties themselves are constitutive of the moral meaning of the term itself. 
For example we might say that pleasure is good. But if the natural is synonymous with 
the moral then this translates as pleasure is pleasure; leaving open the question of 
whether pleasure is itself good. For Moore, moral terms such as goodness are 
indefinable. Instead, moral terms are known intuitively by common language users.
Another objection to the idea of inferring values from facts points to the absence of 
motivational force within natural facts themselves. The core of the objection is that facts 
about the world do not contain within them motivational force; facts inform us about the 
way the world is and do not purport to state how we ought to react in behavioural terms
statements of facts. Only if this fundamental logical position is realized can we begin to formulate the real problems 
of moral philosophy....” Popper (1948) p. 154.
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to it. Facts about the world do not have in themselves ‘attitude-guiding’ features, the 
objection goes, therefore they cannot provide in themselves a motivation to hold beliefs 
or act in a certain way. All that factual claims do is state how the world is; they do not 
contain any prescriptive force about how we ought to think about the world.
The fact/value distinctions posed above present a problem for my account of essential 
human interests in the following sense. I assume that there are facts about the 
world —facts about essential human functioning—that ought to guide our moral 
thinking about how we think and act in the world. However, how can I justify this 
inference in the face of the objections from Hume who held that it is a logical fallacy to 
deduce ‘ought’ prescriptions from natural facts; Moore who held that moral values 
cannot be synonymous with natural facts , and those that hold that facts have no 
motivational force? Would I be forced to concede to the likes of Moore and non- 
cognitivists that this is not possible, and that instead we come to know the moral worth 
of essential interests not by looking at facts in the world, but by formulating intuitions, 
desires or attitudes about what is the morally appropriate response? Does the view that 
facts do not have motivational force negate the possibility of utilitarians arguing for the 
objective value of essential human interests?
It’s important to show that my appeal to the ‘natural facts about persons’ withstands 
objections of this kind. Firstly, let me distinguish my naturalist account of the moral 
import of essential interests from Hume’s objection. Hume offers reasons for why there 
is no logical connection between facts and values. But my account of essential interests 
based on a reference to natural properties is a form of naturalism that can survive the 
objection that there is no logical inference from facts to values. Hume rightly argues 
that deductive inferences cannot or do not allow ought-specific conclusions to follow 
from ought-free premises. But, I argue, that even though this is true it does not mean 
that we can never have an inferential relation between facts and values. All that Hume 
argues in this instance is that we cannot have inferential relations between facts and 
values that are deductive. I will shortly explain the sense in which values can be derived 
from facts in an inferential sense.
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I offer the same type of response to Moore’s objection to those who claim to derive 
values from facts. Moore rightly points out, in my view, that there can be no definitional 
relation between natural facts and values. Facts can never conclusively define values 
because if they did so there would still be an open question about what we, morally 
speaking ought to do. But, again, even if we accept that there can be no definitional 
relation between natural facts and values it does not negate the possibility of there being 
some type of inferential relation between natural facts and values. Inferring values from 
facts is a task distinct from defining moral values exclusively in terms of natural facts.
Here is the sense in which I hold that there exists an inferential relation between natural 
facts and values. The inference that can exist between the descriptive and the evaluative 
is abductive14. Abductive inferences are distinct from deductive and inductive 
inferences. Abductive inferences are inferences that are guided not by logical entailment 
or enumerative force as with deductive and inductive reasoning respectively, but instead 
by an inference to the best explanation15. Conclusions can be abductively inferred from 
premises on the basis that they are reasonable explanations of the content of the 
premises. But, it must be noted, what counts as a ‘reasonable explanation’ or an 
‘acceptable interpretation of the best explanation” will not be found solely in the 
contents of the premises, as is the case with the logical entailment of deductive 
inferencing. Instead, abductive reasoning acknowledges the operation of a common 
sense faculty of reasoning, external to the premises of an argument. In other words, 
there are commonly known salience norms that operate in accordance with abductive 
reasoning that provide information about what features of the issues before us are 
relevant for consideration and realization and which are not.
Essential-interest utilitarianism assumes the existence of primary conditions of human 
well-being —natural facts about persons and their biological nature. For example, it 
assumes that humans are naturally disposed to non-misery, a life of order, predictability 
and regulation, to relations of social and biological interdependency at complex levels,
14 See Pierce (1958) for this term.
15 Abduction and induction are similar in that neither holds conceptually to entailment inferencing. But they are 
distinct in the sense that the former inferences towards that which we have the most reason to believe or that which 
contains the best explanation of the evidence under consideration, whereas, the latter inferences towards that which 
had the best enumerative or aggregated evidence for believing.
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to self-preservation, and the like. It’s a common-sense fact about the world that these 
primary human needs have a natural efficacy for humans. These natural facts about 
humans infer, I argue, the worthiness of one way of valuing the world over another 
when we reason using the method of abduction. These common-sense facts give 
rational agents good reason to adopt them as the content of their normative 
commitments. Such values are inferred from these natural facts about human needs on 
the basis that they provide the best explanation, all things considered, for why such 
natural facts are so prominently placed. So, for example, we infer from these primary 
natural facts about persons certain morality functions that can be applied to our moral 
systems.
Coincidentally, it comes as no surprise that our moral network is contingently geared 
towards a respect for primary human needs. For instance, moral networks promote and 
regulate order and power; they involve inherently other-regarding social practices in 
that they seek to apply order across persons; they are inherently positive in that they are 
geared towards a propriety of human conduct conducive to effective human survival 
overall; and they are inherently ‘discourse-favouring’ in that all moral judgments seek 
to select and favour one viewpoint above others on the basis of providing better reasons 
for believing one thing is more morally appropriate than another16.
This is not to deny that moral networks are constructed by a community of human 
agents. We can agree that morality is a human construct but deny that its validity is 
dependent on contingent subjective beliefs. It is important here to make a distinction 
between the existential nature of morality, which can be said to be constructed by 
human endeavour, and the truth-instantiating nature of morality. The latter defines what 
it is that makes a moral claim what it is, as distinct from other claims we make about the 
world via our beliefs properly fixed as moral claims and not as other claims. Moral 
claims, for instance, may be causally linked with the prevailing beliefs of a community. 
Aggregated subjective beliefs, in other words, may determine the moral standards that 
exist in that domain. On the other hand, with the truth-instantiating dimension of
16 See Shafer-Landau (2003) for the view that non-cognitivists cannot escape the performance of favouring or 
demarcation in their moral judgments, p.34.
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morality the fixing of natural facts to moral beliefs can be done independently from any 
particular subjective beliefs that an agent may have about the world around her. In other 
words, what makes one state of affairs in the world more worthy of aptness in the 
process of abductive reasoning will not be that it is merely desired or preferred by a 
subjective judge on the matter. Rather, what makes certain facts apt in an abductive 
sense is what it is reasonable for a community of believers to endorse.
So, for example, by comprehending the primary facts of human need and their efficacy 
rational actors are expected to infer the normative claim that one ought to ‘protect that 
which is efficacious to our essential functioning as humans and persons’. Abductive 
inferences inform us that it is reasonable to believe this normative claim given the 
existence of the natural facts, even if the natural facts themselves do not overly 
prescribe an evaluative conclusion. However, the fact that human needs are 
biologically efficacious does contain within itself evaluative force if it’s the case that 
the moral network seeks such robustly contingent outcomes such as self-preservation. In 
other words, it is reasonable to hold the normative view that conditions efficacious to 
human welfare should be protected given that it is a fact in the world that certain natural 
conditions are efficacious for human survival. Abductive reasoning informs us that this 
is the best or most apt conclusion to draw from these facts about human existence. I 
want to add that my view does not necessarily hold that there are mind-independent, 
moral facts in the world with their own moral content. I do not hold that there are such 
entities as moral facts in the world independent of us and to which we apply reasoning 
in order to discover. The moral salience of certain natural facts in the world can be 
prioritised over other others facts due to their efficacy within the particular moral order 
we have constructed.
Let me give an example of how abductive reasoning permits the derivation of normative 
value from natural facts, and how this makes morality a matter of truth and falsity. Let’s 
say that one could only choose one of two choices. Either one could choose to partake 
in a luxury pursuit, or one could choose to save the life of an innocent person17.
171 assume here that the option of choosing the luxury-pursuit is one that exists for somebody who is enjoys a high 
level of well-being and is not in desperate need of luxury.
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Knowing that morality is about promoting salient human interests leads us to perform 
the latter in favour of the former. It is a sound moral judgment, therefore, to protect 
innocent life when the choice is to do this or partake in a luxury activity because, ceteris 
paribus, protecting innocent life is inherently the morally appropriate thing to do. It 
would be a mistake of rationality, a mistake of properly rationing the world up in 
accordance with the norms of abductive reasoning, to choose the luxury activity over 
the life-preserving one. In this sense, moral judgements are capable of truth and falsity 
ascriptions. The belief that preserving innocent life has greater normative value, in this 
context, than the belief that one ought to satisfy one’s desires for luxury, in the context 
of this choice scenario. Importantly, what makes it true that life preservation has this 
greater value in this context is not that someone believes it to be so, or has a pro-attitude 
towards it being so. Rather what makes life preservation trump luxury satisfaction in 
this context is something inherent in life that makes it more important, normatively 
speaking, to preserve for the innocent than what is inherent in the pleasure derived from 
luxury satisfaction18. What is more, the ethos of morality itself promulgates that 
everyone has good reason to see that this is the case, and we can argue with others as 
we would argue about disputes over facts in a situation where someone would rank 
luxury-satisfaction over protecting the innocent.
We can now see the sense in which utilitarian essential interests can be understood as 
appropriate factors in the process of abductive reasoning. Essential interests for persons 
are facts about persons that will always be worthy of qualifying as plausible moral 
claims. Claims about what it is morally plausible to consider are subject to truth and 
falsity, we can get such claims right or wrong, and they will be right or wrong not in the 
sense of violating conventional beliefs about right or wrong, but by either conforming to 
or violating what is in our human interests. The force of such reasoning is effective 
given that object of moral networks is to protect and enhance salient human concerns.
This view about morality exists despite Hume’s objection that we cannot logically infer 
moral conclusions from non-moral premises. Salient human interests exist in the world
18 See ibid on the notion of stance-independence. Here Shafer Landau makes the point that moral truths exist 
independently from actual perspective.
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and guide us in separating true plausibility claims from false ones irrespective of the 
fact that moral terms cannot be derived from non-moral premises. Once we know the 
contingent truth that moral networks enhance human affairs positively, then we can 
know what does and does not constitute a valid moral claim. Likewise, with Moore’s 
objection to naturalism. We can still hold that there are mind-independent moral facts 
about the practice of morality itself within social networks, and accept that non-moral 
terms, natural properties are not synonymous with moral terms and properties. Also, we 
need not be committed to the view that natural facts in themselves have motivational 
content or force. The reason why such facts are identified as morally salient, or ought to 
be so identified, is due to our common sense intuitions and experiences about what it is 
needed for the sustenance of biological integrity.
5.4 Essential Interests Compared and Contrasted
The maintenance of essential interests is of value to us because it instantiates an 
objective state of human dignity. It is important, for instance, to note the subtle basis on 
which the utilitarian view about the value of essential interests differs from that of other 
claims made about the moral primacy of human needs. Shue19, for example, argues that 
subsistence has value for individuals due to the fact that these individuals cannot enjoy 
rights in general without the maintenance of subsistence rights. The rights to freely 
speak, move, believe, associate etc. cannot be realised unless we each enjoy basic 
subsistence. The severely malnourished don’t have a voice, they do not function at an 
adequate social level, and it is this, for Shue, that locates the disvalue of such 
conditions. Subsistence rights, then, have instrumental value for Shue. For him, we 
ought to prioritise basic human needs because such needs serve the political ideal of 
individualism.
But I argue that under the utilitarian account covered above, the absence of subsistence 
is a wrong in itself—it produces an intrinsically bad state of affairs for sentient beings. 
Failure to obtain what is necessary for subsistence is not wrong primarily because it 
denies humans the rights to move, speak, believe-although these are good reasons for
19 See Shue (1980).
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acknowledging the undesirability of non-subsistence. Eyesight is good for us qua 
human existence — not qua its function in enabling us to satisfy preferences or desires. 
Such factors privilege the discourse of essential interests over other rights.
This point is important for my analysis because it means that the guarantee of 
subsistence rights for all need not be based on a justification that they serve liberal or 
democratic rights. The protection of essential interests has no necessary connection with 
democracy, for instance. Non-democratic regimes —say those composed of chiefs that 
are appointed via a process of hereditary succession—may be decent in the sense of 
adequately protecting its members from suffering. A society that does not respect the 
rights of individuals to the freedom of speech, movement, assembly etc and whose 
authority does not rest on the consent (nor the contest) of its members, may still be one 
that respects essential interests relative to that society. The non-democratic authority 
that constitutes such a society may do well in protecting the basic human well-being of 
its members by producing good biological functioning of all its members, and by 
respecting the integrity of its members.
It is also worth noting that essential interests can be minimally catered for in this 
instance without them extending to ideal interests as these are understood by preference 
utilitarians. A society may fail to ensure for all its members equal opportunities to 
develop their rational capabilities to become effective preference holders and to express 
those preferences diligently. As long as such a society does not permit the existence of 
suffering or misery in terms of degrading biological development then such a society 
will cater for essential interests. However, this does not deny that in a society or culture 
that does value effective rational autonomy as an essential interest—as a condition of 
well-being—that the protection of such interests will be required for that society to 
realize essential interests sufficiently. The minimal requirement of essential interest, in 
other words, is that misery and suffering be avoided, an extension of this, on utilitarian 
grounds and relative to a society that values rational autonomy, will be definitive of 
essential interests in that society only.
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Think also of decent treatment that is warranted to those who are not capable of 
possessing or exercising liberal rights. Would such treatment be granted to such people 
if subsistence rights only had value if they promoted other rights? Take for example the 
situation with those who are immobile and suffering from dementia and severe forms of 
Alzheimer’s disease. People who fit into this category are unlikely to effectively 
exercise their rights to association, movement, speech, and the like. But there is a very 
important sense in which we say such people are morally entitled to subsistence. If 
basic rights are identified and valued only in relation to other rights, as Shue argues, the 
people in these categories would not be entitled to these basic human needs needs. 
However, it makes sense to say that the protection of people in this situation is 
undertaken in a decent society on the basis of care and comfort being intrinsically 
valuable to the welfare of persons. Adequate subsistence matters for these beings 
irrespective of the issue of rights satisfaction. Subsistence matters for humans in terms 
that can be expressed outside the domain of rights fulfilment.
Essential interests understood from an ideal utilitarian position can also be contrasted 
with Hamilton’s work on needs in the political realm. Hamilton’s account of needs and 
their place in the political spectrum, especially in the sense that they relate to a rights- 
based civil society, is in the spirit of what I present here. However, there are significant 
points of difference that I want to note. Hamilton associates the rights-based political 
realm, the realm that he sees as an insufficient network for the securing of human needs, 
with utilitarianism20. Hamilton is cynical about any attempt to provide for needs from a 
meta-theoretical understanding. Utilitarian theory, from Hamilton’s perspective, tends 
to “generate the unconditional prioritisation of subjective preferences despite the 
acknowledged fact that preferences are determined (at least in part) by sources beyond 
the individuals who avow them. ” 21 and that “At its base, as an approach to morality, 
utilitarianism is subjective-relative; it treats pleasure or desire satisfaction as the sole 
element in human good, and evaluates actions dependent on their consequences on 
human welfare determined by individual avowal (preference) alone.” 22 The limited 
extent to which utilitarianism does prioritise needs is, for Hamilton, at the artificial
20 See Hamilton (2003) p.7 and p. 15 especially.
21 ibid. p. 7.
22 ibid. p. 15.
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level of ensuring that the needs of rational agents to express their judgments about the 
good life are respected23. He adds that in general utilitarianism “excludes any systematic 
political process of evaluation or transformation of preferences...”
The interpretation of utilitarianism here by Hamilton is at variance with my account of 
ideal or interest-based utilitarianism. The latter does express conditions under which 
essential interests can be distinguished from standard preference-satisfaction where that 
is taken to mean the fulfilment of subjective wants. Utilitarians, in other words, are 
sensitive to prioritising preference satisfactions in favour of those more attuned to our 
essential needs and interests. What is more, I am not cynical about the efficacy of a pro- 
theoretical approach to the provision of needs within a political network. I believe that 
pro-theoretical strategies can play an effective role within the institutional structures of 
the state, especially on the part played by policy-making public officials and the values 
and standards we can expect them to profess. The universalism of essential human 
interests ought to have a straightforward appeal to any reflective agent operating within 
such an environment. I will develop this idea further in the next chapter, but it is enough 
to note here my points of difference with Hamilton.
Essential interests understood from an ideal utilitarian position can also be contrasted 
with work on human capabilities. Nussbaum holds that just distributions should be 
based on the Aristotelian ideals that promote human flourishing in the appropriate way, 
namely that humans flourish properly in relation to what makes them human. 
Specifically, this means that humans should be provided with the capabilities to act in 
such a way that the good life can be chosen and lived, and by ‘the good life’ is meant 
something in the order of living life intelligently. This would involve, above all 
possessing the capability to exercise effectively the skills of practical reason. One 
would have an adequate control of one’s intellect and judgement ability to be able to 
effectively choose and monitor a well-lived life; a life free from detrimental extremes 
for example. Associated with this is the degree of well-being or self-esteem that one 
would gain from knowing that one was in such control of one’s life. Feeling like an
23 ibid. p. 7.
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autonomous chooser and not as a slave to the passions is an important component of 
living a flourishing life.
How does such a view relate to what I have said about utilitarianism and essential 
interests? The straightforward point is that utilitarianism can share the Aristotelian ideal 
set forward by Nussbaum. Ideal preference utilitarianism is concerned primarily with 
maintaining the conditions that enable individuals to be effective expressers of 
preferences, and not to be subject to conditions that disable them from doing so. As 
Singer informs us, people must not only be free from misery, but must also be able to 
partake in activities that make their lives uniquely human; namely that they must be 
effective preference holders. It is the capability of expressing preferences diligently or 
rationally that lies at the core of both Aristotelian and ideal preference utilitarianism. 
The theoretical distance between the utilitarianism and the capabilities approach should 
not be drawn as wide apart as it is in the literature. For example, Sen holds that 
utilitarians identify utilities such as pleasure, happiness or desire satisfaction as the only 
worthy objects of the what he calls the evaluative space which constitutes our moral 
sweep, as it were24. Nussbaum herself criticizes Sen’s approach to capabilities when 
she indicates that he ought to counter the subjectivity of utilitarian accounts of the good 
life with a more “objective normative account of human functioning” and instead 
should put more emphasis on constructing a “procedure of objective evaluation by 
which functionings can be assessed for their contribution to the good human life. ” 25 For 
my purposes, it is not important to know whether Nussbaum is justified in this criticism 
of Sen. My point is to show how my theory shares with Nussbaum’s an opposition to 
those who do not explicitly commit to an objective account of essential human needs 
and interests.
The account of essential interests I argue for here is needed in addition to the 
requirements of civil society set out in chapters two and three. As we saw earlier, 
republican civility according to Pettit is established by its relation to freedom as non­
domination. The state is civil and we are civil to each other to the extent that we respect
24 See Sen (1993) pp. 33 and ft. nt. 9 on this page.
25 See Nussbaum (1988) p. 176.
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the rights of all to non-domination, where these rights involve the right not to have 
one’s interests considered arbitrarily, the right to contest decisions, to have effective 
checks and balances in place that discourage concentrated power, to have an effective 
domain of undominated choices, etc. More importantly, for my purposes, Pettit holds 
that it is normatively plausible to think of non-domination as the only concern of the 
state. He holds that this is a congenial idea once we have a thorough understanding of 
non-domination itself26, even though he states in other places a less extreme or 
ambitious role for the language of non-domination in political theory27.
Firstly, I have a problem with Pettit’s account of resource distribution based solely on 
promoting the extent of undominated choice. Take Pettit’s example of a resource 
distribution that grants a disabled person the means to be more mobile. It seems odd to 
say that the justification for this resource distribution is based on increasing the quality 
of a choice-matrix that is increasing the undominated choices of disabled people. 
Mobility may make people more able to effectively contest decisions—being able to 
access transport and buildings more easily and may aid them enormously in contesting 
the world around them and in further tracking their own interests. But should a person 
with such disabilities have to track their own interests in a contestatory world against 
others. It would seem harsh to think that we would empower disabled people only on 
the basis that it makes them better able to contest decisions for themselves28. It is better 
for such people to live in a discerning democracy where members of the public and the 
public service are geared towards protecting the interests of the vulnerable. However, 
this is not a direct criticism of Pettit’s notion of non-domination for under that theory 
alone needs in order to be free is that one is not subject to arbitrary interest
26 See Pettit (1997) p. 81.
27 Ibid. p. 4, 7.
28 We can ask, as an aside, whether such a contestatory environment is consistent with what Pettit and Skinner allude 
to as an assumption about human nature underlying republican theory, namely that ‘the people’ prefer to be left alone 
rather than to be politically engaged. I argue that Pettit’s republic—one where normative knowledge is gained via 
dialogical process— is going to be more engaging for people and more demanding. It is an advantage of my account 
of essential interests that people will trust the state to protect their biological and rational integrity, and in so doing 
will more often than not act humanely on behalf of the citizenry thus making contestation less likely. It is not decent, 
under my account, for people in vulnerable positions —people who are lacking in effective biological functioning —to 
be empowered only to the extent that they can contest for themselves. A world of contestation for the vulnerable 
against the powerful state or powerful private interests may not be a very desirable world for the disadvantaged. 
Better to have, I argue, a state geared to be sensitive or discerning towards the needs of the vulnerable and to use 
public resources, via the public service, to lobby and organise on their behalf. On this basis, my account of a 
discerning democracy is more favourable than Pettit’s account of civility as non-domination for all.
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consideration, and this can be done via representation and not on the basis of one’s 
efforts solely.
But my point of difference with the idea that resources should be distributed in the 
name of promoting the extent of undominated choice, in cases involving the vulnerable 
such as the disabled, is that resource distribution can be justified on a more discerning 
and edifying bases. Resources that increase the mobility of the disabled not only matter 
to the disabled because it increases their choice-matrix, it also matters to them in way 
that it increases their overall essential interests in many aspects of their lives. The 
reason why a disabled person would be granted resources would be due to their lack of 
biological functioning —mobility being an essential part of what it means to live a 
worthwhile life—one where social bonds can be formed and a sense of personal identity 
moulded. Such a person should live in a society where the state acknowledges the 
vulnerable position of disabled people and prioritises them above those better off in 
terms of biological functioning and personhood development. The disabled community 
gained more public status when they acquired resources in the wider community, when 
their membership in that community was enhanced due to their greater capacity to be a 
part of it. Appearing in public without strain or excess effort, without forever relying on 
the good favour of friends, seeking the assistance of strangers or have such well- 
intentioned assistance directed at them by others, all goes to contribute to the dignity of 
civic and social membership in a community.
Another problem with Pettit’s account of civility is that the state is expected to maintain 
equal non-domination for all. This means that all are equally entitled to have a 
satisfactory level of the extent of undominated choice in order to track their interests. 
Undominated choice as a “right for all” and as the guiding principle of resource 
distribution does not necessarily privilege salient interests over less salient ones. The 
dialogical or deliberative process under Pettit’s republican model is based on ‘good 
faith’—that open contestation will produce best outcomes for all.
But what if I am a corporate magnate who can only effectively track my own 
interests —say being globally mobile —if I am granted more personal wealth by the
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state. It could be argued that tax cuts by the state would be an effective way of 
increasing the extent of undominated choices for the wealthy. But tax cuts may lessen 
the extent of undominated choices for those in vulnerable positions where they rely on 
state services for the maintenance of their undominated choice. Pettit does not give an 
account of how the state should satisfy the extent of undominated choices among 
disparate individuals with varying degrees of need. We need to, in addition, ascribe to 
the state the power to favour certain ways of life over others in its relation to citizens.
Another way of expressing the distinction between my account of interest-based 
utilitarianism and Pettit’s account of civility is to say that Pettit is committed to an 
equality of non-domination; whereas I am committed to the notion of equality of 
welfare—where all fare well in relation to an objective sense of what it means to fare 
well. Pettit’s account of civility seeks the foundation of free choice, whereas my 
account seeks outcomes of equal welfare for all. The ranking of our interests according 
to prima facie moral appeal, as I argued earlier, needs to be added to the liberal and 
republican notions of civility. Not only, I argue should a political order be deliberative, 
it needs also to be morally discerning.
My account of a discerning democracy —a democracy that is designed with a 
requirement to ensure that the essential interests of all are prioritised—is also distinct 
from the other forms of republicanism covered earlier. It is distinct from Dagger’s 
republicanism in that demands from the state that it not only promote the autonomy of 
citizens. Remember, that for Dagger a preconditon of rational autonomy is a stable 
public that exemplifies public virtue. One cannot be effectively autonomous in a society 
laced with corruption, for example. But there is no account here in Dagger’s 
republicanism of ensuring that the essential interests of all in a republic will be served 
by those who hold positions of constitutional authority. Daggers places faith in the 
ability of all to be autonomous within a community—the reliance is on exercising one’s 
self-determination effectively within a domain of civil community practices. There is no 
acknowledgment by Dagger of the kinds of forces that operate surreptitiously within 
political communities that can undermine the ability of citizens to ensure that their 
essential interests are tracked. Such concerns were raised in chapter four. There is a
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need, I argue, for republicans such as Dagger to look beyond their general commitment 
to autonomy—that which is fundamentally a commitment that owes its origins to liberal 
ideals —and think more of how a political society can operate so as to prioritise the 
essential interests of its citizens.
The notion of a discerning democracy based on the provision of essential interest for all 
differs also from Sandel’s republicanism. Remember that for Sandel a republic needs to 
ensure the self-determination of all its members by empowering them to operate 
effectively within the community unique to their particular identity. This may require a 
political environment in which it is acknowledged that the social and cultural identity 
that all members of that unique political community needs to be enhanced so as to make 
each members capable of effectively functioning in that community. Sandel here 
implies that resource distribution in his republic will be largely influenced by the needs 
to enhance this unique social and cultural (or communitarian) identity within each 
members of that society. Again, the emphasis is not on a deep concern with ensuring 
that each citizen has their essential interests satisfied, rather the deep concern with 
Sandel’s republicanism is that the contingently determined, and by contingent 1 mean 
the common understandings of collective identity established by history, tradition and 
the prevailing or dominant social values, communitarian identity of each member of 
that society is upheld and protected. Communitarian standards such as these are likely 
to include basic needs. However, there is a theoretical point of difference between the 
strategy adopted by Sandel and the one I set out here.
My account of essential interests also offers important additions to the liberal 
commitment to civil society. I presented in the second chapter the emphasis that liberals 
place on certain rights of the individual. For our purposes, the most important of these 
was the right to life and the right to freedom from harm. However, both notions are act 
more as standard-setters in the normative sphere of public discussion and legal 
interpretation about what it means to have a right to life or to be free from harm. For 
instance, there will be disagreement about the extent to which people are entitled to a 
certain quality of life rather than the mere sustenance of life itself. There is also 
ambiguity under Mill’s notion of harm as to what forms of harm can be universally
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agreed upon as harms detrimental to one’s well-being. My account of essential interests 
which sets out the universal requirement of the protection of bodily integrity and 
freedom from misery offers standards that can fill in the gaps within liberal theory 
concerning the use of public power over private citizens.
I have argued in this section that the state ought to exist not just to enforce the canons of 
reasoning to ensure transparency, accountability and the prevalence of relevant issues. 
For both sides will present their account of relevant issues: Fast food companies for the 
freedom of choice of children and the enjoyment that they derive from consuming their 
products, and lobby groups for the protection of child health and autonomy. A state that 
seeks to implement essential interests under my account of this term will hold that a life 
of obesity is contrary to essential human functioning, and will side with the interests of 
children against commercial interest on this issue. A decent and morally discerning 
state, in other words, will take a stand against the competing interests in society and 
legitimately discriminate against those interests that seek to harm the base natural 
functions of humans. A decent state will be entitled to take a stand and contribute to the 
decision making process about what counts as a relevant issue under consideration, and 
why one issue should be given more priority that others on the grounds of human 
dignity.
The state needs to be geared towards protecting the salient interests of all those involved 
here, and not just playing the role of facilitating the sharing of ideas between the 
participants in a contestatory process. It is legitimate, I argue, for state policy makers to 
endorse the arguments of child protection lobbyists on such issues on the grounds that 
they are protecting the vital interests of children as they proceed in their development to 
person. State policy makers can legitimately argue that excessive commercial targeting 
of children has very real dangers of bringing about poor diets that are damaging to 
concentration levels, obesity that leads to misery and long-term ill health and self­
esteem problems which in turn affects the educational performance of such children, 
etc. Or it rules out post-hypnotic suggestion in advertising to all (or food stores 
releasing the smell of baking bread into the air to induce purchasing).
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5.5 Essential Interests and Legitimacy.
It’s worth noting that I hold that while the provision of essential interests is a moral 
claim on the official power holders in that society, it is not a claim about what makes a 
form of political authority legitimate. A political order can be legitimate without 
protecting the essential interest of those within it. Having legitimate political authority 
means possessing a recognized right to rule over others. To have legitimacy to exercise 
power over others requires that the authority holds the status of ‘rightful ruler’ over 
those others. What it means to have ‘rightful rule over others’ is a contested notion. 
Rightful rule, for example, in a patriarchal, tribal society will consist of meeting the 
criteria of ‘conforming to traditional decision making procedures and giving power to 
those with the right hereditary status’. Rightful rule in a western democracy will be 
articulated very differently. It has been based on the idea that political authority is 
endorsed by divine command and, at another stage, via the consent of individuals where 
it is held that “persons are the basic units of value; all are worth of social recognition; 
personal worth is best protected by civic participation.”29 But the question of whether 
democratic legitimacy is “better than” tribal legitimacy is inexplicable. Both involve 
societies that have, for their respective members, legitimate or rightful rule. They both 
hold formal, publicly acknowledged forms of ruling that serve the political functions of 
those societies. The criteria for determining legitimacy are socially or rationally 
normative, not morally normative. The concept of legitimacy itself has been open to the 
constructivist forces of history. It is very hard to say what role philosophical reflection 
should play in our understanding of legitimacy, if such a role exists at all.
Lacking democratic rights or the enjoyment of rational abilities, for example, is not 
necessary for legitimacy. Nor are they essential for the enjoyment of some essential 
interests Children, for instance, can have their essential interests catered for without 
possessing either of these conditions. The fact that children do not have equal 
representation in a society is not going to be termed as a matter of indecency under my
29 Redford (1958) p. 98.
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account. However, this is not to say that the lack of representation for children is of no 
concern normatively. Democratic principles and the rights of individuals to non- 
arbitrary interference could be argued for on a separate basis.; on say, the basis of what 
goes to make a society a decent society or the basis of who should have legally 
recognized political rights.
Having said that possessing essential interests is not necessarily connected with 
democracy, I want to add that open and democratic societies will be more likely to 
promote essential human interests than other political systems. The promotion of 
essential interests for all is highly unlikely to lead to, on a contingent basis, the 
totalitarian drive if it takes place within an open society with a sense of enlightened 
public service. Such a society will value and promote inclusiveness as a well as 
essential interests. A decent state, according to my account, needs more however. It will 
be one that allows the public service, and the citizenry, to argue positively for a way of 
life that conforms to the tenets of their real interests for each individual qua their 
biological functions and qua their personhood functions. But by arguing for and 
privileging these tenets of human integrity, the state is obligated to provide good 
evidence for the policies they propose on this basis. The offering of such evidence and 
policies will be up for review and tested in a non-dominating society. It will be up to 
the non-state sectors of society to contest the accuracy of the information presented by 
the state in the name of promoting the universal tenets of decency.
By showing that there is a universal standard of human propriety I have offered a good 
reason for holding that an essential aspect of ‘rightful rule” or the “rightful exercise of 
power” could be such a standard. Essential interests would then act as external moral 
constraints on the rightful exercise of power. All political societies, and the legitimate 
holders of authority within them, in other words, would have good normative reason to 
be decent. The nature of political authority places individuals into a vulnerability 
relation30. Given that political authority has the power to significantly influence how 
people fare in their lives, it is important that this power is morally constrained—that
,0 See Margalit (1996) for the idea that all authority is humiliating.
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those who hold this power are made to think about their basic moral obligations to those 
who are vulnerable under this power.
We are now in a position to explore the ways in which the state could go about 
implementing the changes needed to produce a decent society as I have set it out here. 
Essential human interests have an important moral force in the political realm. I have 
argued that it is morally pressing on authority holders that they ensure that people get 
what they need; that there is an understanding of what is proper for each individual to 
have. Preferences based on wants that are not necessary for needs will not outweigh 
basic needs in a decent society, and any legitimate governance in a decent society will 
be geared towards ensuring that needs-based preference outweigh wants-based 
preferences when they clash in deliberative engagement. This is a necessary distributive 
principle in a decent society.
Before closing this chapter, however, I will briefly cover the issue of the extent to 
which my account of essential interest offers a guideline to how the relevant parties 
ought to respond to cases where essential interests conflict. In cases involving extreme 
comparisons the ranking of essential interests should be clear enough. Intuitively, for 
example, we should see that preventing such things as the misery of torture over a long 
period of time would outweigh the essential interests that children have in developing 
their audio faculties. If the choice is between either the former or the latter, then we 
intuitively ought to see the greater importance of preventing the former rather than 
creating the latter. A life of severe and prolonged pain is, intuitively speaking, worse 
than a life where one has no audio function.
So some essential interests will outrank others in extreme cases where they are mutually 
exclusive. But, of course, extreme cases will not dominate everyday decision-making 
about which essential interests should be realised over others. The harder cases are 
going to be those where two or more essential interests compete where it is not clear 
that one obviously outranks the other, as in the above case where excessive pain and 
misery outweighs audio function. How do we decide between competing essential 
interests in these more moderate cases? For instance, we might ask whether there is a
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way of knowing whether the essential interest of a mother to have the opportunity to 
nurture her offspring outweighs the essential interests of, say, healthy children to 
develop their audio faculties. Does the essential interest in developing one’s audio 
faculties from a young age outweigh, in any sense, the essential interest that a mother 
can be said to have in nurturing her offspring? Or, to take another example, is having 
good eyesight a more important essential interest than enjoying mobility?
How do we know when an essential interest outweighs another? In the extreme case 
mentioned above where the essential interest of avoiding a life of misery outweighs the 
essential interest of possessing audio function, we know that what makes the former of 
greater value than the latter (in this context) is due to experience (or appreciation) of the 
displeasure of excessive pain when compared with the perceived displeasure of a life 
without audio function. This is something that we can claim to know about essential 
interests and their comparison without much effort. But can we know, for instance, that 
eyesight is more important than mobility by turning to our ‘common sense’ 
perceptions? We cannot. The value of one of these essential interests over another is not 
as clear-cut as in the extreme example. In such cases where one essential interest does 
not obviously outweigh another, I argue that there exists an indeterminacy about how 
we ought to decide which one is of greater value. In the more moderate example, both 
eyesight and mobility are important interests to realize for human beings in their 
capacities as biological agents. It should be clear to us in this context that neither of 
these essential interests ought to be demoted. However, there may be occasions when a 
political decision needs to be made which will involve one interest being promoted to a 
greater extent than another. In such cases, we may need to know such things as the 
extent to which ‘good eyesight’ or ‘mobility’ is sufficiently realized.
Given that the weighing of competing essential interests can be clear-cut in some cases 
and indeterminate in others, we can derive the following position. When it comes to the 
issue of ‘who decides’ which essential interests should prevail when they compete, we 
should turn to a inclusive, principled and open decision-making process. Such a 
process will be inclusive in that public decision-making concerning essential interests
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ought to include the combination of many groupings. In the most general sense, the 
public ought to informed of such decisions and have an opportunity to comment. The 
people who are more directly affected by a decision concerning their essential interests 
ought to have a prominent position in the deliberation process. However, what is needed 
in addition to this is a principled framework under which such public deliberation 
should take place. This is especially so given that I indicated above that there will be 
clear-cut cases where some essential interests will outweigh others. Decision-making 
processes need to be suitably constructed so as to ensure that these common sense 
judgments about essential interests prevail.
But given that I also stated above that there will be cases where the assessment of 
competing essential interests will not be clear-cut and will involve some degree of 
indeterminacy, the conditions of inclusiveness and principled judgment will also have to 
recognize the roles played by the relevant experts. Deciding such issues as to the extent 
to which an essential interest is sufficiently satisfied will involve the expert advice from 
health professionals, educationalists, scientists, sociologists, etc. It is vital that these 
groupings play a large part in deliberations about essential interests so as to ensure that 
deliberations are made on an informed basis. In addition to this, deliberation over 
essential interests needs to be sufficiently guided in such a way so that the relevant 
issues are brought forth and debated, and that the salient interests are prioritised over 
others. In this sense, we need the state to be sufficiently geared to do this. For this 
reason, I include public service officials in this list of professionals who contribute to 
the principled structure of deliberations over essential interests. The next chapter will go 
into more detail about what this entails. What I wish to establish here is the eclectic 
nature of the decision-making process that ought to accompany public deliberations 
involving essential interests.
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SUMMARY
In this chapter I have set out a case for how our normative thinking about persons and 
their welfare should be conducted. This will serve as a foundation for a new way of 
thinking about the relationship between states and citizens. Specifically, I will argue 
that the state can take a new principled stance towards the latter on the basis of making 
provision for the protection of their essential interests. I have set out an account of such 
interests based on a utilitarian perspective. I have done this by distinguishing ideal 
utilitarianism from other forms of utilitarianism. This was done on the basis of making a 
distinction between welfare understood on a subjective basis, and welfare understood on 
the basis satisfying interests that are crucial for the biological well-being of persons. I 
have argued that the latter has a common sense appeal to all. I have shown how the 
epistemic appeal of these essential interests has important implications for our 
normative considerations, especially in the context of abductive reasoning about 
morality. This method of moral reasoning gives us clear guidelines about how to rank 
states of affairs in the world in order or normative importance.
This way of thinking about basic human needs or essential interests has been compared 
and contrasted with similar positions taken in the literature on normative political 
thinking. However, my main task has been to highlight points of difference between my 
account of essential interests and those who have incorporated human needs into their 
political theory. A utilitarian account is theoretically distinct from most others in this 
area on the grounds that it places emphasis on individuals as sentient beings, rather than 
individuals as citizens.
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6. IMPLEMENTING ESSENTIAL INTERESTS: THE ROLE OF 
PUBLIC SERVICE INTEGRITY.
In this chapter I will show that essential interests can not only be formulated as an 
independent and coherent philosophical theory, but can also serve as feasible 
institutional goals for a democratic state to implement1. As we have seen, what makes a
1 Essential interests have been applied at a constitutional level. But this style of constitutional creation is the 
exception rather than the rule. Governance in a democracy is constitutionally bound. The legitimate institutions of 
authority are identified by the constitution and their jurisdiction and coercive powers are clearly defined and publicly 
known. For example, sovereignty and the nation-state will be identified, and the separations of the powers of the 
executive, legislature and judiciary will be established. Different levels of government may exist in the forms of 
federal, central and local denominations. Electoral systems will be codified. Rights to equality, non-discrimination, 
property, association, etc will be legally protected in statute. The legislative house(s) will be identified and the 
corresponding offices of the state (e.g. Presidents, Head of State,). Powers will be conferred upon these offices such 
as the power and authority to make, amend and annul law; identify and create citizens; exclusive authority to raise 
revenue, military power, and the like etc.
The prominent democratic constitutions that codify these formal relations in a polity vary in content. Each is a 
creature of history and convention unique to the particular society in which it originates. Some constitutions are 
formal and singularly identifiable documents others are less formal and spread throughout statute or are identifiable, 
in part, with relation to the common law. Take for example the constitutions of the United States and Australia. In 
these constitutions the powers and nature of the state are formally declared in a single document; the content of these 
constitutions is general in the sense that broadly defined powers of the different institutions of the state are identified 
rather than the specification of outcomes that those institutions ought to pursue. In these situations, constitutional 
provisions are vital for the maintenance of order and stability, as well as the protection of the democratic principles of 
individual freedom. Compare the nature of these constitutions with that of New Zealand where there is no single 
constitutional document.
Ireland’s constitution is one where essential interests are codified— where there are more details included in the 
constitution about the sort of'society that the state’s institutions ought to create. For example, in Ireland’s constitution 
Article 45 sets out the “Directive Principles of Social Policy.” Here it is stated that the state will “strive to promote 
the welfare of the whole people”; and “direct its policy towards securing:
“That the citizens...have the right to an adequate means of livelihood, ii. That the ownership and control of the 
natural resources of the community may be so distributed amongst private individuals and the various classes as best 
to subserve the common good. iii. That...the operation of free competition shall not be allowed so as to develop as to 
result in the concentration of the ownership or control of essential commodities in a few individuals to the common 
detriment.”.
Not only are distributive principles detailed but also statements about the right to dignified treatment:
4. l .’The State pledges itself to safeguard with especial care the economic interest of the weaker sections of the 
community, and, where necessary, to contribute to the support of the infirm,...and the aged.
2. The State shall endeavour to ensure the strength and health of workers, men and women, and the tender age of 
children shall not be abused and that citizens shall not be forced by economic necessity to enter associations unsuited 
to their sex, age or strength.”
While the constitutional provision for essential interests is possible and a worthy goal, such a codification is not my 
main concern. This is not to deny that human decency as a principle of constitutional purpose would be a suitable 
principle for a democratic state to use as its foundation1. But my concern is with implementing the tenets of decency 
in a democratic state that does not formally identify essential interests in this way. My task is to articulate how 
essential interests could be established in democratic societes that are founded on perfunctory constitutions. In such
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society decent -one that systematically upholds the essential interests of its citizens- is 
not going to be fully cashed out purely in terms of what makes a society democratic, for 
the two are distinct concepts. However, this chapter shows how essential interests and 
democracy can systematically cohere within the institutional structures of a political 
order. The question is how can governance that respects essential interests be 
entrenched within such a system? Before answering this question I will argue for why 
we ought to consider the protection of the essential interests of all as a primary concern 
and obligation of the state.
6.1 Responsibility and Essential Interests
In the previous chapter I set out the sense in which we can come to make knowledge 
claims about moral truth and falsity in terms of identifying plausible claims of moral 
concern. I showed how we can maintain a theory of utilitarian essential interests in the 
light of three major objections to naturalist morality. As we saw above, essential 
interests have a moral appeal to rational agents who deliberate in accordance with 
abductive reasoning. Such reasoning favours those natural facts that are conducive to 
our common sense understanding of what it means for individuals to preserve their 
biological integrity. Here I will argue that all forms of political authority have good 
normative reason, at the very least, to protect and promote the essential interests of 
those who are subject to that authority. The link between “having authority” and 
“having the obligation to uphold essential interests” is based on the normative 
importance of protecting basic human interests when the ability to do so exists. Political 
authority has the potential to seriously affect how people fare in terms of the 
preservation of these basic interests, hence its obligation to treat people decently. Take 
the issue of responsibility. There are two ways in which we can take responsibility for 
our actions. We can take responsibility by consenting to take responsibility. By 
accepting a job or freely choosing to have or adopt children, we take on responsibilities 
not only of a legal nature but also responsibilities of care. We are responsible for
societies, the challenge is to show how the essential interests of all can be catered for within the institutional and 
dialogical processes of a democratic order rather than directly through constitutional reference.
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ensuring that our actions within such roles are conducted with due attention to the 
responsibilities undertaken. An airline pilot, on taking the position, accepts not only the 
legal responsibilities that the job entails, but also the moral responsibility of paying due 
respect to his/her legal duties. We expect the pilot to act responsibly in ensuring that 
he/she takes the required amount of rest and sleep before flying and refraining from 
excessive alcohol consumption. The law acts as deterrent for the violation of such 
responsibilities, but we do not rely solely on this force for the effective implementation 
of such regulations. We rely, to a large degree, on the holders of the legal 
responsibilities to act reasonably.
There is however another way in which we can be said to be ascribed responsibility that 
does not involve consent. If one has the ability to act so as to prevent the detriment of 
essential interest to others, at no cost to their own essential interests, then one ought to 
accept some form of responsibility for protecting such interests. This is an expectation 
about moral responsibility on a par with the expectation that people will diligently obey 
and conform to their duties. I will call this type of responsibility ‘original 
responsibility’.
The duty to assist others when their essential interests are under threat is not a duty that 
one explicitly consents to uphold. Rather, it is a duty that derives from a common sense 
expectation that needy people are entitled to the assistance of others where such 
assistance is viable. If someone is drowning, for example, it is understandable if one 
does not go directly to the rescue due to one’s concerns about one’s ability to preserve 
one’s own life and well-being in the process. But it is not morally acceptable to do 
nothing. If it is within my ability to assist a drowning person, even if to merely raise the 
alarm, where there is no threat to my own essential interests then I have a moral duty to 
assist. Where the interests at stake are not essential then no such moral duty exists. It 
would be considerate of me to open the door for a tradesperson with her/his hands full, 
but there is no common sense notion of a moral duty of me to do so. Failing to open the 
door on this occasion would not violate the essential interests of the parent nor the child.
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6.2 Public Service Integrity
This interplay between the two types of responsibility in the domain of public service is 
covered by J. Patrick Dobel and Debra Stewart. Dobel argues that responsibility is 
linked to real power and not just to formalized power2. Dobel argues that certain moral 
obligations can be derived from the nature of state office itself3. Specifically, Dobel 
points to Debra Stewart’s point about the facts of state power to do with its capacity or 
ability to assist those in need which, in turn, implies its possessing the appropriate 
proximity and expertise to assist those in need4.
Public service integrity, for Dobel, is constituted by the following. He offers three 
desiderata for public integrity and notes that it is the responsibility of professional 
public officials to seek a balance between all three. The three desiderata of public 
service practice, according to Dobel, are paraphrased here as 1. The discretionary 
judgment of public officials must be consistent with liberal and democratic principles, 
2. Public service discretion involves balancing official authority with the personal 
integrity of citizens, and 3. Public service discretion must be consistent with the 
standards of prudence without being dominated by political expediency5. To perform 
these practices Dobel argues that public officials need to possess professional integrity. 
This means, according to Dobel, that they must be disposed to act reflectively, with 
self-discipline, courage, and an awareness of the difference between private beliefs and 
public service obligations6.
The second desideratum above is the most relevant in terms of assisting those in need or 
in terms of protecting the essential interest of all, assuming that the personal integrity of 
citizens involves the notion of catering for their welfare. But Dobel does not go into 
great detail about the basis on which public officials can promote the needs of the 
citizenry. He indicates that an essential value of public service is to provide care for
2 Dobel (1999) p. 13.
1 Ibid. See also Denhardt (1988) for a similar point.
4 Ibid. p. 15. See also Stewart, D “An Ethical Framework for Human Resource decision Making” pp. 72-4 in Keller 
(1988).
5 Dobel (1999) p. 2.
6 Ibid. p. 3-4.
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others7 and to acknowledge that all citizens possess dignity8. However, this is just 
briefly mentioned and not elaborated on. More emphasis is placed by Dobel on the 
norms that ought to guide public service decision making in the sense of making such 
decisions respect truthfulness, accountability, fairness, competency and the like.9 Dobel 
holds that public integrity, and with it the protection of and care for individuals, is 
desirable in the sense that it promotes democratic values. Public officials ought to be 
concerned for the welfare of citizens on the basis that such action promotes the liberal 
principle of respecting individuals10. One point to note is that Dobel does not explain 
public service integrity in any utilitarian sense.
Bovens makes a similar commitment without elaborating on the reasons for why the 
state should be concerned with the welfare of individuals. He states that “Conduct is 
often called ‘responsible’ if it shows some sign of an adequate perception of threatened 
dangers; if in the weighing up of the alternative forms of conduct, the possible 
disadvantageous consequences for others have received special attention.” Yet Bovens 
does not say why the protection of individual welfare in this way is important, nor how 
public officials go about identifying what constitutes harm or what harms are more in 
need of avoidance than others.
An interesting aside to this is found in the work of J.P Burke. Burke argues that there 
are no objective and uncontroversial answers to the questions of what harms we ought 
to prioritise as worthy of avoidance over others. In general, he holds that the utilitarian 
mission of utility-based maximization of state of affairs cannot be achieved due to there 
being no objective standard of what counts as utility-maximization nor what method of 
maximizing utility should be adopted11. What would a utilitarian account of public 
service integrity look like, and in what way does it differ from the notion of public 
service integrity as it is articulated under a democratic guise? I turn now to a response to 
these questions.
7 Ibid p. 5.
8 Ibid. p. 7.
y See Ibid. p. 21.
10 Ibid. p. 7
11 Burke (1986) p. 34, 36-7, 101,
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6.3 Conscience Utilitarianism
In order to facilitate the public services protection of essential interests we can, I argue, 
articulate some normative guidelines based on utilitarian principles. Public servants 
who are instrumental in formulating public policy have the ability to influence 
proposals, agenda, outcomes and the like, but this ability must also be restrained by 
normative restraints that makes the exercise of this covert form of power consistent with 
the public interest. I will set out in this section how the norms of conscientiousness can 
provide such constraints and facilitate the professional performance of public service.
Let me say, firstly, something about conscientiousness. Conscientiousness is a trait of 
human personality whereby one is cognitively attuned to the proper or relevant 
considerations pertaining to one’s responsibilities or to the issues before one’s 
consideration. Conscientiousness describes a cognitive or rational excellence. 
Conscientiousness thus assumes self-control. A conscientious person is not someone 
who is only sporadically conscientious. Being randomly attuned to the relevant 
responsibilities expected under certain conditions is to say that a person is conscientious 
on occasion, but it does not mean that this is a conscientious person. Conscientiousness, 
then, can describe the nature of a persons cognitive abilities during the performance of 
an act and, or, the overall disposition of a person to hold this trait as a permanent feature 
of their being. Conscientiousness also means that one is diligent in learning from one’s 
experiences. A conscientious approach is one where one is skilled in being able to 
compare and contrast current actions and issues with past one’s, and seek to note the 
salient forms of knowledge gained from experience that can assist in the process of 
making future actions and politics effective. It is in the latter sense that I will refer to 
conscientiousness as a trait of professional life.
Being in control or disciplining one’s professional cognitive functions not only means 
that one gives priority to the salient or proper features of one’s responsibilities, but also 
that one acts so as to uphold such features. It is one thing to know how one is expected 
to deliberate and function as a professional, and another to act in such a way. This
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means there has to be a certain robustness of character to uphold the professional duties 
of conscientiousness even in an environment in which one might be pressured to act 
otherwise. Being conscientious means that one is motivated to stand up for what it is in 
one’s duty to do. A professional environment is going to be one where the costs of 
fulfilling the duties of conscientiousness are negligible. Professionals need to be free to 
profess; they need to work in an open and productive environment in which their 
professional duties are not compromised by outside factors.
Professional conscience needs also to be distinguished from personal conscience. A 
personal conscience is one that is formulated, primarily, in private. A professional 
conscience or consciousness is where publicly endorsed standards and values are 
promulgated and served. The professional conscience is related inexplicably with 
reference to the interests and welfare of others, whereas personal conscience can be 
performed in private, say in relation between one’s God and oneself. Professional and 
private consciences can contingently overlap, where say one’s personal, religious belief 
that one should be a good Samaratan and assist those in need may be contingently 
consistent with a lawyer’s professional duty to provide legal assistance where it is 
sought, or a doctor’s professional duty to preserve life. But the link here is only 
contingent. It is not permissible for personal conscience to impinge on professional 
conscience. For example, believing that suffering is the will of God and should go 
unaided is not consistent with the professional duty of a doctor to preserve life and 
reduce suffering when necessary. Nor could a public servant professional argue that 
anti-abortion policy should be implemented on the basis that it violates the sanctity of 
human life, divinely created. Private conscience can never legitimate the public 
conscientiousness of public service professionalism.
Having made these general points about conscientiousness and professionalism, what is 
the best form of conscientiousness for public servants to adopt in their professional 
role? I present utilitarian conscientiousness, or what I will term as ‘conscience 
utilitarianism’, as the best mode of professional thinking for public servants12. The 
tenets of conscience utilitarianism should not be foreign to us by now. Conscience
12 For the origins of this idea see Brandt, R (1996) pp. 146-7; 149-50; 153-55.
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utilitarianism stipulates a responsible way of thinking for professionals, namely that we 
ensure that every policy considered or undertaken, is one that best avoids the disutilities 
that are detrimental to human well-being. The entitlement to avoid such disutilities is an 
impersonal good held in equal regard by all sentient creatures alike. It does not matter 
who is vulnerable to disutility—all are equally entitled to avoid subjection to it. Sentient 
creatures count as sentient creatures and not as entities as they might be perceived 
according to personal conscientiousness (eg. as servants of God, female, male, children, 
etc).
Conscientiousness, of any kind, is an elevated ideal of thought. This not only means that 
being conscientious means disciplining oneself to give paramount attention to the 
salient features before oneself and filter out those that are irrelevant, it also means that 
one can be expected to feel a sense of shame or guilt when one fails to perform one’s 
responsibilities conscientiously. Not only is one expected to have a response to the 
failure in one’s actions, the community to which the responsibilities apply are expected 
to view others with shame when they fail to act conscientiously. There are two 
important implications of this for the way we ought to create a professional 
environment in which public servants should act. Firstly, public servants should act in 
an environment in which conscientious acts, acts consistent with the tenets of 
conscience utilitarianism, are institutionally rewarded by increasing the good name or 
status of those who so act. Secondly, public servants should act in an environment in 
which peers and colleagues are free to express disapprobation when other professionals 
fail to act conscientiously.
Acts of approbation towards others in a professional environment may take the form of 
honour. Honourable action can be taken as actions done for the sake of avoiding the 
intrinsically bad property of misery, and having a concern to maintain dignity and value 
human flourishing. Honour, or good favour, should be bestowed upon those who 
exemplify such standards within the public service, and such a trait will be expected to 
have benefits for those who exemplify it. However, there is also an important sense in 
which an honourable person is not solely motivated by such benefits. An honourable
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person is one who acts not for the sake of their own gratification but for the sake of 
bringing about states of affairs in the world that are intrinsically good for persons.
It’s important here to note how my interest-based account of honour differs from 
Pettit’s account. With Pettit, identifying the presence of honour involves identifying the 
character traits that promote the value of non-domination via the practice of civility13. 
Pettit holds that “people can be assured of their non-domination only so far as others 
recognize normative reasons for respecting them”. Also, “ Widespread civility is likely 
to be supported by the intangible hand of regard-based sanctioning, since the 
honourable are destined in most circumstances to be the honoured, ” 14 and “If we assume 
that people care about the regard of others, seeking their high regard and fleeing their 
low regard, then it is natural to think that the intangible hand can be an important way 
of establishing and securing certain patterns of behaviour. ” 15 Civil people under Pettit’s 
account of civility are ego-centred; they take umbrage at someone gaining benefit from 
the efforts of a collective for which they have failed to contribute. Those violated feel 
cheated that the rewards of their efforts are accessed by free-riders. Specifically, for 
Pettit, civil people who seek to act honourably will be those who act so as to enhance 
their own sense of honour, and uphold the bonds and supporting characteristics of non­
domination and the institutional fairness that it constitutes.
I argue that while the ego-centred account of honour is plausible and possibly effective 
under certain conditions, it should not overshadow an equally plausible account of 
honour based on conscientiousness about essential interests. My point is that Pettit’s 
account of honour is narrowly construed, and does not acknowledge the breadth which 
an account of honour can take. A decent or discerning society, I argue, will encourage 
the recognition of those whose internalisation process is governed by conscience 
utilitarianism. Public officials acting in the name of decency will not seek honour from 
their fellow because they are honour seeking. Such officials will be first and foremost 
conscientious—they will see their role as treating people properly and they will not seek
13 See also Davies (1969) p.103.
14 Pettit sees civility as sprouting also from a spontaneous basis (habitual respect for others). But when people stray 
from this they need to be sanctioned by dishonour.
15 Pettit, P (1997) p. 254.
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honour in itself nor esteem in the eyes of others as the motivation to honour, but instead 
a concern for doing what is fitting or appropriate to human beings. Honouring will 
involve endorsing the motivation to decency, not the motivation to seek self-esteem. 
Decent people, I hold, who seek to act honourably will have a concern for making 
others better off in terms of promoting their essential welfare.
If public officials act for the sake of acquiring esteem from their peers when that esteem 
is not directed towards an optimal moral code—the code of avoiding the detriment of 
basic interest for all —then they will not be worthy of honour16. The motivation for 
civility, according to Pettit, is the payback one gets in terms of esteem from one’s peers 
and in terms of the non-domination that is reaffirmed and hence secured. The 
motivation for protecting essential interests is quite different. People will be decent due 
to conscience not due to personal paybacks17.
Consider the case of those who we might expect to report domestic violence of a friend, 
as Pettit addresses. We might say that they are so motivated to get paybacks of non­
domination. But it is equally as plausible to say that people do this for conscientious 
reasons—for the sake of avoiding misery and treating people decently. Or think of the 
segments of the white population in South Africa and the US that fought for the civil 
rights of blacks. It sounds odd to say that they were fighting for the sake of paybacks for 
themselves —that their non-domination was threatened by the domination that blacks 
were experiencing. The non-domination of the white population in the former scenario 
was secure in a police state dominated by the minority white population. Instead, it is 
more plausible to say that the white advocates acted in these cases from a motivation of 
conscientiousness—out of a concern for human decency18.
16 Benevolence: doing good for the sake of others and showing sympathy, empathy with victims. See Thompson, V 
(1975)
l7Denhardt writes: “Honor denotes a quality of character in which the individual exhibits a high sense of public duty, 
pursuing good deeds as ends in themselves, not because of any benefit or recognition that might be accrued because 
of the deeds.” (Denhardt, K 1991 p. 103).
18 Taking civic responsibility for the dispossessed, unable and unorganised. See Gortner, H (1991) p. 117; Van Wart 
(1998) p. 292 for multi-faceted approach to implementing institutional values (control by law, norms, public opinion, 
etc.
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I argue that while the ego-centred account of honour is plausible, it should not 
overshadow an equally plausible account of honour based on conscientiousness about 
essential interests in the domain of the public service. Individual public servants may 
seek the esteem of their peers for reasons of self-interest, seeking promotion and 
financial advancement the status that goes with being in held in high esteem by their 
peers. But they may also be motivated to behave honourably not for overtly self- 
interested reasons, but for the sake of their acceptance of their moral duty to do so. Both 
approaches, the self-interest and responsibility strategies, may both result in outcomes 
where the essential interests of all those affected by the actions of government and the 
public service are realised.
In this sense the public service can tolerate motivational diversity behind the acts of 
professionalism performed within it. However, let me conclude by saying why we have 
better reason to promote honour as it is understood as an act of responsibility rather than 
honour as it is understood as an act of self-interest. I argue that the former, acts of 
honour performed for the sake of one’s responsibility to uphold human dignity, is more 
likely to produce positive effects for a professional environment than negative ones. In 
other words, honourable acts performed in the name of human dignity, and which are 
publicly recognised as being performed as such, will have a resonance that will play an 
important part in the sustenance of a professional environment.
Honour performed for reasons of self-interest, I hold, will have a greater likelihood of 
producing negative affects. Respecting human dignity due to self-interest is more 
susceptible to malleability than the morally grounded motivation of responsibility. For 
example, self-interested people may under certain environments be motivated to seek 
the esteem of their fellows when such esteem is distributed on the basis of effectively 
realising the essential interests of all. But the motivation of self-interest can just as 
easily be swayed to seek the esteem from other sources even if this is at the cost of 
producing optimal levels of welfare for those in need of it. Think of the career obsessed 
public servant enticed by financial incentives to cut costs or overlap service delivery. Or 
think of the public servant who wishes to gain the esteem of those employed in the 
private sector for the sake of their future employment, and who seeks to outsource to
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these areas for reasons of career advancement. Here the drive for self-interest threatens 
the professional status of public servants more than the motivation to act for reasons of 
moral responsibility. The expectation need not be that all public servants are motivated 
by a deep sense of conscientiousness or responsibility, we can imagine a public service 
functioning effectively without this. But the idea is that we can plausibly conceive of 
professionals acting on the basis of such reasons.
Public service professionalism in this sense, however, will involve a form of 
discretionary power that needs to be checked. Policy proposal initiated by the public 
service should only proceed on the condition that it acquires a positive response from 
the relevant sectors of society. We have seen that being honourable and acting 
honourably involves privileging the welfare of all as the basis for an optimal moral 
code19. But the extent to which public servants can be assured to adequately meet these 
standards can only in effect be measured by the degree to which they are endorsed by 
the community over which the state has jurisdiction. But not only will it be the level of 
community support that will determine whether the use of discretionary power by 
public servants is justifiable. If a public servant advocates essential interests and 
receives substantial support from his/her peers in the public service for doing so, this 
will count if favour of the justifiability of the action.
6.4 Implementing Essential Interests
6.4.1 Role-based function of the Public Service.
Public service integrity can be understood in two sense. Firstly, public servants are 
expected to perform their formally defined institutional roles with integrity. I will 
briefly cover in this section what I take these roles to be. I will then move on to the 
second sense in which public servants can be expected to exemplify integrity, namely in 
the capacity they hold to perform influence-based functions within public institutions.
19 See Brandt (1996) p. 145.
173
Under the role-based notion of public service governance the state exists as a 
“constitutionally endorsed authority that is given to it by the head of state and informed 
by the legislator. ” 20 . The public service, in this sense, plays a reactive role to the 
policies chosen by the government of the day. It is reactive in the sense that it will take 
its policy guidance from the legislator and will serve the legislator when the latter seeks 
knowledge and information about how best to achieve the policy objectives set by those 
who control the legislator21.
What is more, underpinning the role-based notion of public service governance is the 
notion of neutrality (i.e. giving fair and impartial advice to the government of the day 
without leaning towards any political views). Technical decisions fall on the side of 
public servants—political on the side of ministers22. Policy-making by public officials 
may be sensitive to what is politically feasible, but again their role is only one of 
reaction to the political realities prevailing at the time. There is no position taken by 
public officials as to the desirability of policy direction.
Linked with the expectation of neutrality is the ethical duty of accountability. Public 
servants are held to account for the information they provide and the advice they give to 
government representatives, and for the actions they take with relation to the day-to-day 
running of government departments. Parliamentary representatives hold public servants 
to account through the committee system, and citizens can hold state departments to 
account through the law and various grievance procedures provided by the state. 
Internally, public servants are held to account by the hierarchical structure of the 
institution of the public service itself. Superiors will hold those under their 
responsibility to account for the actions they take and the outcomes they seek; and this 
task is monitored by the publicly declared institutional goals of the public service 
institution. For example, there will be institutional checks to ensure that no public 
servant or official occupies a position that poses a conflict of interest.
20 Moore (1995) p. 17
21 See Flathman, R (1966) for ‘discourse/procedural model. Also Shipman, (1959)
22 Moore (1995) p. 148.
174
Public servants are expected to exercise professional conduct in line with the public 
service role they fulfil. Conduct within the service is expected to be undertaken with 
good faith, courteous respect for process and for citizens and the dignity of public 
office, conformity to the duty to respect the confidentiality not only of private 
information pertaining to citizens but also to information crucial to the public interest, 
and to be open, responsible and fair. Such conduct is vital for establishing strong bonds 
of trust between the citizenry and the state, the government and the public service, and 
to foster the principles of a functioning democracy. The nature of this trust is not of the 
kind where all participants expect optimal virtue or compliance to the values of 
neutrality, fairness, and responsibility. Although, it is fair to say that each may hold to 
the ideal that this would be the case. Rather the trust that is to be found in such a 
network of ethical relationships is that each will be orientated towards respecting this 
ideal, and that those who transgress these important public values are at risk of being 
caught and dealt with in such a way as to uphold such values.
One of the basic roles of the state is to facilitate the delivery of public services23. The 
most straightforward way the public service performs its role-based function in this 
sense is via the provision of technical expertise. Such requirements as organizational 
efficiency will call for public service expertise on the technology available for accurate 
and effective public service delivery. Computer and office systems designed to fulfil the 
public service of benefit assessments, data processing, surveillance, etc. will be a 
paramount concern for those charged with the responsibility of achieving a ministry’s 
goals. Also underpinning the notion of role-based governance are certain ethical 
standards. Honesty, loyalty, confidentiality, respect for procedures, accountability and 
the like will go hand in hand with providing the most cost-effective services.
Established institutional roles are a vital part of the continuity of public service. The 
public service needs to act consistently, regularly, predictably and coherently in relation 
to parliamentary, business and social cycles that act as the core to the fabric of a society. 
Each compartment of the state must be able to cohere effectively with the workings of 
other areas of the state and with the institutions outside of the state. Established roles
23 23 See Finer (1941)
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that constitute the foundation of the institutional identity of the state make the state a 
unified whole that can exist as the same entity over time. Official state positions, in 
other words, have an identity separate from that of the people who fill them, and the 
demarcation of state power into roles of power and responsibility make the state a 
metaphysical entity, greater than its parts.
6.4.2 Influence-based function of the Public Service.
But there is another dimension of public service policy making. By initiating policy 
advice to the government themselves, public servants can make substantial 
contributions to the formation of policy goals and outcomes. In this sense the role of the 
public servant is proactive rather than reactive in relation to the body of elected 
government. “Most public servants, especially at the most senior level, see themselves 
as involved in making policy and not just advising and implementing.” 24 This is due to, 
in part, the limitations of parliamentary representation. Members of parliament have 
neither the time nor the expertise to be the masters of the information required for 
policy formation. It is also of great benefit for new governments that the public service 
is not a political arm of the previous administration. If the public service was not neutral 
but instead a political arm of governments then much time and cost would be expended 
during the transition of power.
There is another argument for why the public service should not be totally subservient 
to, nor solely an administrator to, the parliamentary executive. It is that, as Dvorin and 
Simmons write, “ The elected executive more often than not has a weak mandate. Large 
numbers of the populace are ineligible to vote and do not vote (eg. children, prisoners, 
the disabled, poorer citizens, etc). Most elections are decided by small percentages 
rather than overwhelming majorities. Many pressing issues are not debated, much less 
resolved, in the heat and bombast of modem electioneering.”25
24 Mulgan (1997) p. 147-48
25 Dvorin (1972 ) p. 38.
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Public service as an independent source of policy initiation and influence is needed, I 
argue, to ensure that the essential interests of the citizenry are protected and not subject 
to arbitrary influence. Public service is independent of government in the sense that it 
ought not to be subject to the pressures of political or electorate opinion26. Each citizen 
in a decent society should not only have their vital interests considered via their place 
within a political environment, but also within an environment that is professionally 
geared to track such interests (eg. to good health or biological functioning, to freedom 
from despair, to dehumanising treatment, etc). Serving the public will involve a 
commitment to protecting the essential interests of all.
26 The idea of essential interests utilitarianism I argue for is not intended as a guide for political action on the part of 
the elected representatives of parliament. Why do I hold this view? Parliamentary authority is constitutionally 
entrenched.The practice of legislative authority derives from what is permitted by the constitution. Legislative 
governance in a democracy is an open exercise of power. All citizens-irrespective of whom they voted for, have 
reason to respect the legitimacy of the government if their representation is determined by democratic vote and their 
programmes subject to institional checks and balances. For example, democratic governments must declare proposed 
legislation and subject it to public consultation, parliaments must meet regularly and publicly to address policy 
issues, and parliamentary privilege is granted to the peoples’ representatives so that they can speak freely. All are 
equal under the law.Despite these checks and balances, legislative power-holders or the parliamentary representatives 
derive their policies from various sources. There is the source of their engagement with the electorate at a party level. 
One dimension of the policy making process undertaken by politicians will be to produce policies that will further 
their own electoral interests. The nature of the party system is to group interests together for the sake of acquiring 
political clout. The support that funds and finances parties can expect to have a privileged voice for those parties that 
find themselves in government. Legislative governance is also greatly influenced by executive governance. Executive 
rule will use its own discretionary power in the day to day running of government. This will involve the formation of 
law that by-passes the legislative process. Executive orders are an example of this. But such orders are checked by 
expectation, namely that the law implemented will be in the spirit of laws legislatively processed. The government 
cabinet tends to lead policy direction to a far greater degree than in any other area of the party structure. The 
executive component of a government has ties and obligations to the international community both commercially and 
strategically in terms of international trade, defence and national security. Political parties dominate parliament—not 
individual members —and the hierarchical structure of such parties needs to be taken into account with any analysis 
of the nature of democratic governance. Traditionally, parties provide an indication of their policy programme prior 
to an election, and the voters can decide which programme to endorse. However, this practice has its limitations.
Some of the limitations of legislative governance were covered in the third chapter. Due to what I take to be the 
realities of power in modem democracies I do not hold that my account of essential interests, as a normative ideal to 
be institutionally or systematically entrenched, should be implemented within parliamentary parties as they undertake 
their legislative roles. It is an important substantive and symbolic feature of a democracy that the people are free to 
articulate their ideas and concerns as they see fit. The freedom to associate and formulate parties and policies of their 
own choosing is an important feature of a democratic order. An important role of the legislative is to represent the 
interests in the community. Members of Parliament must be effective in voicing the concerns of the people they 
represent. This representative role is best not morally constrained by formal networks, and should be performed 
largely along the lines of political strategy. Formally or systematically placing the moral constraint of human decency 
over all political actors and institutions at this level of organization would violate this important democratic principle. 
This is not to say that we shouldn’t hope that a concern for the essential interests of all will be expressed as a value 
from the grassroots level of political activity. It is also not to deny that my account of essential interests is not 
universal, for the affirmation of universality is a crucial aspect of that theory. Utilitarians will hold that all rational 
agents, irrespective of their subjective associations have reason to recognise their utilitarian moral obligations. 
Welfare interests, as we saw in the previous chapter, are of universal moral concern. But at the level of institutional 
design on which this chapter is based, I do not see any feasible role for the instantiation of utilitarian decency at the 
level of legislative governance as that role is undertaken by political representatives. This is not to deny that we ought 
to seek to put moral restraints on elected representatives, but this is not the focus of my work.
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For the public service to be independent it has to be able to provide ‘impartial advice in 
the public interest.27. This means the public service should have some degree of 
autonomy in undertaking research, and its time and research emphasis is not to be 
limited to serving the political interests of parties. I hold that essential interests are a 
legitimate source of knowledge that public service officials can draw upon in exercising 
these roles. The previous chapters suggested ways in which the state could protect the 
salient interest of persons and sentient beings. But, at the same time, it is important to 
note that the discerning role played by the public service here will not constitute 
arbitrary rule if such a role is constrained, firstly, by a robust public service ethos. Here, 
the practioners of the public service themselves can be expected to keep each other in 
check, ensuring that essential interests are served and not private interests. But, in more 
official terms, a public service permitted to undertake public action in the name of 
serving essential interests will be kept in check and prevented from arbitrary incursions 
on others by the checks and balances of law and institutional review. Performance in the 
public service is closely monitored and assessed in order to ensure that the use of public 
power is held to account, and the pursuance of essential interests on the part of public 
service activists will be subject to the same processes.
The autonomy of the public service as a decision-influencing organization will also be 
found in the degree to which certain public officials will be able to identify and seek 
information pertaining to essential interests. In order to identify what essential interests 
are public service officials will be expected to gather information from, and seek the 
advice of, the professional communities that are concerned with the basic needs of 
people. The ability of public officials to liaise effectively with these professional groups 
will be a crucial part of responsible decision making by the state. Given that policy- 
influencing public officials are required to be well educated and trained in the areas 
relevant to their responsibilities, the ability to engage effectively with outside 
professional groups should be well established. It is important to note that public service 
officials are not expected to provide a definitive judgment about essential interests
27 Gerald Caiden (1996 p. 25) also points out that policy making bureaucrats will have conflicting loyalties. They will 
have loyalties to profession, ministers, the constitution, class, personal ideology, and nation. I acknowledge that 
bureaucrats will have their conflicting loyalties, but I set out here the nature of their duty to humanity —their duty to 
promote decency. See Dolan, J and Rosenbloom, D.H (2003) for the theme of public service and the influence of 
personal experience.
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themselves. Rather, their role is to be aware of their responsibility to prioritise such 
interests and gather thorough evidence and support from the professional community as 
to what they are. Public officials need to be conscious of the importance of highlighting 
the importance of such interests in the public policy processes it undertakes with 
governments. These officials will be called upon to consult on a wide basis with the 
relevant sectors of society and engage with civic institutions such as universities and 
libraries so as to present detailed information of the extent to which essential interests 
need to be satisfied or the extent to which they are falling short of being satisfied.
Of course, public service officials will have other responsibilities when it comes to 
prioritising issues for institutional deliberation by the state. As we have seen, they have 
a responsibility to be sensitive to the policy programmes of the government. They will 
also have a general responsibility to respect the autonomy rights of the people affected 
by state action. An autonomy right is not necessarily an essential interest. I may have a 
right to make choices for myself without undue interference from others, but it is not 
clear that the denial of this right would lead to the detriment of my basic biological 
functioning. Under western democratic ideals the denial of such a right may well lead to 
the biological detriment of agents, but it is not as clear cut as say the effects that the 
denial of food and clean water has on such functioning. However, autonomy rights are 
highly valued in western democracies and the state is compelled (sometimes legally) to 
treat such rights with respect.
The issue I want to raise briefly is the nature of the relationship between autonomy 
rights and essential interests? For instance, can we know how to assess autonomy rights 
and essential interests if they were to compete against each other in a particular decision 
scenario? For example, parents possess the right to choose what disciplinary action they 
may take towards their children consistent with the law. But, it is arguable that a child’s 
development may be better enhanced by non-violent forms of discipline. Here we have 
a case where the autonomy of parents may conflict with the essential interests of 
children. Which one ought to prevail? The answer I present is that the relationship 
between autonomy rights and essential interests is not a zero-sum game in this context. 
Neither is it so in a case where the essential interests of a hospital patient could be
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satisfied if the autonomy of another citizen was violated by their being forced to give 
blood to that patient. It is vital that the autonomy of citizens is respected. People have a 
prima facie right to their own dignity as self-determining agents Equally, it is important 
that the essential interests of all are sufficiently catered for. I argue that in western 
democracies there is good reason to hold that both autonomy and essential interests 
should be protected. The state here through its public officials can, as I will mention in 
the next section, educate parents as to alternative/non-violent ways of disciplining their 
children. Likewise, they can inform citizens of the need to supply blood to those in need 
of transfusions. The autonomy of citizens and essential interests of all can be respected 
by the state carrying out an advisory role in such a manner.
6.5 Examples of Public Service Discernment
In what areas of life would we expect a discerning state to take on the responsibility of 
protecting essential interests? What areas of social life will be feasible one’s for state 
action in this sense? Here are some examples. Take the case of the state in New Zealand 
providing post-natal clinics for women prisoners. The rationale here is that the first 
eighteen months of a child’s life are crucial for the child’s long-term physiological 
development. Breast-feeding, for example, from the natural mother is essential for the 
transference of nutrients that will assist the development of the child’s immune system. 
What is more, there is a sense in which the natural birth mother deserves to nurture her 
child after giving birth. Child bearing is obviously not a necessary function of being a 
woman; but it is an essential capacity of a woman’s body and once realised it is vital for 
well-being.
The policy making process in place to determine how women prisoners should be 
treated by the state ought to privilege the natural welfare of the women and children in 
its care and under its responsibility. It should not be the case that the debate is thrust 
open for all to contest the allocation of state funds to corrections systems. Those who 
hold the view that post-natal clinics would be considered a luxury to prisoners and the
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money spent instead on harsh work schemes should have their input relegated in a 
deliberative process. State policy officials should feel no restriction in promulgating that 
they are doing what is morally permitted of them in these circumstances —doing what is 
accordance with the essential interests of those subject to their authority.
Other examples of creating a decent society by protecting natural functioning can be 
found. There will be physiological limits on how much driving hours a truck driver can 
fit into a day. Such limits must be ensured to prevail by a decent state when it reviews 
the negotiations between unions and transport corporations. Likewise, there will be 
natural or physiological facts about the digestive needs of workers that will rule out 
arguments in a contestatory process that seek to regulate toilet breaks to fixed times. 
The examples go on to include the protection of conditions that protect the vital human 
functioning of individuals. One method of disciplining children is by smacking. It is in 
the interests of children to be disciplined by their parents to avoid behaviour that may 
be detrimental to their overall welfare (e.g. children have to learn not to run out onto the 
road or not to display rude behaviour). Yet under my account, although smacking may 
be effective in producing a proper behaving child it may not produce a child with self­
esteem. Smacking, it can be argued, is an act of violence that is inimical to the overall 
welfare of children and is harmful to their interests. The state here need not take steps to 
legislate against smacking, but could instead educate parents about alternative and more 
effective forms of punishment.
Enlightened public servants would be able to draw on anthropological data to support 
their case for providing alternatives to violence as a means of discipline. For example, 
the Inuit of the Canadian Northwest territories have enshrined in their culture non­
violent conflict resolution. Their attitudes to volatility, fear, anxiety and their use of 
positive emotions act as the ultimate ends of their social being. Incorporated into this 
are different conceptions of masculinity and maternalism that are vital to the parent 
child relationship. By drawing on such material, public officials can offer valuable 
alternatives within a policy debate about the nature discipline. Of course, not only can 
they point to alternative anthropological cases, but they can also point to knowledge 
within child psychology.
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Take the basic requirements of nutrition, sanitation and clean water needed for effective 
biological functioning. Or take the view that good health—good biological functioning 
that is conducive to better long term prospects in terms of health and well-being —is 
owed to individuals by the state promulgating the benefits of regular and frequent 
exercise. Or the issue of noise levels that are detrimental to children’s hearing (as well 
as adult hearing). The state can be expected to work on the assumption that ‘the hearing 
life’ is better than ‘a deaf life’. A decent state would be expected to favour the view 
when facing the possibilities of putting restrictions on the production of children’s toys, 
that good hearing is an essential precondition of an enjoyable life, and market interests 
will be subservient to such vital interests in any deliberative processes.
Let me give another example of a state arrangement that is potentially harmful to the 
vital interests of children. In New Zealand, the Advertising Standards Authority is the 
first port of call for those who wish to complain about the content of adverts on 
television, radio, newspapers or magazines. The Authority is constituted by the 
following representatives: two members of the public, ministerial appointment, five 
market representatives from television, magazines, radio, etc. Is such a board well 
equipped to protect the vital interests of children? Is the representation on the board 
likely to favour deliberation that includes an informed insight into the psychological 
needs of children and the effects that advertising has on these? It seems very doubtful 
that it does. A civil service geared towards protecting such vital interest—a civil service 
that is substantively civil—is one that would include the appointment of an expert in the 
field of child psychology to such an authority. The dominance of commercial interests 
in the make up of this board is insufficient to ensure a decent society.
These issues will have implications for the state when it comes to deciding which 
arguments to favour over the issue of advertising for children. Fast food companies 
target children in their advertising and the subsequent affects on child health and 
education can be of concern. That is, influences to the extent of pressuring children to 
consume in the areas of fast food. Lobby groups point out the dangers of excessive 
advertising along these lines during prime time viewing for children. Both parties will
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come together in contestation under the umbrella of the state: the lobby groups seeking 
to regulate the actions of the commercial market in targeting children. Commercial 
interests will seek to inculcate in children traits conducive to profit-maximization.
Here are some examples of public policies initiated by the public service. Gifford 
Pinchot was the chief bureaucrat in the US Department of Agriculture in 190528. 
Pinchot initiated a campaign to shift the forest reserves from the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Interior to his department. He argued that the Agriculture Department 
was better equipped to protect the forests in the public interests; namely to protect them 
from the misuse of the resource by loggers miners and ranch owners. Pinchot proposed 
putting fees on the latter to discourage over use of the resources. Pinchot sold this 
policy proposal to the scientific community and the media, and gradually gained 
support for it in the House of Representatives.
Or take the case of Harvey Wiley29. He was the chief of the United States Drug 
Authority’s chemistry Bureau in 1905. Wiley initiated and proposed a drug Bill that 
sought to regulate the safety of food and drug products. Wiley gained support for his 
initiatives from various non-government associations and convinced members of the 
House of Representatives to turn the bill into law. Wiley also campaigned against the 
use of caffeine in Coca-Cola, and his public mission resulted in the company reducing 
the quantity of the drug used in its product. In both the cases just stated, and in the case 
involving Pinchot, we can see how a leading bureaucratic official was able to propose 
and influence policy formation. Decency will have pedagogical impact- public officials 
will be called on to promulgate their role of maintaining and protecting decency as non­
misery in society.
Actions such as these are what Paul Dugdale refers to as insider activism, as opposed to 
the influence placed on governments and the public service by external organizations 
such as lobby and interest groups, community organizations and private citizens30. He 
argues that public service activism takes many forms and can be identified by an
28 See Carpenter (2001) p.l for this example.
29 ibid. p. 2.
3(1 See Dugdale in Yeatman (1998).
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affiliation between an autonomous professional ethic to pursue ‘the good’ for people 
under their jurisdiction, and a duty to respect the administrative functions that the 
constitution binds them to31. The forms that this type of activism can take can be less 
overt that the direct policy initiatives stated in the cases above. It can, for example, take 
the form of a public servant making contact with and feeding policy information to a 
specific interest group, or increasing the capability of such a group participating in the 
policy process. This would involve using professional discretion as it would target and 
promote one sector of interests. But such discretion would be justified if the actions can 
be explained in terms of promoting essential interests. This may involve making the 
processes of government deliberation more culturally sensitive to indigenous groups, or 
more open to different sectors of the socio-economic community such as gangs, 
prostitutes or other groups alienated from normal government procedures32.
Insider activism can take other forms as well. It may not necessarily take the form of 
direct policy initiation but might include performing a critical response to proposed 
legislation. Autonomous professionalism implies, I argue, the capacity to promote 
universally reasonable ideals concerning human needs. If a proposed policy threatens to 
disadvantage the vulnerable then public servants are justified in speaking out against the 
viability of the policy proposal on the bases of its potential harm. For example, a 
government proposal to make funding for child health care centres more favourable to 
working parents rather than to non-working one’s who value such a service for the 
provision of needs rather than the facilitation of work33, could legitimately be argued 
against, by public servants, on the basis of its indecency.
Another aspect of the critical approach involved with public service activism can take 
the form of whistleblowing. In serving the public interest an official must be able to 
whistleblow without fear. But officials can only whistleblow if certain conditions are in 
place: 1. You can only whistleblow if, the public is not being fully informed. Once the 
information that would have been suppressed prior to the whistleblowing is out and 
transferred to the relevant parties, then it is up to the democratic process to settle the
31 Ibid, p 107.
32 See Yeatman (1998) p. 7.
33 See Brennan (1998) p. 96.
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issue34 “..the public servant, even qua trustee, must bow to the popular will, suitably 
informed and emphatically expressed. ” 35 People’s interests are at their core “settled, 
reflectively-endorsed preferences. ” 36 The need to balance these considerations is a 
crucial skill for all relevant practitioners.
In the case of legal breach, the assessment of whether the corresponding whistleblowing 
is justified is clear cut. We can asses whether the whistleblower had good reason for 
believing that a law was being broken. In the case of whistleblowing ion the basis of 
full information the issue may not be so clear cut. How does a whistleblower know 
which information being kept from public disclosure should be publicly exposed? On 
what basis is a whistleblower in a justified position to make such an assessment. The 
ambiguity here would need to be assessed on a case by case basis, but I hold that at least 
one form of justification for the public disclosure of private information can be 
performed on the basis of protecting the essential interests of others. A psychiatric 
nurse, for example, may have expressed his/her concerns about the release of a patient 
within the formal structures of a public department. However, if the department still 
permits a patient to be released from the institution’s care and the nurse believes, on 
his/her professional assessment, that the patient will still pose a threat to public safety, 
then whistleblowing will be justified.
Essential human interests can be applied at many levels. It ought to be a common moral 
concern between individuals, between communities and between the ways the state 
relates to and treats its citizenry. This thesis is concerned only with the last 
application—the way in which the state is obligated to protect and enhance essential 
interests and the way it might go about doing so through its institutional practices.
Examples of where the promotion of essential interests is required may apply in more 
opaque situations. Take the case of where the government proposes to stop subsiding 
public housing and instead pass over the leasing of state houses to private ownership at 
market rates. What sort of advice from the civil service is legitimate advice? I argue that
34 see Goodin. (1998) p 328
35 ibid. p. 329.
36 Ibid.
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it is legitimate for civil service policy makers to argue against such a scheme on the 
basis that it would cause serious stress to people in disadvantaged circumstances. Or 
what if the government proposed to rapidly cut welfare payments? It is legitimate (and 
obligatory) for civil service policy makers to show the serious effects this will have for 
these people and future generations. The implications for the creation of an 
impoverished sector of society would negatively affect the society in which this 
happens.
A public service geared to protect essential interests could also promote anti-smoking. 
Partialism will not be committed and neutrality will not be violated if public servants 
favour the overwhelming scientific evidence that points to a relations between smoking 
and lung and heart disease. Favouring such information in its dialogical engagement 
with citizens and interests groups would see the state promoting the health interest of 
the vulnerable, which would include children exposed to passive smoke. The damaging 
effects of smoking go further to inhibit the psychological development of children who 
smoke themselves and experience the state of addiction; a psychological state that is 
highly likely to impair educational development.
The environment will also fall under the category under discussion. Humans need fresh 
air and reliable eco-systems; they need to perform basic biological or physiological 
functions such as digesting, nurturing their young and being nurtured as youth37. While 
it is a fact that environmental awareness has come about due to the protest and lobbying 
of people outside of state (or loosely associated with the state through universities), it 
seems unreasonable to say that environmental protection is not a core concern of the 
state itself if it is to be obligated to protect basic human functioning. If we need 
anything we need fresh air, clean, water and good food. A state concerned with decency 
is going to be one geared towards promoting these facts against the competing interests 
of those with short-term goals that are inimical to sound environmental principles. Pettit 
sees this point but of course, as I argue in this thesis, he does not see that this should be 
a requirement of a decent state; rather he sees it as a way of increasing non-domination. 
Yet, I reiterate, it sounds odd to say that we protect the environment on the basis that its
37 See Watkin (1963 )
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protection enables me to have more undominated choice. It sounds more suitable, I 
argue, to explain the value of protecting the environment in terms of protecting basic 
human functioning —states of being that are intrinsically good for humans— and not in 
terms of the value it may give to the quality of a choice-matrix.
6.6 Essential Interests and Judicial Governance.
The judiciary is also an area in which the utilitarian understanding of essential interests 
and the notion of conscientiousness can play a role in the service of the public good. An 
important dimension of democratic governance is found with the judiciary. At work 
here is the notion of the separation of powers. Power or authority is decentralised and 
spread by the constitutional provision for the judiciary to make law itself. Judicial 
authority holds its place within a democratic system so as to combat the centralization 
of power in the legislature.
Decisions of legal consequence are made at different levels within the institutions of the 
state38, but here I wish to focus exclusively on the legal decisions made by the judiciary. 
The function of the judiciary is to “ interpret and apply the law laid down in 
parliamentary statutes and in the precedents of the common law.”39. The judiciary is an 
institution that ensures that all governance —whether legislative, judicial or public 
service orientated—is carried out in accordance with the law. The ‘rule of law’ rather 
than ‘the arbitrary rule of persons’ is, as we have seen, a strong liberal and republican 
tenet, and it ensures the protection of individual rights against state power via 
constitutional rights, and in some cases a bill of rights. The notion of judicial 
independence is a strong democratic principle linked with this ideal of protection. For 
instance, elected representatives must not interfere with judicial decision-making. The 
judiciary is expected to rule on matters of law without fear or favour. Judges also have 
to be free from suspicion in terms of ruling on the basis of vested interests.
38 See Kagan (1984) p. 816.
39 Mulgan (1997) p. 155.
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The main decision making role of judges is that of adjudication in civil, criminal and 
statutory contexts. In fulfilling this adjudicatory function, and in acting independently, 
judicial decisions must be based on legal reasons. This has different dimensions. One is 
that all legal adjudication must follow legal procedures as established by the 
constitutional jurisdiction set. Another is that the justification of judicial rulings can 
only be expressed with reference to the law, and that such rulings are expected to be 
consistent with previous rulings in similar cases pertaining to the one under 
consideration. In the latter sense, judges not only adjudicate according to law but also 
make law in the form of common law rulings in civil and criminal cases.
However, judicial decision will also involve a certain amount of discretion and this is 
the area upon which I will focus. Discretion arises for judges in their rulings where 
there is no clear legal standards guiding their decisions. It is up for debate about 
whether this is an unintended feature of the law itself or whether discretion is an 
integral part of any legal function40. However, uncertainty about how judges ought to 
rule in certain contexts is a common feature of their adjudicatory function.
There are established guidelines for how judges can respond to such uncertainty. The 
common law guide is one example. Judges can turn to precedent to justify their 
application of a ‘created law’ when there is no existing law pertaining to the specifics of 
the case under consideration. This precedence-guide kicks in when such imprecision 
applies and judges are bound to follow decisions made by other courts on similar 
matters where the jurisdiction is the same or higher. Judges, in other words, must 
adjudicate consistently with established law and can only make new law ‘with 
reference’ to existing law.
Another established guide for judicial decision-making in the presence of uncertainty is 
that of doctrine of referral. Here there is a standard guide for judges when they are in 
doubt about the how to proceed with a ruling. In the presence of such doubt, judges 
have the power to, and are expected to, refer the decision to its parliamentary source.
40 See Arthur, J (1995)
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The following case illustrates the restraint of legislative referral. The example has to do 
with the provision of benefit eligibility for pregnant women. The Social Security Act 
made no reference to benefit entitlements for pregnant women. Again, the legislation 
was interpreted to include “the unborn in the act’s definition of dependent children’41. 
The spirit of the act was interpreted in such a way as to cater for the needs of the 
vulnerable. Proper prenatal care is vital to the physical and mental well-being of 
children, and that the needs of the mother and child are greater before the time of birth 
than any other time42.
Sometimes uncertainty about how to adjudicate can be overcome by a contemporary 
assessment of modem, community standards, or what we might call the ‘communitarian 
guide’. An example of this restraint is the following. In the case of Riggs versus Palmer 
there existed no statute guidance, precedence or referral option for a judicial ruling. In 
this case, a grandson who was convicted of killing his grandfather claimed the 
inheritance legally due to him as a result of his grandfather’s death. The judge 
considered the morality of legally granting an inheritance to the person convicted of the 
death of possessor of the will. The standard justification to this case is that public 
standards would not allow the inheritance to take place. But there is also a sense in 
which the judge could have been said to act with the guidance of the rule of 
unconscionability. Outcomes, according to this rule, cannot prevail where they produce 
conditions that violate our sense of reasonableness and decency. This rule is central to 
one aspect of the operation of equity law, and the account I give here of utilitarian 
essential interests is intended as a contribution to the task of determining conditions and 
outcomes that are unconscionable from the judicial viewpoint.
The guidelines stated above for judicial decision-making in the face of uncertainty 
enable judges to use the law to produce fair outcomes. But there is another realm of 
uncertainty that faces judges in their adjudicatory role. This is where there is no clear 
guide for referral to any of the above avenues, and where the judge is empowered to 
make a judgment on the basis of possessing discretionary power. Having discretionary
41 Melnick (1994) p. 101.
42 See the following cases: Carver vs Hooker (1974); Parks v. Hardin (1974); Wilson v. Weaver (1974.
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power is inextricably linked with the possession of autonomy that enables a decision 
maker to make a free, or formally unrestricted, choice between options. The possession 
of discretionary power by judges is what some opponents of judicial activism fear most. 
The fear is that if judges have such discretionary power then they will make legal 
rulings based on personal interests, and not on matters to do with what are just for all 
those concerned.
I want to refer here to a distinction made by Kenneth Davies between the ‘possession of 
the power to decide according to discretion’ and ‘exercising discretion’43. The two may 
sound similar if not the same, but there is, according to Davies, an important difference 
between the two. Possessing discretionary power is committed, as I stated above, with 
the idea of unfettered choice, whereas the capacity to ‘exercise discretion’ is not 
necessarily linked with this ideal of autonomy. Exercising discretion can be performed 
under certain constraints, for example ‘prudence constraints’, which in themselves do 
not leave the decision maker to decide as she/he wishes. Rather, the exercise of 
discretion is a feature of decision-making where the norms of prudence are expected to 
apply. Flexibility is granted to the decision maker but it is not unfettered flexibility. The 
flexibility of decision making needs to be used diligently by the decision maker with 
respect for certain norms.
Why do the likes of judges need such flexibility in their decision-making capacity. The 
provision of flexibility is granted to judges on the basis that such an allowance enables a 
judge to produce just outcomes according to the nature of the circumstances in each 
case, or to effectively produce equity for all parties involved. Examples of the use of 
such discretion are found in the flexibility granted to judges in making decisions 
involving sentencing. The discretion whether to impose maximum sentences or a 
sentence less than this due to mitigating circumstances is the best of ensuring that just 
and equitable outcomes are reached. Discretion about the extent to which penalties or 
standards are imposed are spread throughout the judicial rule (eg. whether to suspend or
43 See Davies (1969) p. 4.
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revoke licences, adjudicating in favour of ‘minimum procedural protection” in official 
proceeding or maximal one’s, etc.44
From this we can see that the use of discretion on the part of judges is limited or 
regulated by a ‘justice constraint’. Flexibility in decision making is justified within 
judicial adjudication on the basis of enabling those decisions to meet the requirements 
of equitable outcomes for all. We can think of other justice constraints on the exercise 
of discretion such as the constraint of the right of parties to appeal decisions, that the 
judge must state reasons for why she/he used her/his discretionary power in the way 
she/he did, that the judge must make the decision within a particular time period, 
constitutionally created supervision of those who are making discretionary judgments, 
and so on.
The exercise of discretion on the part of judges performing their adjudicatory role can 
be guided by essential interests given that they are expected to lead the application of 
the law to just outcomes. In other words, I hold that the exercise of discretion can be 
justified on the basis that it serves the utilitarian essential interests that I covered in the 
previous chapter. The tenets of these essential interests can serve as another constraint 
on the exercise of discretionary, judicial decisions.
I hold that we can get an indication of the use of essential interests guidelines from the 
following cases. Take the case of V.C v M.B (2000) where the New Jersey Supreme 
Court initiated the term ‘psychological parent’ so as to allow a lesbian to apply for 
visitation rights and custody of the biological children of her former partner. The court 
here invents a new term so as to allow a non-biological, lesbian parent to have the same 
status of an adoptive parent due to the psychological attachment that it is reasonable to 
expect such a woman to have towards her children. It can be plausibly argued that the 
court sought to empower this woman legally so as to avoid the suffering that she could 
reasonably be said to experience if she were to have no such legal statutes with relation 
to her children, and the potential suffering that the child may undergo is denied access 
to continued contact with its psychological parent.
44 Ibid. p. 23.
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The following case reflects the eclectic nature of some forms of judicial decision 
making. Here is an example that shows the eclectic sources of judicial decision­
making. In Brown v. Board of Education (1954) the United States Supreme Court acted 
so as to make education policy consistent with the 14th Amendment that requires ‘equal 
protection’ under the law for all. The education system in Topeka, Kansas in the 1950’s 
was legally entitled to enforce the segregation of black and white students. This was 
based on a ruling in a 1896 case (Plussy v. Ferguson) where the court ruled that 
segregated rail travel did not violate a citizen’s constitutional right to freedom from 
slavery, nor from equal protection under the law to enjoy “life, liberty or property.” or 
the right to enjoy the privileges of citizens. Segregated functioning in the community 
still meant that each could pursue their own lives, but it meant that blacks and whites 
had to do it separately from each other.
Linda Brown was a young black student living in Topeka, Kansas in 1954. Due to the 
segregated education system in that state, she had to bus five miles to school each day 
even through a public school was located only a few blocks from her place of residence. 
A suit was filed entitled Brown v Board of Education. The suit argued that racial 
segregation within the education system deprived “the plaintiffs of the equal protection 
of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.”
The United States Supreme Court based a part of its ruling on a legal-historical 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. It ruled that the “history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is inconclusive as to its intended effect on public education.” It also ruled 
partly on a communitarian consideration. It ruled that “The question presented in these 
cases must be determined not on the basis of conditions existing when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted, but in the light of the full development of public education 
and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.” (My emphasis).
However, there is another interesting dimension to the court’s ruling in this case. The 
court ruled that segregation based on race created a sense of inferiority for black 
children. This sense of inferiority, the court went on to rule, is contrary to the
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educational development of children. To quote the ruling, “A sense of inferiority affects 
the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a 
tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of Negro children and to 
deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school 
system.” “To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because 
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that 
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.’
The court justified this position with reference to the findings of the ‘modern authority’ 
of psychological knowledge. But in turning to these findings —in turning to what the 
academic community’s findings about children and their educational development—the 
court was assigning a privileged status to certain facts about persons that outweighed 
other facts. For example, it was implicitly implied in the ruling that other facts such as 
the psychological sense of security that members of the dominant white community 
would receive from the maintenance of a segregated education system, were of less 
relevance than the salient facts pointing to the likely of inferiority felt by black children. 
Here, the judiciary used its discretion to favour the essential interests of children over 
the welfare of the pro-segregationists.
The Supreme Court in this case ruled according to the dictates of the legal and 
communitarian restrictions of judicial activism. But it also ruled on the basis of a 
concern for decency-for a concern to give people what they deserve qua their interests 
in fulfilling their biological functioning and to respect their dignity as persons. The 
court chose these areas over those of others, and in the sense of ruling in terms of 
‘giving people what they deserve qua their biology’ I argue that the court is ruling under 
the influence of a moral constraint. In particular, as it should now be clear, it is a moral 
constraint based on the utilitarian concern to give individuals the best chance of 
developing ideal pleasures (to enable their personal autonomy to flourish) and avoiding 
unnecessary suffering in their lives. The Court sided with and favoured the 
conscientious position with regard to this matter.
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6.7 Essential Interests and Judicial Independence
I have argued that the judiciary can legitimately favour a utilitarian approach to the use 
its discretionary power. The exercise of such power is justified on the basis of 
producing outcomes that realise not necessarily general welfare, as this would express 
an exclusively broad and majoritarian notion of utilitarianism concerned with total 
welfare45, but salient forms of welfare for all those whose essential interests are most at 
risk in a particular context. A consequence of a utilitarian understanding of law, based 
on the notion of pro-welfare outcomes, also has implications for how we should think 
about the idea of judicial independence. I will set out a way in which judicial 
independence has been conceived in the past where unconscionable outcomes were 
permitted by state action. I will show how the principled stand of protecting essential 
interests could have been adopted by the judiciary in this case so as to avoid reaching 
this interpretation of independence. Judicial independence has been interpreted in 
various ways, but one of the most interesting ways in which it has been interpreted is in 
the way the South African judiciary saw itself during the apartheid years. My account of 
utilitarian essential interests can give the judiciary a way to think of its own 
independence in contrast to the contingent powers granted from the source of 
parliamentary sovereignity. The following scenario illustrates this point.
The South African Supreme Court after the formation of the Republic in 1961 had a 
unique view of its own independence. Their ethos of judicial independence was based 
on the view, directed by the constitutional relationship that the judiciary had with the 
legislative branch, that their rulings were to made in line with their legal duty to respect 
the supremacy of parliament as the law making body in the Republic. An implication of 
this was that the judiciary recognized that statute law outweighed common law 
principles when the two came into conflict. The latter would have committed the 
judiciary to a different source of legal guidance, a source that was imbedded in the 
history of the legal traditions behind the Republic, and not the parliament per se. For 
example, it has been argued that the South African judiciary the 1961 constitution still
45 It is on this point that I distinguish my account of ideal preference utilitarian from the total utilitarian notion of law 
defended by Arthur (1995) p. 108.
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retained the power to turn to common law principles, deriving from the Dutch-Roman 
legal traditions, that would have included “the presumption that statute should be 
interpreted so as to give maximum effect to individual liberty and the presumption that 
statute should be interpreted so as to give maximum effect to a principle of equality of 
all individuals before the law. ” 46
Dyzenhaus argues that the South African judiciary did not side with this normative 
approach to statute interpretation, when statute interpretation was ambiguous, because 
the judiciary thought that to do so would violate their constitutional duty to respect the 
supremacy of parliament as the law making body in the Republic, and that such a 
normative interpretation in favour of the independence of the common law principles of 
equity would involve committing a moral decision, a decision that judges are not 
permitted to make given their independence47. In short, the judges were reluctant to 
favour moral norms over legal and constitutional one’s.
Before showing how my account of essential interests could have justified the 
discretionary favour of a moral norm over a legal one and, in doing so, maintained the 
independence of the judiciary, I want to deal with the view that what the judges 
committed in holding to the above view was a failure of legal and not moral reasoning. 
The argument could be put that the judges in the apartheid Republic failed to recognize 
that judicial independence empowered them to use common law principles as a 
guideline to statute interpretation. While it is plausible to say that the South African 
judiciary was mistaken to define judicial independence so narrowly in this case, it 
should not be forgotten that judicial independence itself is a contested notion. The fact 
that the South African judiciary did legitimately interpret their independence in this way 
and adopted the style of statute interpretation that they did, even though such a strategy 
allowed the oppressive apartheid regime to flourish, shows that the use of legal 
reasoning can be used to justify different accounts of judicial independence.
46 See Dyzenhaus (1998) p. 15.
47 Ibid. p. 16.
195
In what sense, then, could the South African judiciary have made a moral decision to 
favour the principle of equity above parliamentary intent when it was confronted with 
ambiguity when interpreting statute? I argue that the judiciary could have made such a 
moral decision based on the impersonal consideration of essential interests that I have 
set out, and the adoption of such tenets would not violate the judiciary’s status as an 
independent and neutral branch of government. The maxim that the judges could have 
adopted was that the move from statute law to common law is justified when the ‘plain 
fact’ approach to statute law would involve detrimental levels of human suffering.
There are examples from the rulings of South African judges that show that they were 
doubtful whether the ‘good’ intended by the parliament in creating housing and 
movement zones in apartheid South Africa would result in effect goods for the people to 
whom it would apply48. The judges in these cases sided with parliamentary intent even 
though they held these doubts, but the existence of the doubts themselves shows that the 
judiciary can reason critically independently from the functions of parliament. The 
reasons why the South African judiciary did not challenge the supremacy of parliament 
are varied, and are not restricted to moral considerations only. The political and social 
feasibility of the judiciary overriding parliamentary intent may have thrown South 
African society into turmoil. Maybe such turmoil would have been edifying for society 
in this context, the foundations of apartheid themselves would have been severely 
shaken. Such political and sociological issues do not directly concern me here. My task 
is to show that the judiciary did and could have, if it had so wished, implemented the 
concerns about human decency whilst retaining its status of judicial independence. I 
have shown how the judiciary did make evaluative speculations about the consequences 
of apartheid law even if they eventually sided with parliamentary intent by facilitating 
the effective functioning of such law. The fact that the judges could have articulated 
such concerns shows that they could have promulgated in their rulings, concerns for the 
well-being of the coerced even when such concerns may not have been adequately 
considered by the parliament. In this sense, the judiciary can contribute to public 
discussions about decency and the rights of the coerced. The promulgation of the 
standards of decency is often used by judges in the Western legal tradition when they
48 See Dysenhaus (1998) pp. 17-18 where he refers to the case of Minister of Interior v. Lockhat (1961).
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make reference in their rulings to the conditions that maintain the fabric of a society. 
Judicial officers can be decent by exercising enlightened, practical reasoning.
SUMMARY
In this chapter I have shown how essential interests can be applied within the public 
service. I have given reasons for why the public service ought to take on the moral 
responsibility of overtly protecting essential interests in conjunction with its 
constitutional obligations. To facilitate this process, I have set out the basic tenets of 
conscience utilitarianism. Here public officials ought to develop for themselves a 
professional framework of moral consideration that prioritises the protection of essential 
interests for all. Likewise, public institutions should create workplace environments 
conducive to enlightened deliberation towards this goal. Public officials have many 
roles and duties and are called upon to use their professional insight to find a balance 
between each. However, the balancing of such roles and duties can take different forms 
under the watch of professional standards. Some may, for example, order conflicting 
roles and duties in favour of efficiency, economic growth or political prudence. But, I 
have argued, public service professionals have a moral obligation to balance here in 
favour of the overall outcome of protecting essential interests. Such a commitment, 
however, is not held in isolation from the other responsibilities that public servants 
have, nor is the implementation of the protection of essential interests to be undertaken 
in a covert manner. The major actions of public servants ought to be subject to the 
checking mechanisms that are integral to the operations of a fair and open society. I 
have argued, however, that public officials can adopt a morally discerning approach to 
their work in a way that does not violate these standards of fairness and openness. The 
examples I have presented in this chapter illustrate how public officials have promoted 
essential interests in this way. This thesis provides a theoretical framework for such 
actions and seeks to make the protection of such interests a tangible goal for public 
authority.
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CONCLUSION
In this thesis I have presented a case for why a concern for the essential interests of all 
should be incorporated into our normative thinking about politics. I have argued that 
this way of thinking about citizens needs a greater presence in this area of thinking, 
especially as much of the contemporary literature on political theory is dominated by 
the themes of political civility and civil proceduralism. I have set out a basic 
characterization of this concern for civility (chapter one) and focused on its prevalence 
in two major political idioms (chapters two and three). I have responded to these 
positions by challenging some of the assumptions made about the operation of such 
processes in a pluralistic environment (chapter four).
As a response to the analysis undertaken in chapter four, I presented an account of 
utilitarian essential interests (chapter five). Here I highlighted the need to think of 
individuals not only in their capacity as citizens bound by legal and institutional ties, 
but also as persons with essential biological and social needs. The status of citizenship 
is crucial for the protection of individuals in a political context, and this thesis does not 
challenge this ideal and its functions. However, citizenship can’t be the whole story. 
The formal relations between individuals and states based on the rights of citizenship do 
not, I have argued, sufficiently track the essential interests of persons. The reasons for 
why such a minimalist approach has been taken are various. One of the main reasons 
being the belief by liberals that the state should not concern itself with the substantive 
concerns of the citizenry, and instead limit itself to providing basic protections and the 
performance of neutral governance. This position has been tempered by the 
contributions of welfare liberals, however the overall emphasis has leaned in favour of 
individuals and groups enjoying structural and legal equality first and foremost. Liberal 
theory, in general, has limited itself to protecting rights and implementing outcomes that 
result from procedural origins.
Pettit’s republican thinking, I have shown, is presented in a similar fashion. Legitimate 
outcomes are generated as a result of deliberative processes where each participant
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enjoys a sufficient level of non-domination. Interests are tracked in Pettit’s republic by 
each having equal access to the mechanisms of contestatory democracy. But, I have 
argued, Pettit’s republicanism does not address the impact that power imbalances could 
have on such processes. A great deal of faith is placed by Pettit on the operation of ‘fair 
and inclusive’ deliberation between competing parties. I have argued, in response, that 
state institutions need to be better equipped to identify and protect the essential interests 
of all in the presence of such imbalances. The lack of a philosophical contribution in 
this area, I have also shown, is a concern with Sunstein’s account of republicanism.
The other forms of republicanism I have addressed in this thesis have acknowledged the 
importance of the state taking on the responsibility of pursuing more substantive 
outcomes for the citizenry in the name of the ‘common good’. Dagger and Sandel have 
argued that the state needs to show a greater awareness of the conditions that protect 
and enhance autonomy and self-government respectively. This move within 
republicanism is more in line with the pro-active strategy I endorse. However, my 
account of utilitarian essential interests presents a way of thinking about the relationship 
between individuals and the state that is not always bound by the relation of citizenship, 
and in this sense it differs from the approaches taken by Dagger and Sandel.
In the last chapter I covered ways in which essential interests could be applied within 
the public service. I showed that public service professionals, and the institution of the 
public service in general, ought to recognise a moral obligation to uphold and protect 
the essential interests of all that come under their jurisdiction. Actions consistent with 
such an obligation exist already in many areas of the public service, albeit covertly. The 
last chapter (chapter six) is presented in the spirit of bringing this moral obligation to 
the surface as an integral part of the public service ethos. The public service has many 
obligations, functions and roles and is influenced by differing social and political forces. 
In this sense the public service is a multifaceted institution. However, this thesis has 
argued that the institutions of the public service must be united by professional 
standards, one of which is to recognise and act on the moral obligation to protect and 
enhance essential interests.
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